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 There is a tension, allegedly, between traditional epistemology and standpoint 
epistemology. Traditional epistemologists, on the one hand, hold that knowledge is sensitive to 
epistemic (truth-conducive) features alone. By contrast, standpoint epistemologists argue that 
knowledge, in some cases, is sensitive to non-epistemic features related to the agent’s social 
identity. My goal here is to vindicate this thesis. Though the thesis of standpoint epistemology is 
controversial, it plays an important role in illuminating a phenomenon that emerges in our 
epistemic practices - epistemic oppression. Epistemic oppression occurs when an epistemic agent 
is excluded from the practices of knowledge production. If the aim of epistemology is to bring us 
closer to truth, then any practice that subverts this aim ought to be thoroughly investigated. 
However, as I will argue, our capacity to root out epistemic oppression is limited to the extent 
that we continue operating within the traditional epistemological framework. In this dissertation, 
I will argue that the traditional epistemologist can either acquiesce to the standpoint 





social identity, or consider social identity an epistemic feature. I further clarify the standpoint 
thesis, and examine why standpoint epistemology is able, where traditional epistemology fails, to 
understand epistemic oppression. I close by considering applications of the thesis to other 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
A father and son have a car accident and are both hurt badly. They are both taken to 
separate hospitals. When the boy is taken in for an operation, the surgeon says “I can not do 
the surgery because this is my son.” How is this possible?  
This riddle aptly captures the view that facts about one’s social conditions shape inquiry. Often 
people cannot solve this riddle because they’re unable to imagine that the surgeon is a woman. In 
this case, the surgeon is the boy’s mother.  
 That facts related to one’s social conditions shape inquiry is not a new idea, but it is a 
controversial one. Attempts by social epistemologists in general, and standpoint epistemologists 
in particular, to motivate the claim that features related to one’s social conditions are relevant to 
knowledge have been met with skepticism at best and great criticism at worst. My aim here is to 
legitimate the idea that social conditions, and in particular, social identity, can shape what one 
knows about the world.  
 To understand why these views have been met with such outrange, I propose that we start 
by thinking about traditional treatments of knowledge within academic discussions. The study of 
knowledge has a long and storied tradition in philosophy, reaching back to Plato, who is often 
said to be the first to analyze knowledge as justified, true belief.1 Such accounts have since been 
refuted, notably by Edmund Gettier (1963), who noted that justified true belief can, and often 
does, fall short of knowledge (in cases where we arrive at the belief by luck, for instance). But 
still, most accounts of knowledge share at their core an assumption that features relevant to 
knowledge are truth-conducive - that is, they are features that make it more likely that a belief is 
true. Such features include, for instance, justification, evidence, reliability, and so on. Following 
                                                
1 Plato seems to be hinting at such a definition in the Theaetetus at 201 and perhaps accepting one at Meno 98.  
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Jason Stanley (2005), I propose that we call those views that limit knowledge to such features 
intellectualist. Intellectualists hold that knowledge depends only on epistemic features - features 
like those listed above. It does not, they argue, depend on non-epistemic features - features which 
are not (straight-forwardly) truth-conducive.  
 Intellectualism has long been accepted as the standard view in epistemology. Plato 
defended it. Descartes held some version of it. Today, prominent thinkers such as Keith DeRose 
(2009), as well as Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (1985), offer up variations of knowledge 
rooted in this traditional view. Arguably, those who reject the role of intuition in knowledge, as 
well as those who reject the essentiality of indexicals, such as Josh Dever and Herman Cappelen 
(2014) are also committed to some version of the traditional view. I also suspect that eminent 
philosopher Paul Boghossian (2014), and perhaps too Thomas Nagel (1989), number among the 
intellectualists’ members.  
  This view is also fairly entrenched in our culture. The ‘Rational Racist’ is responding to 
facts, not race, and it’s his detractors who are led astray by their membership in marginalized 
groups. Popular television shows, like Dragnet, remind us to stick to “just the facts, ma’am”. In 
books, take The Talented Mr. Ripley, for instance, we see that ‘women’s intuition’ is regarded as 
distorting.  
 More significantly, this view is embedded in our social, legal, and healthcare institutions. 
Patricia Williams (1991), for instance, notes that a legal article she submitted for a symposium 
was initially rejected for including a reference to her race (Williams is a black woman), which 
violated their editorial policy. Likewise, Karen Jones (2002) discusses the case of a US judge 
who initially denied refugee status to a woman who fled her native Togo in order to escape 
female mutilation on the grounds that he took her testimony to ‘lack rationality’. Nancy Tuana 
 3 
(2006) has similarly examined the adverse impact of health care initiatives that fail to center 
women’s needs and instead treat the male body as the medical norm.  
 As the aim of epistemology is truth, we might be, for good reason, sympathetic to the 
analysis of knowledge as offered by the intellectualist. After all, if we’re concerned with 
acquiring truth and obtaining knowledge, shouldn’t we focus our attention on all and only those 
features that make truth and knowledge more likely?  
 Despite the distinguished pedigree of the traditional view, there are a number of 
important cases that intellectualism renders unintelligible. Consider, for instance, the following 
case, to which I will return later: 
Unwilling Barista: Elena is really looking forward to the in-house philosophy conference her 
department hosts every year, so she arrives bright and early, and in serious need of coffee. 
She greets her colleagues and bounds toward the coffee pot only to discover, after her first 
sip, no less, that this is yesterday’s coffee. So she brews a new pot. But when she returns for 
the much-anticipated cup, the pot is empty. It turns out that her fellow conference goers, all 
white men, really wanted coffee, too. Slightly annoyed, she mentions to her friend Preston 
how sexist it is that all the men waited for her to arrive and brew a fresh pot. But Preston 
replies “You’re overreacting - you see sexism everywhere! Isn’t it more likely that they just 
don’t know how to use the coffee pot?”  
Suppose that, in this situation, the behavior of Elena’s colleagues is in fact sexist. We will need 
an account that both explains why Elena knows this and why Preston fails to. As a standpoint 
epistemologist, I argue that this case is explained by appealing to facts about Elena’s social 
identity. That she is a woman, I submit, places her in a better position to know about what 
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behavior is (or counts as) sexist. Such a case is unintelligible by the traditional epistemologist’s 
standards. Or so I will argue. 
 Is it not possible that whether a person recognizes some piece of evidence as evidence 
depends on features that are non-epistemic? Does, for instance, your capacity to discover the 
answer to the riddle above depend on facts about your social environment?  
 In the US context, where our schema for ‘doctor’ and our schema for ‘woman’ conflict, 
it’s difficult to arrive at the correct answer. But in Russia, where most practicing physicians are 
women, I imagine this riddle is hardly a riddle at all (Ramakrishnan, Sambuco, and Jagsi 2014). 
If knowledge is sensitive to features like one’s social conditions, then it seems that the 
intellectualist is wrong. For it is the case that, in some instances, knowledge depends on features 
that are non-epistemic, features like your social identity. This is the claim I aim to motivate here.  
 Narrowing our investigation from social conditions, I will here offer a somewhat 
different analysis of knowledge that interrogates the relationship between knowledge and social 
identity. Standpoint epistemology, a theoretical framework that I develop and clarify, is the 
thesis that what a person is in a position to know depends on facts about her social identity.  
 In contrast to intellectualism, standpoint epistemology is a member of a family of views 
that hold that knowledge does depend on some non-epistemic features. For instance, where 
pragmatic encroachers argue that practical interests make knowledge more or less difficult, 
standpoint epistemologists argue that social identity makes knowledge more or less difficult.  
 I argue that the traditional view of epistemology must accommodate the claim that 
knowledge is sensitive to non-epistemic features related to one’s social identity. Primarily, I 
defend this claim because in committing to intellectualism, traditional epistemologists contribute 
to epistemic oppression.  
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 Epistemic oppression “refers to epistemic exclusions afforded positions and communities 
that produce deficiencies in social knowledge” (Dotson 2012: 24). Deficiencies in social 
knowledge include, for instance, hermeneutical gaps that result in marginalized knowers being 
incapable of understanding their own experiences2 (e.g. marital rape), as well as the inability of 
marginalized groups to share their knowledge because of identity prejudice3 (e.g. testimony 
regarding sexual assault is not taken seriously because women are viewed as hysterical and 
conniving). These epistemic exclusions disproportionately affect marginalized groups - women, 
people of color, gays and lesbians, and so on.  
 Here, for instance, are the options available to the traditional epistemologist who wishes 
to preserve the notion that knowledge is independent from non-epistemic features like social 
identity in the case of Unwilling Barista: 
i. Deny that Elena has knowledge. 
ii. Accept that Elena has knowledge, and argue that she has some evidence which Preston 
does not.  
If the traditional epistemologists pursues (i) then, I argue, he will have epistemically oppressed 
Elena by discounting as knowledge her testimony that her colleagues’ behavior is sexist. And I 
will argue that the traditional epistemologist cannot both pursue (ii) and maintain a commitment 
to intellectualism.  
 There is no account the traditional epistemologist can offer which explains why Elena has 
evidence that Preston does not which does appeal to facts about her social identity. That is, I 
suggest that any complete explanation will require that we appeal, somewhere down the road, to 
non-epistemic facts related to Elena’s social identity. Of course, work must be done to examine 
                                                
2 Fricker (1999) calls this a hermeneutical injustice. 
3 Fricker (2007) calls this a testimonial injustice. 
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precisely how, and why, it is the case that social identity impacts knowledge. That is what I set 
out to accomplish in these pages. 
 To be clear, this project is not an entirely new enterprise. The idea that knowledge is 
sensitive to features related to one’s social identity gained traction during the rise of second-
wave feminism during the 1960s, and interest continued well into the 1990s during third-wave 
feminism. During this time, the project was taken up by philosophers of science, who largely 
focused on examining how race and gender influence what research questions we ask, which 
hypotheses we’re most likely to entertain, and what theoretical presuppositions we bring to bear 
on our research. But beyond the philosophy of science, the project of standpoint epistemology 
has largely been abandoned in epistemology. Partly, this is because of the perceived tension 
between standpoint epistemology and traditional epistemology. I thus begin in chapter 1 by 
distinguishing the various assumptions that guide the traditional epistemologist. In undertaking 
this task, I hope to elucidate the source of the apparent tension between this school of thought 
and standpoint epistemology (and the various positions that might be associated with or share 
features similar to that of standpoint epistemology). Furthermore, gaining a better understanding 
of the basic commitments of the traditional epistemologist will allow us to better see why it is 
that our epistemic practices, as they exist in their current form, stand in need of revision.  
 Furthermore, despite the vast literature on the topic, standpoint epistemology, as a 
framework, is radically underdeveloped. Consequently, its role in making salient certain features 
of our epistemic practices - namely, epistemic oppression - have been largely ignored. My goal is 
to fill in the existing gaps, and in doing so, to make explicit how, and why, it is that existing 
epistemic practices facilitate certain forms of injustice. A large part of my project here is to offer 
a model of how the thesis of standpoint epistemology can be interpreted. Thus, in chapter 2, I 
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offer several interpretations of the bare thesis of standpoint epistemology. In this chapter, I begin 
by unpacking the general version of the standpoint thesis, and exploring the various other 
commitments of the view. Then, I offer two ways of filling out that general thesis. I begin my 
examining the material version of the thesis, before turning to an epistemic reading. I next show 
how each of these readings can be usefully applied to understand forms of epistemic injustice 
that have been discussed in the budding literature on epistemic oppression. I close this chapter by 
arguing that traditional epistemology, as defined above, not only makes these injustices opaque, 
but is itself a cause of epistemic oppression.  
 As I have discussed above, standpoint epistemology was abandoned, in part, because of 
the supposed tension between it and traditional epistemology. But the project was also 
abandoned because of difficulties in explaining some of the additional commitments of 
standpoint epistemology. Of particular concern is the standpoint epistemologist’s commitment to 
the epistemic privilege thesis. This thesis captures the notion that some knowers have better, 
more accurate knowledge because of their marginalized social positioning. The epistemic 
privilege thesis has been widely resisted, by mainstream and feminist epistemologists alike. In 
chapter three, I aim to vindicate the standpoint epistemologist’s commitment to this thesis. 
Drawing on the peer disagreement literature, I use the concept of epistemic peerhood to provide 
a clearer definition of epistemic privilege as an epistemic position in which a person is more 
likely to be correct, either because she has a greater body of evidence relevant to the question at 
hand, or because she is more competent with respect to that evidence. I next provide four 
arguments to establish that, in the social domain, marginalized knowers satisfy these conditions. 
I then use these arguments to motivate the claim that, in the social domain, dominantly situated 
knowers are not the epistemic peers of marginalized knowers. 
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 Denying that knowledge is sensitive to non-epistemic features, features like one’s social 
identity, comes at a cost. It is a cost that is paid by those who are largely invisible in the academy 
- women, people of color, gays and lesbians, queer folks, those from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds, and so on. It is oppression - socially, politically, epistemically. These individuals 
will continue to be invisible so long as our analyses of knowledge rule out their contributions.  
 In order to amplify the voices of those who have been silenced, we need to understand 
the forces that have allowed for that silencing. In this project, I attempt to give an analytical 
treatment of oppression so that we can understand its very root. These issues have typically been 
the purview of women’s and gender studies and ethnic studies departments. The goal of my 
dissertation is to bring this conversation into philosophy. While other fields in the humanities 
give a historical analysis of oppression, explore resistance movements, or evaluate what systemic 
structures facilitate oppression, there is a distinct value in offering an in-depth analytical account 
of oppression. Primarily, we can begin to understand why these forces are so inflexibly rigid, 
how they are embedded in our cognitive system such that they alter the world we see, and what 
is required to undermine these systems. While most work in the humanities is engaged with 
addressing the symptoms of a diseased system - a system that allows for oppression - my goal is 
to tackle the problem at the root. Oppression happens because we don’t have the language to 
understand it. In this work I aim to give us the words to understand, because only then are we no 
longer silenced. Until we can fully understand the origins of oppression in thought itself, we will 
continue to struggle to understand, to empathize, and to collaborate with those who are the most 
vulnerable among us.  
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 I believe the most fruitful way to empower the silenced and the marginalized is by 
recognizing the role our social identity plays in how we know, understand, and interpret the 






















Chapter Two: Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology 
Standpoint epistemology has been extensively discussed within academic philosophy and has 
many fruitful applications, but it is underdeveloped. As a result, standpoint epistemology is open 
to a number of diverse (and sometimes, conflicting) interpretations. My first goal here is to give 
a specific interpretation of standpoint epistemology that is unavailable elsewhere in the literature.  
 Many of the feminist philosophers who have advocated for standpoint epistemology have 
asserted that there is a tension between mainstream, or ‘traditional’ epistemology, and standpoint 
epistemology (Anderson 1995; Baber 1994). However, little has been done to examine what the 
source of this tension is. My second goal in this paper is to explain what this tension consists in. I 
do so by identifying a plausible characterization of traditional epistemology according to which 
it does stand in a clear tension with standpoint epistemology. This characterization is of 
traditional epistemology as a form of intellectualism (to use a technical label Jason Stanley has 
recently popularized). I then investigate the conflict between standpoint epistemology and 
intellectualism.  
 Intellectualism is the thesis that knowledge does not depend on non-epistemic features 
(Stanley 2005: 6). My proposed interpretation of standpoint epistemology will be as a form of 
the view that knowledge is sensitive to non-epistemic features. Therefore, standpoint 
epistemology belongs to the family of views that denies the thesis of intellectualism. Members of 
this family include some forms of epistemic relativism (Neta 2007; MacFarlane 2011) and 
pragmatic encroachment (Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005). 
 Standpoint epistemology, as I will interpret it, takes an epistemic agent's social identity to 
be a non-epistemic factor that makes a difference to what she is in a position to know. This is an 
important, but controversial thesis. It owes its controversial nature to the fact that it is in tension 
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with at least some characterizations of traditional epistemology. And it is an important thesis, I 
suggest, because it sheds light on a phenomenon that emerges in our epistemic practices - 
epistemic oppression. Epistemic oppression is the obstruction or exclusion of epistemic agents 
from the practices of acquiring or sharing knowledge (Fricker 1999, 2007; Dotson 2012, 2014).  
 My aim is to clarify and develop the theoretical framework of standpoint epistemology, 
and to use this framework as a tool to better understand epistemic oppression. However, we can 
only begin to make inroads into this latter project insofar as we manage to clarify the landscape 
of standpoint epistemology. And so, to better understand epistemic oppression, we must first be 
clear about the thesis under discussion.  
 The standpoint thesis, as I have articulated it here, features a number of technical terms 
that, before I proceed, need to be defined. I define an epistemic agent as any person who has the 
capacity to acquire knowledge and to share knowledge with others.4 The distinction between 
epistemic and non-epistemic features has been used to frame the debate between intellectualists 
and their opponents like Stanley (2005), Hawthorne (2004), Fantl and McGrath (2009), and so 
on. Neither these authors nor I have a precise definition of when a feature is epistemic.5 
However, paradigm examples give us a strong grasp on the category of epistemic factors: the 
examples are evidence and justification, truth, belief, reliability—in short, those properties that 
featured in the post-Gettier trend that characterizes traditional epistemology. It is in this sense 
that the standpoint thesis is in tension with traditional epistemology, and intellectualism more 
specifically. 
                                                
4 I define epistemic agent in this way in order to better conceptualize epistemic oppression. As epistemic oppression 
involves obstructing or excluding some person from the practices of knowledge-production, it has the effect of 
preventing a person from being a distinctly epistemic agent. 
5 The difficulty of giving a definition was noted long ago by Alvin Goldman (1979: 2). 
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 Here, I focus on the role that non-epistemic features, like those related to social identity, 
play in knowledge-acquisition. However, before we can further explore what role (if any) social 
identity plays in knowledge, more must be said about the apparent tension between traditional 
epistemology, as I have characterized it, and standpoint epistemology. I thus begin here by 
distinguishing the various assumptions that guide the intellectualist position. In undertaking this 
task, I hope to elucidate the source of the tension between this school of thought and standpoint 
epistemology.  
 My goal, in doing so, is to offer one way of giving a more concrete specification to the 
general framework of standpoint epistemology. In order to accomplish this task, I will use as an 
expository tool a distinct, but related view - pragmatic encroachment. Pragmatic encroachment, 
like standpoint epistemology, suggests that knowledge is sensitive to non-epistemic features. But 
where the standpoint epistemologist emphasizes social identity as the non-epistemic feature that 
makes a difference to what a person is in a position to know, pragmatic encroachment instead 
focuses on the practical costs associated with being wrong. Using pragmatic encroachment as a 
spring board, I will show how it is possible to have a similar view that takes social identity to be 
the non-epistemic feature that makes a difference to what a person is in a position to know.  
 1. Exploring the tension 
As my proposed interpretation of standpoint epistemology belongs to the family of views that 
explores the influence of non-epistemic features on knowledge acquisition, part of my project 
involves spelling out the parallels between standpoint epistemology and these views. To that end, 
I explore the relationship between my view and those like pragmatic encroachment. But before I 
do, I first offer my interpretation of intellectualism in order to better understand what is at the 
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heart of the apparent tension between traditional epistemology and standpoint epistemology (and 
others in this family). 
 First, as mentioned, traditional epistemology can be characterized as an endorsement of 
intellectualism. In defense of this way of characterizing the foil that standpoint epistemologists 
say their view is in tension with, consider two of the central ideas that leading proponents of 
standpoint epistemology have attributed to traditional epistemology, theses they aim to criticize. 
These theses are at the heart of the tension between traditional epistemology and standpoint 
epistemology. The first, the atomistic view of knowers, is a view which characterizes epistemic 
agents as generic or interchangeable (Grasswick 2004). The second, aperspectivalism, is the 
view that an epistemic agent’s justification for some proposition must be accessible to other 
epistemic agents who are exposed to the same epistemic features of a situation (Kukla 2006).6 
Where the intellectualist is committed to both the atomistic view of knowers and 
aperspectivalism, the standpoint epistemologist (and others in this family) must reject these 
views. 
 As I interpret it, the atomistic view of knowers conceives of knowers as ‘substitutable’, 
one for the other, such that certain subjective features of the knower make no difference in 
whether she is in a position to know some proposition. A number of other philosophers have 
explored the role of the atomistic view in our epistemologies, including, for example, Allison 
Jaggar (1983), Naomi Scheman (1995), and Lorraine Code (1995), who writes that the atomistic 
view 
…presuppose[s] a universal, homogenous, and essential human nature that allows knowers to 
be substituted for one another…knowers worthy of that title can act as ‘surrogate knowers’ 
                                                
6 Note that this principle is restricted to empirical knowledge, as by definition, introspective knowledge fails to be 
aperspectival. 
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who are able to put themselves in anyone’s place and know her or his circumstances and 
interests in just the same way she or he would know them. Hence those circumstances are 
deemed epistemically irrelevant. (Code 1995: 23) 
The atomistic view of knowers suggests that we “transcend [the] particularity and contingency” 
of individual knowers (ibid). I offer a specific reading of what these particularities and 
contingencies are that the atomistic view denies make a difference to what we can know. I 
suggest the atomistic view of knowers is best interpreted in the following spirit: a knower could 
be substituted or exchanged with another knower and each should arrive at the same belief 
despite differences in their social identity or practical investments, if they share all epistemic 
features. Thus, I interpret the atomistic view of knowers as emphasizing that evidence, 
reliability, and such traditional features, are exclusively what is epistemically significant. 
 To that end, the atomistic view of knowers nicely complements aperspectivalism. On the 
interpretation that I propose, aperspectivalism means simply that one’s evidence for some 
proposition is such that it is accessible to other agents. There is a good deal of support for this 
ideal in the literature. Thomas Kelly, for instance, writes 
..it is thought central to the concept of evidence that evidence is by its very nature the kind of 
thing that can generate rational convergence of opinion in virtue of being shared by multiple 
individuals. This encourages the idea that any genuine piece of evidence can in principle be 
grasped by multiple individuals; anything which cannot be so grasped is either not genuine 
evidence or is at best a degenerate species thereof. (Kelly 2016; italics mine) 
Support for this ideal is also present in the works of prominent philosophers of science, including 
Herbert Feigl (1953) and Carl Hempel (1952), as well as Peter Railton (1985), who writes that 
“… objective inquiry uses procedures that are intersubjective and independent of particular 
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individuals and circumstances—for example … it makes no essential use of introspective or 
subjectively privileged evidence in theory assessment” (Railton 1991: 764). 
 What does it mean, though, to say that evidence is accessible or can be grasped by 
multiple individuals? I propose that we interpret the view that evidence must be accessible in the 
following way: evidence is accessible if any other epistemic agent who had the epistemic 
features that I have is in a position to know what I know. Of course, we can still ask what 
features Kukla, Kelly, and others imagine to be ‘inaccessible’. It’s plausible, and logically 
possible, that private, unique features of an epistemic agent’s circumstances are features that I 
could also possess. Consider, for instance, that I don’t have the perceptual experiences that you 
have, but that there is a sense in which I could have those perceptual experiences. I advance a 
proposal for how to divide the line between what is accessible and what is not. Epistemic 
features are those features which are, in a certain natural sense, accessible to everyone. But at 
least some non-epistemic features, in particular, those associated with social identity, are not so 
accessible. Aperspectivalism, then, is the view that knowledge is sensitive only to those features 
which are accessible to all epistemic agents.  
 Aperspectivalism is an epistemic ideal that is meant to reinforce the atomistic view of 
knowers. Lorraine Daston writes that aperspectivalism is “the ethos of the interchangeable and 
therefore featureless observer”, the goal of which is to “[eliminate] individual (or occasionally 
group, as in the case of national styles of anthropomorphism) idiosyncrasies” from our epistemic 
practices (Daston 1992: 599, 609). Thus, intellectualism is meant to rule out the influence of 
idiosyncratic features, which include distorting influences like ideology, bias, prejudice, and 
other subjective features, like one’s preferences, desires, and so on. By restricting which features 
are taken to be epistemically relevant, the atomistic view of knowers, together with 
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aperspectivalism, ensures that what epistemic agents are in a position to know is not determined 
by idiosyncratic features particular to the agent. 
 However, as defenders of pragmatic encroachment – alternatively known as interest-
relative invariantism or subject-sensitive invariantism – have argued, there is some extent to 
which intellectualism fails to accurately map onto our intuitions in certain cases. To illustrate, let 
me present two examples that have been given by Keith DeRose (1992, 2002), and also by 
Stanley (2005), but that I have modified for my purposes here: 
Low Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to 
stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their checks. It is not important that they do so, 
as they have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines 
inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Realizing that it isn’t very 
important that the paychecks are deposited right away, Hannah says, ‘I know the bank will be 
open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can 
deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.’  
 
High Stakes. James and his husband Amir are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan 
to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Noticing the lines are long, 
James says that he was at the bank two weeks before on a Saturday morning, and it was open. 
However, they have an impending bill due, and very little in their account, so it is very 
important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. And, as Amir points out, banks do 
change their hours. James says, ‘I guess you’re right. I don’t know that the bank will be open  
tomorrow.’7  
                                                
7 James and Hannah both believe that the bank is open. But given the practical costs, James does not take himself to 
know that the bank is open. 
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The intellectualist and the pragmatic encroacher will differ in their analyses of the preceding 
examples. Stanley takes it that our intuitive reactions to these cases will be as follows: we will 
agree that in Low Stakes, Hannah does know that the bank will be open tomorrow, and that in 
High Stakes, James is right in thinking that he does not know that the bank will be open. We can 
represent the pragmatic encroacher’s argument as follows:  
1. Hannah knows the bank is open but James does not know the bank is open. 
2. Hannah and James share the same epistemic features. 
3. Therefore, non-epistemic features make a difference to what an epistemic agent is in a 
position to know.  
The pragmatic encroacher argues that there is an asymmetry in knowledge, and that the feature 
that best accounts for this asymmetry is a non-epistemic feature - namely, the practical costs in 
the case.  
 The intellectualist, on the other hand, denies that there is any asymmetry in knowledge, 
and thus denies premise one. Consequently, the intellectualist will be forced to argue that it is 
either the case that both Hannah and James know that the bank will be open, or neither of the two 
know this. The intellectualist must take this position because his view rules out the role of non-
epistemic features - like the costs associated with being wrong - in his analysis of knowledge.  
 In contrast, according to pragmatic encroachment, practical facts, like one’s impending 
bills, do make a difference in what an epistemic agent is in a position to know. That is, from the 
point of view of the pragmatic encroacher, the stakes – that is, the costs associated with being 
wrong – partly determine what we are in a position to know. Thus, if for Hannah the stakes were 
high, she would not be in a position to know that the bank will be open on Saturday (and the 
reverse holds for James).  
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 We can see that in Low Stakes and High Stakes, the epistemic agents are exposed to the 
same epistemic features. Both Hannah and James have evidence that the bank may be open on 
Saturday, as it was open two weeks ago on a Saturday morning. They are also both aware that 
banks change their hours, and thus the bank may fail to be open on the Saturday in question. As 
these are the only features of the epistemic situation available to both agents, then according to 
aperspectivalism, this is the only information on which they should base their judgment about p: 
that the bank will be open tomorrow.  
 The pragmatic encroacher, however, denies that one’s justification for some proposition, 
p, must be accessible to all epistemic agents exposed to the same epistemic features of a 
situation, S. Primarily, this is because the pragmatic encroacher believes that features particular 
to an epistemic agent’s situation, like the costs associated with being wrong, make a difference to 
whether she is in a position to know p. The cost of being wrong for Hannah is not a reason 
available to James (or vice-versa). Thus, the pragmatic encroacher must reject aperspectivalism.  
 The pragmatic encroacher uses the bank cases to motivate the rejection of intellectualism. 
This can be further used to motivate the rejection of the atomistic view of knowers and 
aperspectivalism. My standpoint thesis similarly entails the denial of intellectualism, and 
consequently, the denial of both the atomistic view of knowers and aperspectivalism. However, 
where the pragmatic encroacher believes one’s practical commitment to a proposition’s truth is a 
feature that is not available to other epistemic agents and which makes a difference to whether 
she is in a position to know p, the standpoint epistemologist thinks that an epistemic agent’s 
social identity plays this role. To better understand the standpoint epistemologist’s motivation for 
rejecting these views, I offer and analyze an example in the next section. 
 
 19 
 2. Clarifying Standpoint Epistemology 
Standpoint epistemology is the view that an epistemic agent’s race or gender makes a difference 
in what she is in a position to know. Consider the two cases below: 
Black Subject. Moira, an African-American resident of Oklahoma City, is watching the local 
news as they turn to their lead story: “White Cop Convicted of Serial Rape of Black 
Women”. The story covers the ongoing case of Daniel Holtzclaw, an Oklahoma City police 
officer, who is accused of the rape of at least 13 women who, save one, were all African-
American women living in a poverty-stricken, predominantly black neighborhood in the 
northeastern section of the city. The report notes that many of the alleged victims were 
suspected of prostitution and drug possession, and that many delayed coming forward about 
the assault. The reporter wonders aloud about the veracity of these women’s claims, citing as 
evidence for her doubt their criminal backgrounds.  
 Moira says to herself, “I know those women were sexually assaulted. They took so long 
to report it because he’s a cop and they are poor black women - they thought no one would 
believe them.”  
 
White Subject. June, a white resident of Oklahoma City, is watching the local news as they 
turn to their lead story: “White Cop Convicted of Serial Rape of Black Women”. The story 
covers the ongoing case of Oklahoma City police officer, Daniel Holtzclaw. Holtzclaw is 
accused of the rape of at least 13 women who, save one, were all African-American women 
living in a poverty-stricken, predominantly black neighborhood in the northeastern section of 
the city. The report notes that many of the alleged victims were suspected of prostitution and 
drug possession, and that many delayed coming forward about the assault. The reporter 
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wonders aloud about the veracity of these women’s claims, citing as evidence for her doubt 
their criminal backgrounds.  
 June says to herself, “Those women have criminal records - they could be lying. I am in 
no position to know that they were sexually assaulted.”  
Daniel Holtzclaw did, in fact, assault these women, and in 2015 he was convicted on 13 counts 
of sexual assault.  
 Here, I’m interested in exploring whether there are certain propositions that, given 
features of their social identity, Moira is in a position to know but that June is not. The 
propositions that are of particular interest to the standpoint epistemologist are those involving 
social facts. In this case, Moira knows p: that the women were sexually assaulted. But she knows 
it because she also knows why they delayed reporting - that they were unlikely to be believed. It 
may seem controversial, perhaps, whether there is a ‘fact of the matter’ about why the alleged 
victims didn’t report. Consequently, one might think that in such a case there can be no fact of 
the matter about who has what knowledge. In response I will make two points. First, the 
standpoint epistemologist is concerned primarily with knowledge of social facts, and to that 
extent, the standpoint epistemologist’s domain of inquiry is the social world. Second, social 
facts, though not mind-independent (because socially constructed) are still facts about which we 
can have knowledge. For instance, whether or not gender maps onto ‘nature’s joints’, it is a 
social fact that we employ the social categories ‘women’ and ‘men’, and that we sort people into 
these categories, and that perhaps the criteria we use to do so are unjust or inaccurate. 
 So knowledge of p in this case requires knowing social facts, like that these women 
delayed reporting, not because they were not in fact assaulted, but because they were unlikely to 
be believed. There are a number of propositions, like p, the knowledge of which requires 
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knowledge of further social facts. The standpoint epistemologist argues that knowing such facts 
depends on distinctly non-epistemic features. In particular, the standpoint epistemologist will 
argue that facts about the standpoint an epistemic agent occupies - where one’s standpoint is 
determined by facts about one’s social identity - will make a difference in what she is in a 
position to know. 
 Before I elaborate on the standpoint epistemologist’s explanation as to why these features 
make a difference, let’s briefly consider competing explanations in this case, focusing in 
particular on the intellectualist’s response. The intellectualist will deny that we need to appeal to 
non-epistemic features to explain that Moira, but not June, knows that the women were sexually 
assaulted. I suggest that there are two explanations the intellectualist might pursue that will allow 
her to maintain a commitment to intellectualism. She can suggest that Moira knows p where June 
does not either because of 1) differences in their background beliefs or 2) differences in how they 
evaluate the evidence. 
Explanation #1: Differences in background beliefs 
One strategy that the intellectualist might appeal to is to argue that Moira and June’s responses 
can be explained in terms of differences in their background beliefs. Background beliefs may be 
a part of one’s total evidence - thus, if we think that Moira and June have different evidence, this 
explains why Moira knows p, but that June fails to be in a position to know p.  
 As Alvin Goldman (2010) notes, it’s rare that two people share all their evidence. 
Although Moira and June have been exposed to the same facts about this case, they have in the 
past been exposed to different evidence and have had difference experiences throughout their 
life. These differences are relevant to Moira and June’s epistemic assessment of p.  
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 Given her evidence, it’s possible that June thinks that the women, because they are poor 
and have criminal records, have other motivations for coming forward. Or, given her knowledge 
of police brutality in the African-American community, Moira might have a rational distrust of 
the police that motivates her to believe the women in this case.  
 If this is right, the intellectualist can maintain a commitment to intellectualism and 
acknowledge that evidential differences account for why Moira knows, but June fails to know, 
that p. This is because we can explain Moira’s and June’s knowledge claims by appealing to the 
fact that they each had a difference body of evidence for p.  
 However, we can stipulate in this case that both Moira and June possess the same 
background beliefs about the ulterior motives the women might have and about the history of 
police brutality in the African-American community. It seems to me that the thought experiment 
I offer here can be filled in by this stipulation and still be representative of a realistic and fairly 
common sort of case. If an intellectualist wants to insist that there will always be a difference in 
relevant evidence that people have, I will soon offer reasons to think otherwise (in section 3c, 
below). Thus, I suggest it would be inadequate to leave the story to be explained in this manner. 
Assuming this is the case, the intellectualist must pursue another line of explanation regarding 
Moira’s and June’s different assessments of p.  
 Furthermore, any explanation that appeals to differences in background beliefs to explain 
the different assessments agents may reach in regards to some proposition is to trivialize the role 
of evidence. If the mere fact that epistemic agents have different background beliefs can account 
for why epistemic agents reach different epistemic assessments in a given case, then we ought to 
expect there to be a large number of cases in which epistemic agents do in fact reach different 
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assessments. So this account does not provide a non-trivial explanation of the fact that, given the 
relevant shared evidence, Moira and June differ in their epistemic assessments of p.  
Explanation #2: Differences in evaluation of the evidence  
Another strategy that proponents of intellectualism might pursue in the face of these examples is 
to argue that Moira and June’s responses reflect their different evaluations of the evidence. The 
evidence in this case consists of the following:  
Q: at least 13 women have accused Holtzclaw of sexual assault, 
R: many of the alleged victims had criminal backgrounds,  
S: many of the alleged victims were poor and black, and  
T: the alleged victims delayed coming forward (and in some instances, had to be prompted to 
do so).  
The intellectualist may suggest that June weighs R and T more heavily than she weighs Q and S, 
whereas Moira weighs Q and S more heavily than the other evidence. The intellectualist might 
argue that it’s permissible for June and Moira to weigh the evidence as they choose. And given 
this, the intellectualist can argue that this explains why Moira and June reach difference 
epistemic assessments of p.  
 This explanation appeals to a form of permissivism - a view which states that sometimes 
there is more than one rational response to a given body of evidence -  as endorsed by Thomas 
Kelly (2014) and Miriam Schoenfield (2013), among others. Schoenfield, describing the 
permissivist position she adopts, argues that  
…the permissivist thinks that what it is reasonable to believe about p needs to be understood 
relative to some set of epistemic standards. Thus, the reason it is permissible for [Moira] and 
[June] to differ in their beliefs with regard to p is that [Moira] and [June] have different sets 
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of standards, which differ regarding whether to believe p, given their body of evidence. 
(Schoenfield 2013: 200)8 
Why might the intellectualist think we have different epistemic standards? According to Kelly, 
what accounts for the differences in the epistemic standards agents adopt is the value they place 
on either acquiring true beliefs or avoiding false beliefs. Kelly writes 
In general, the more value one gives to not believing what’s false about some issue, the more 
it behooves one to be relatively cautious or conservative in forming beliefs about that issue. 
That is, the more weight one gives to not believing something false, the more it makes sense 
to hold out until there is a great deal of evidence that p is true before taking up the belief that 
p. On the other hand, the more one values not missing out on believing the truth, the more it 
makes sense to take a somewhat more liberal attitude about how much evidence one expects 
before taking up the relevant belief. (Kelly 2014: 301) 
Thus, the intellectualist can appeal to differential epistemic standards to explain why it is that 
Moira is in a position to know something that June is not. Namely, the intellectualist can suggest 
that Moira places a greater value on acquiring true beliefs, whereas June places a greater value 
on avoiding false beliefs. This in turn explains why each weighs the evidence as she does. 
 This explanation may appear to satisfy the criteria for intellectualism - it may seem to 
both meet the condition that knowers are interchangeable, and that their reasons are accessible. 
On this account, all the epistemic features are the same between Moira and June. Furthermore, 
knowers are interchangeable in the sense that the epistemic standards of different rational 
thinkers are sensitive only to epistemic features. In this sense, it could be argued, it satisfies the 
atomistic component of intellectualism because it rules out those features that have no bearing on 
                                                
8 Note that in the original text Schoenfield is discussing epistemic agents in her own case. I have replaced the names 
she uses with those I give in Black Subject/White Subject.  
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the truth that p. Further, the reasons Moira uses in her assessment of p are accessible to June. The 
only difference between them is how they choose to weigh those reasons. 
 Though I find myself sympathetic to the permissivist position, this line of defense is 
unsatisfying as a defense of intellectualism. I grant that appealing to differences in epistemic 
standards will explain a great range of cases. But this explanation is incomplete, as the epistemic 
standards an epistemic agent adopts are partly constituted by non-epistemic features. I submit 
that in cases like the one described above, there is a tendency among dominantly situated 
knowers to be overly cautious and to favor avoiding false beliefs. By contrast, there is a tendency 
among marginally situated knowers to favor acquiring true beliefs.9 
  This tendency of dominantly situated knowers to favor the status quo is, I claim, a non-
epistemic factor that is essential to what excludes June from being in a position to know what 
Moira is in a position to know. This is not a stipulative or technical categorization of the non-
epistemic. The natural family of epistemic features, as it figured in traditional post-Gettier 
epistemology, does not have a place for this difference between dominantly and marginally 
situated knowers. Thus a complete explanation of why epistemic agents adopt the epistemic 
standards that they do will require appealing to non-epistemic facts about the agent.   
 3. Appealing to Standpoint Epistemology  
The explanation I prefer, to the traditional alternatives considered above, is that Moira and June’s 
differences in knowledge can be accounted for in terms of differences in the standpoint that each 
occupies. I will provide a simple sketch of the possible explanations the standpoint 
epistemologist might offer to account for why Moira, but not June, is in a position to know that 
the women were sexually assaulted.  
                                                
9 See Linda Alcoff (2007) and Charles Mills (1997; 2007) for further discussion on the relationship between social 
identity and epistemic goals. 
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 First, the standpoint epistemologist will deny that the differences in Moira’s and June’s 
knowledge can be fully accounted for either in terms of differences in background evidence or 
differences in how they weigh the evidence.10 The standpoint epistemologist is committed to the 
view that even given the same body of evidence and the same background beliefs, epistemic 
agents are in a position to know different propositions because of the standpoint they occupy.  
 Here’s an example that roughly illustrates and motivates the standpoint epistemologist’s 
project. Consider the famous duck-rabbit gestalt. In this case, depending on where you direct 
your attention, you see either a duck or a rabbit. We can easily imagine that of two viewers who 
possess the same background beliefs and perceptual capacities, one might see the duck (and fail 
to see the rabbit) and the other might see the rabbit (and fail to see the duck). In this case, one 
could argue that we cannot account for why one viewer sees the rabbit (but not the duck) and the 
other doesn’t, by appealing to differences in their background beliefs, evidence, or so on.  
 Furthermore, we can say that one viewer is in a position to know that the object they are 
seeing is a duck (where the other viewer is in a position to know that the object they are seeing is 
a rabbit). And though it’s true that the each viewer can be primed to see what they hadn’t before, 
the fact remains that what they are initially in a position to know differs, and that this fact 
arguably cannot be accounted for in terms of any differences in the epistemic features of the 
case.  
 Someone might object that in virtue of the viewers having different experiences they 
thereby have different evidence. But this is simply to push the question back, as we might then 
still ask: what accounts for the fact that the viewer has the perceptual experience that they in fact 
do (rather than some other perceptual experience)?  
                                                
10 Or that such explanations can fully account for the epistemic assessments an agent makes without appealing to 
some facts about her social identity. 
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 Standpoint epistemology attempts to answer such questions by appealing to facts about 
the standpoint a person occupies. According to standpoint epistemology, we can explain why a 
person attends to what they do, and believes what they do, by appealing to the person’s 
standpoint. In this sense, standpoint epistemology is an explanatory hypothesis, the goal of which 
is to capture a number of important features about our epistemic practices that the intellectualist 
simply cannot.  
 But appealing to standpoint epistemology as an explanation requires that we do more to 
spell out what a standpoint is and how standpoints influence what an epistemic agent is in a 
position to know. Broadly speaking, a ‘standpoint’ is a social position, or perspective, that one 
occupies and that influences how one engages with and comes to know facts about the world. 
Standpoints are determined by features of social identity, which include, but are not limited to, 
sex, gender, class, race, and so on.  
 Regarding the role that a standpoint plays, I propose that the standpoint epistemologist 
can pursue three explanations to account for how a standpoint influences what a person is in a 
position to know. First, the standpoint epistemologist can suggest that the difference in 
knowledge is accounted for in terms of the different conceptual resources associated with the 
standpoint an epistemic agent occupies. Second, the standpoint epistemologist can argue that 
which hypothesis a person entertains will be determined in part by the standpoint the person 
occupies. And finally, the standpoint epistemologist can argue that an epistemic agent’s capacity 
to embed another’s de se mode of presentation as her own depends on facts about the standpoint 
she occupies. I’ll discuss these each in turn, and explore in detail how they interact to, potentially 
jointly, account for why Moira, but not June, is in a position to know p. 
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Explanation #3a: Conceptual Resources 
The first explanation the standpoint epistemologist can pursue depends on saying the following: 
one’s standpoint allows one to develop conceptual resources in order to make sense of the 
experiences of members of that standpoint. Subsequently, these resources will influence what 
facts an agent is in a position to know. This warrants a brief digression on the nature of 
conceptual resources. 
 According to Gaile Pohlhaus (2011), conceptual resources include language, concepts, 
and their associated criteria. I take it that there is a shared understanding of what is meant by 
language and concepts.11 By criteria, I simply mean the features that might be used to sort 
objects under concepts.  
 To illustrate the relationship between these three conceptual resources, consider the 
concept of ‘woman’. We can effectively use this concept and discuss it. Though there is a shared 
understanding of the concept ‘woman’, people might disagree about the criteria that are (or ought 
to be) used to sort people into this category. For instance, whether one must be biologically 
female to belong to this category might be up for dispute.  
 Pohlhaus writes that epistemic agents use conceptual resources as tools to understand and 
evaluate their experiences. Conceptual resources are not fixed and immutable, but stand open for 
revision. If we find that our existing resources are inadequate, then we are free to revise and 
reform those resources as necessary. So, for instance, we can use a concept of ‘woman’ that 
includes transwomen.  
 I claim that what conceptual resources an epistemic agent has will make a difference in 
what she is a position to know. This is the case for several reasons. First, what features of the 
                                                
11 Gaile Pohlhaus calls these epistemic resources, but I prefer ‘conceptual resources’ so as to avoid these resources 
being mistakenly identified as epistemic features. 
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world we notice will depend, in part, on facts about the epistemic resources we posses. Thus, if 
we lack the conceptual resources necessary to make sense of some aspect of the world, then we 
are not likely to notice that aspect.  
 Second, what conceptual resources we have and develop will depend on facts about our 
experiences. If we don’t have the experience of a certain kind, then we will not (need to) develop 
the requisite conceptual resources for understanding that experience.  
 The experiences an epistemic agent has - and subsequently, the conceptual resources she 
will go on to develop - depend in part on features of her social identity. Since we develop 
conceptual resources to make sense of our experiences, and the experiences we have may depend 
on our social identity, then consequently, conceptual resources will differ along lines of social 
identity.  
 Thus, which conceptual resources a person is in possession of will make a difference in 
what she is in a position to know. This is relevant to standpoints because some standpoints - 
where the standpoint is determined in part by the social identity of its members – provide greater 
access to certain conceptual resources than do other standpoints.  
 As a quick illustration, working women in the 1970’s, some of whom were subject to 
sexual harassment, occupied the same standpoint because of their shared social experiences. As a 
result of their shared experience of harassment, they developed the concept of ‘sexual 
harassment’ in order to make sense of, and to communicate to others, those experiences (Fricker 
2007). Furthermore, because these women had a concept which their male counterparts lacked, 
these women were in a position to know some facts that men were not similarly placed (at the 
time) to know. Note that it isn’t necessary for every member of the standpoint to have 
experienced sexual harassment in order to have the concept of ‘sexual harassment’. Rather, this 
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is a conceptual resource that is now available to all women because some women were able to 
develop this concept.  
 In the same vein, the standpoint epistemologist will say that Moira’s standpoint, and the 
resources that have been developed by members of her standpoint, place her in a position to 
know something that June, given her standpoint, cannot. In particular, her standpoint allows her 
to know that the women in this case delayed reporting because they feared they would not be 
believed. Of course, the intellectualist might ask what conceptual resources are available to 
Moira that account for why she knows, but June does not, that p.  
 I argue that just as women in the 1970s shared a standpoint because of their shared 
experiences of sexual harassment, black women occupy a shared standpoint because of their 
shared experiences of hypersexualization. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, for instances, writes 
Blacks have long been portrayed as more sexual, more earthy, more gratification-
oriented…Thus Black women are essentially prepackaged as bad women within cultural 
narratives about good women who can be raped and bad women who cannot. The 
discrediting of Black women's claims is the consequence of a complex intersection of a 
gendered sexual system, one that constructs rules appropriate for good and bad women, and a 
race code that provides images defining the allegedly essential nature of Black women. If 
these sexual images form even part of the cultural imagery of Black women, then the very 
representation of a Black female body at least suggests certain narratives that may make 
Black women's rape either less believable or less important. (Crenshaw 1994: 1271) 
As a black woman, Moira occupies this standpoint, and consequently, she has access to the 
resources black women have developed in order to understand the experience of 
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hypersexualization. Thus, given that she has these concepts, Moira is in a position to infer the 
right conclusion from the evidence.  
 Furthermore, as a result of her standpoint, Moira may understand that police officers 
benefit from a credibility excess, whereas people of color suffer from a credibility deficit. As a 
member of this standpoint, Moira has access to the concept of a credibility deficit, and is able to 
use this resource to understand the particular social phenomenon in question - that is, that the 
women were sexually assaulted and delayed reporting because they knew they would not be 
believed.  
 Let me briefly discuss why appealing to conceptual resources is not an explanation 
compatible with an intellectualist account. First and foremost, the features that allow Moira to 
know what June does not are distinctly non-epistemic. In this case, what allowed Moira to know 
p was a feature of her social identity - her race. Further, consider that in the case of sexual 
harassment, women were able to know what sexual harassment is, and recognize it when it 
occurred, because of some feature of their social identity - in this case, gender. However, 
features of a person’s social identity need not change their evidence. So, according to the 
intellectualist, these are features that should not be relevant to whether an epistemic agent is in a 
position to know some proposition.  
 Furthermore, given her commitment to the view that an epistemic agent’s standpoint 
influences what that agent is in a position to know, the standpoint epistemologist must deny both 
the claim that knowers are interchangeable and the claim that their reasons are equally 
accessible, in the senses defined earlier. We see, for instance, that Moira and June are not 
interchangeable in the case described above. Even given that they are in the same epistemic 
position, what they are in a position to know differs because of facts about their social identity 
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(and subsequently, facts about the standpoint they occupy). Additionally, we see that Moira 
knows p because of a stable, but contingent non-epistemic feature about her - namely, her race. 
And June does not know p precisely because she lacks this feature. Consequently, Moira’s 
grounds for knowing what she does are not available to June. The conceptual resources that 
Moira has, in virtue of the standpoint she occupies, simply aren’t available to June, because June 
occupies a different standpoint and thus has different resources.  
Explanation #3b: Hypotheses 
A similar, albeit distinct, explanation that the standpoint epistemologist can explore is that Moira 
and June entertain different hypotheses to explain why it is that the women in the Holtzclaw case 
delayed reporting. In turn, the hypotheses they consider are influenced by the standpoint they 
occupy. By ‘entertain’ I simply mean that for each, a different hypothesis comes to mind. I do 
not mean that they are aware of multiple hypotheses and entertain only the one they find most 
likely. 
 Consider an example. Jack and Jane are independently interested in determining why it is 
that the logic class they TA for is majority male. Jack surmises that women are under-enrolled 
because women are uninterested in logic. Jane supposes that the under-enrollment of women is 
due to the fact that there is a rumor in the department that the lecturer has engaged in 
inappropriate behavior with female undergraduates in the past.  
 Now, we can stipulate that Jack and Jane have the same evidence and background beliefs. 
Let’s suppose they have both been informed of the rumors regarding the lecturer and of the view 
that some hold that women are less interested in the mathematical aspects of philosophy. But 
nevertheless, they entertain different hypotheses as to what best explains the low enrollment of 
women. Why is this? 
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 For someone who has likely never had to carefully consider which class they are taking 
so as to avoid serial harassers, it’s unlikely that Jack would think that the rumor involving the 
lecturer would have any impact on enrollment. Jane, on the other hand, as a woman in a field 
where this has long been a problem, might immediately realize the impact this could have on the 
enrollment of women. Similarly, we might think that Moira, as a black woman, is able to 
immediately realize why the women in the Holtzclaw case were initially uninterested in filing a 
report.  
 In both cases, I think we can explain why Moira and Jane entertain the hypotheses they 
do by appealing to the standpoint each occupies. We can acknowledge that June and Moira may 
both occupy a ‘woman’s’ standpoint. But Moira also occupies a ‘black’ standpoint, and June 
does not. Subsequently, Moira may be better placed than is June to consider the role that race 
may have played in the women’s decision not to report. For instance, June, as a white woman, 
may have never had to consider whether her race influences how others evaluate her. Moira, on 
the other hand, as a black woman, may have had to consider how her racial identity impacts how 
seriously she is taken by others.  
 As should be evident, this is closely related to the explanation regarding conceptual 
resources. I suggest that the conceptual resources available to an epistemic agent because of her 
standpoint likely influence which hypotheses she entertains. As I noted previously, Moira, but 
not June, may possess the concept of a credibility deficit, because she has likely suffered this. 
Consequently, this might inform which hypothesis she considers. By extension, since it’s 
unlikely that June possesses this concept (because as a white woman she may have never had this 
experience) she might fail to entertain this hypothesis when considering what best explains the 
women’s delayed reporting. 
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Explanation #3c: De Se Knowledge  
In the discussion above, I suggested that what an epistemic agent is in a position to know can be 
influenced by her standpoint. I further argued that standpoints influence which conceptual 
resources an epistemic agent is able to make use of, and which hypotheses she may consider. In 
the discussion of both these explanations, I noted that our conceptual resources, and the 
hypotheses we entertain, may be impacted by the experiences we have. This brings me to the 
final explanation the standpoint epistemologist might offer: de se knowledge.  
 I argue here that de se knowledge can be used as a tool to ‘imaginatively grasp’ the first-
personal perspective of another epistemic agent. De se knowledge is personal knowledge that 
one expresses or grasps using first-personal concepts, e.g. ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘mine’, and so on (Ninan 
2010). My argument that de se knowledge can be used to explain why some knowers are in a 
position to know p, where others are not, proceeds in three stages. First, I argue that epistemic 
agents are able to first-personally grasp the first-personal perspective of other agents, such that 
they can know what those agents know. This involves the epistemic agent possessing an 
‘imaginative capacity’ that allows her to ‘imaginatively grasp’ another’s first-personal 
perspective. Second, I argue that this ‘imaginative capacity’ is more difficult the greater the 
social distance between epistemic agents. Finally, I conclude by exploring how this explanation 
applies to the case of Black Subject/White Subject described above.  
 Appealing to an argument advanced by Laurie Paul, I argue that epistemic agents use a de 
se mode of presentation to imaginatively represent the experiences of others. Paul writes that this 
‘imaginative capacity’, what she calls ‘empathy’, goes beyond merely allowing yourself to ‘feel 
what another feels’, or simply ‘imagining yourself in their shoes’. Rather, it involves performing 
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a cognitive act that “allows you to first personally represent some element of another’s 
experience” (Paul 2016: 198).  
 Paul argues that when we engage in this imaginative capacity, we need a mode of 
presentation that allows us to embed another’s mode of presentation into our own, such that we 
first-personally grasp that person’s first-personal perspective. To do so, we must engage in a 
subjective mode of presentation, what Paul calls the ‘de se mode of presentation’. This mode of 
presentation allows us to imaginatively grasp another’s de se mode of presentation as our own. 
That is, this mode of presentation allows us to subjectively represent some element of that 
person’s experience and to draw on what is learned. This is to go beyond merely imagining what 
it must be like to have some experience. Rather, it requires that we imagine what it is like to be 
that person having the experience.12  
 Returning to the cases above, this means that June cannot simply imagine what it might 
have been like to be sexually assaulted by a cop. Instead, she must imagine what it must have 
been like, as those women, to have been assaulted by a cop. However, I submit that this is more 
difficult for June, than for Moira, since there is a greater social distance between June and the 
alleged victims than between Moira and the alleged victims. 
 Let me say what I mean by ‘social distance’. Social distance, in contrast to locational 
distance, describes the distance between groups of society. To illustrate, June and Moira are not 
socially distant in terms of gender, but are socially distant in terms of race. One charge that has 
been levied against using empathy as tool of moral reasoning, by Paul Bloom (2016) and Jesse 
Prinz (2011), among others, is that our capacity to empathize with another person varies as a 
                                                
12 This perhaps sounds similar to simulation theory in the philosophy of mind. Victoria Pitts-Taylor (2013) has done 
interesting and important work exploring the intersections of simulation theory and feminist epistemology, 
developing what she calls ‘embodied simulation theory’. 
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function of social distance. Paul herself notes this, writing that “to have the capacity for empathy 
seems to require a certain amount of shared experience” (Paul 2016: 199).  
 Extending this, I suggest that the greater the social distance between two people, the more 
difficult it will be for one to engage in the de se mode of presentation in order to represent the 
other’s experience.  In turn, the less socially distant two people are, the more easily they will find 
it to ‘imaginatively grasp’ the other’s perspective. As Paul also writes, “the empathetic task 
involves grasping some relevant feature of another person’s first personal perspective” (ibid). If 
the epistemic agent is unable to imaginatively grasp the relevant feature, then I argue she will 
also be unable to accurately represent the other person’s first personal perspective.   
 The intellectualist might object that given the pervasiveness of bias in applications of 
empathy, we ought to rule it out as an epistemic tool. But it is precisely for this reason that I 
think empathy is epistemically significant. Because we are better able to ‘imaginatively grasp’ 
the perspectives of those who are most like us, this explains why some epistemic agents are 
better placed than others to know certain propositions. Others have noted that in moral 
judgments, empathy plays a crucial epistemic role in determining when (and whether) moral 
(dis)approbation is warranted. I think it is not implausible to imagine that it plays a significant 
role in epistemic evaluations, as well.  
 However, empathy should not be considered a distinctively epistemic feature. As such, 
the intellectualist cannot explain its role in epistemic evaluations. Consider that empathy is not 
evidence, nor is it a background belief. It is simply a capacity. As Paul writes, when one engages 
the de se mode of presentation, she does not learn new information so much as she gains a new 
ability.13  
                                                
13 The traditional epistemologist might object, here, that differential capacities allow for differences in evidence. For 
instance, those with functioning visual perceptual systems are in a position to gather more evidence than those with 
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 Let me now extend the argument considered thus far to the case of June and Moira. It’s 
plausible that June can imaginatively conceive of what it must be like to be a woman at the 
center of the Holtzclaw controversy. But as she is not black, and has no lived experience as of 
being black, I argue it will be more difficult to conceive of what it must be like to be a black 
woman at the center of the Holtzclaw controversy. Furthermore, while June, when she imagines 
herself as the women in the Holtzclaw case, might think she is representing their experience, her 
representation likely fails to build in the blackness of the experiencer. This is especially likely 
given that ‘whiteness’ is regarded as racially neutral, which means that she may fail to see the 
salience of race in her own experiences, and thus fail to build a racial dimension into such 
representations. Consequently, I suggest it will be more difficult for June (than for Moira) to 
imaginatively grasp why the women may have acted as they did.  
 Moira, as a black woman herself, will have little trouble ‘building in blackness’ into her 
representation. Given her lived experiences as a black woman, Moira can more easily imagine 
herself as the victim in the Holtzclaw case, and from that perspective, she can infer, and come to 
know, the most likely explanation for why the women delayed reporting. 
 This explanation may work in tandem with the two previously considered to explain why 
Moira, but not June, is in a position to know that p. I suggest that which hypothesis an epistemic 
agent entertains will depend on her conceptual resources, and which conceptual resources she 
has will depend on how capable she is of taking on the perspective in question (where this will 
depend on the social identity of the agent and of the perspective she is trying to imaginatively 
grasp).  
                                                                                                                                                       
faulty visual perceptual systems. However, this is not analogous to Black Subject/White Subject. We must still 
provide an explanation that accounts for why social identity makes a difference in one’s ability to acquire or utilize 
some capacity, as it does in the case I have outlined here. 
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 When Moira first-personally grasps the first-personal perspective of Holtzclaw’s victims, 
she is able to know those women and their experiences. Furthermore, as a black woman herself, 
she is able to utilize the conceptual resources developed by black women to understand their 
shared social experiences. It is because Moira is black and she can, more effectively than could 
June, engage in this perspective-taking, that she is able to imagine the kinds of experiences black 
women are likely to suffer. Consequently, she is better placed to develop the conceptual 
resources necessary to understand these experiences, and then arrive at the hypothesis that she 
does. As a black woman, Moira can know (where June cannot) that other black women might not 
report for fear of being believed. She can know this because she can know why she might not 
have reported, had she been the victim. Consequently, she can know that in the Holtzclaw case, 
the victims delayed reporting for the same reason.  
4. Concluding Remarks  
The standpoint epistemologist argues that there are numerous cases like Black Subject and White 
Subject. Just as race played a role in Black Subject and White Subject, standpoint epistemologists 
further argue that other features of one’s social identity, like one’s gender or class, may make a 
difference in what an epistemic agent is in a position to know.  
 The task of the standpoint epistemologist is to a provide a theoretical framework that 
explains why features of our social identity play a role in determining what propositions an 
epistemic agent is in a position to know. I’ve gestured at a few possible responses the standpoint 
epistemologist might offer here. I have not, however, specified what a standpoint consists in, nor 
have I considered how a standpoint arises. Further work may examine how standpoints, in 
particular dominant and marginal social positions, are largely constituted by these features that, 
though non-epistemic, make a critical difference to knowledge. My task here has merely been to 
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demonstrate what is at the heart of the tension between standpoint epistemology and one 
characterization of traditional epistemology, and to motivate the standpoint epistemologist’s 
argument. 
 I have argued that intellectualism is comprised of two components - the atomistic view of 
knowers and aperspectivalism - that the standpoint epistemologist (and others in this family) is 
right to reject. I have further shown that where the intellectualist will fail to adequately explain 
such cases as Black Subject/White Subject, the standpoint epistemologist is well-poised to offer 
an explanation. Namely, the standpoint epistemologist’s explanation relies on arguing that 
features of our social identity make a difference in what an epistemic agent is in a position to 
know, and this may be the case for several reasons. I have suggested that the conceptual 
resources we develop, the hypotheses we entertain, and our capacity to embed another’s de se 
mode of presentation as our own, will all make a difference in what we are in a position to know. 
I have further suggested that these explanations are not compatible with the intellectualist 
position.  
 Traditional epistemology, as I have interpreted it, operates from the assumption of an 
idealized rational framework and conceives of knowers in “abstraction from relations of social 
power” (Fricker 2007: 3), and obscures questions that arise when we conceive of the knower as 
socially situated. As Pohlhaus also notes, ‘the dominantly recognized concept of the ‘generic 
knower’ is not only an epistemic resource that focuses attention on particular aspects of the 
world experienced from a dominant position, but it is also a concept that hides that fact” 
(Pohlhaus 2011: 720, italics mine). Knowledge claims, whether or not they ought to be, are 
importantly tied to our social situatedness. In overlooking how our epistemic practices are in fact 
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employed, traditional epistemology fails to address the inadequacies that emerge as the result of 
our existing epistemic framework.   
 Standpoint epistemology, which accounts for the influence of one’s social location on 
one’s knowledge claims, is therefore essential to our conceptualization of epistemic oppression. 
Standpoint epistemology, as I have interpreted it here, is particularly helpful in revealing 
epistemic oppression because it makes explicit the underlying assumptions of some 
characterizations of traditional epistemology. Thus, our understanding of epistemic oppression – 
and perhaps of knowledge-acquisition more broadly – is impoverished without the theoretical 
framework standpoint epistemology provides. I do not take myself to be arguing here that 
standpoint epistemology ought to supplant traditional epistemology. Rather, I mean to suggest 
that we need to broaden our conception of epistemology altogether - that is to say, we need to 
bring standpoint epistemology out of the margins and into the mainstream. If traditional 
epistemology is to do justice to each of us in our capacities as knowers, then it must be open to 











Chapter Three: From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression 
The landscape of epistemology is changing. Epistemologists are no longer solely concerned with 
questions regarding what conditions are necessary for knowledge or how knowledge is 
transmitted; they have instead shifted their attention to concerns regarding our epistemic 
practices and how those practices oppress. Epistemic oppression, the unwarranted exclusion or 
obstruction of certain epistemic agents from the practices of knowledge production, has been the 
focus of much work produced by feminist epistemologists in the last decade, and rightly so. If 
the aim of epistemology is to bring us closer to truth, then any practice which subverts this aim 
ought to be thoroughly investigated.14 However, as I will argue, our capacity to root out 
epistemic oppression is limited to the extent that we continue operating within the traditional 
epistemological framework. If, as I will suggest, epistemic oppression has its origins in 
epistemology as traditionally conceived, then we cannot hope to find a solution there. In this 
paper, I will argue that in order to understand, address, and eliminate epistemic oppression, we 
must appeal to the conceptual tools made available by standpoint epistemology.  
 Standpoint epistemology is committed to the thesis that some non-epistemic features 
make a difference to what an epistemic agent is in a position to know. Precisely which non-
epistemic features are of concern, and the way in which those features make a difference to what 
a person knows, is what I aim to explore further in this paper.  
 The standpoint thesis is important but controversial. It owes its controversial nature to the 
fact that it stands in tension with those versions of traditional epistemology that suggest that it’s 
exclusively epistemic features (such as truth, evidence, reliability, and so on) that make a 
difference to what a person is in a position to know. And, as I have already alluded, it is an 
                                                
14 For interpretations and defenses of the dictum that ‘belief aims at truth’, see Railton (1994) and Velleman (2015). 
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important thesis because it sheds light on a phenomenon that emerges in our epistemic practices: 
epistemic oppression. 
 In order to make clear the role standpoint epistemology plays in illuminating this 
phenomenon, we must first do some important work to clarify the landscape. The thesis of 
standpoint epistemology has been characterized in a number of diverse (and sometimes, 
conflicting) ways. And so, to better understand epistemic oppression, we must first be clear 
about the thesis under discussion. My goal here is to carve out the conceptual space so we have a 
clearer sense of what standpoint epistemology is, how it is to be defended, and to what ends it 
can be applied.  
 I begin in section 1 by analyzing what I take to be the bare, or general, standpoint thesis. I 
next explore how we can fill in this bare reading to offer additional versions of the thesis. In 
section 2 I examine the historical material and material feminist readings, offered by George 
Lukács and Nancy Hartsock, respectively. In section 3 I develop an epistemic reading, gestured 
at by Miranda Fricker and Gaile Pohlhaus, among others. Then, in section 4 I analyze how these 
readings can be usefully applied to illuminate some (though not all) well-known forms of 
epistemic oppression. I conclude in section 5 by offering an analysis of why traditional 
epistemology falls short in illuminating this phenomenon. 
1. A Starting Point 
I interpret standpoint epistemology as one member of a family of views that hold that some non-
epistemic features make a difference to what an epistemic agent is in a position to know. In 
particular, standpoint epistemologists argue that what an epistemic agent is in a position to know, 
and what knowledge she is in a position to share with others, is sensitive to non-epistemic 
features related to the agent’s social identity. Standpoint epistemologists differ with regards to 
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which features of an epistemic agent’s social identity they take to be epistemically significant. 
As such, I will begin here by sketching the general commitments that I take all standpoint 
theorists to share, before narrowing in on specific iterations of the view.  
 I argue that the general version of the standpoint thesis might be understood as follows: 
(S) For certain propositions p, whether S is in a position to know that p depends on some 
non-epistemic social facts about S. 
The general thesis does not specify which non-epistemic social facts make a difference to what 
S, the epistemic agent, is in a position to know. However, of primary concern to the standpoint 
epistemologist is the relationship between one’s position of marginalization or dominance in a 
social system and what one can know (or fail to know) given that social positioning. The more 
rarified versions of the standpoint thesis spell this out in more detail. For now, it’s important to 
understand what the general thesis means.  
 First, it’s worth noting that standpoint epistemologists restrict their claim to the social 
domain. Thus, when I speak of ‘certain propositions’, I mean certain social propositions. 
Characterizing the social domain is difficult, but propositions regarding the oppression of 
members of marginalized groups are paradigmatic of the sort I have in mind here when I speak 
of the social domain.  
 Next, we should unpack what it means to say that ‘S is in a position to know that p’. There 
is a sense in which it’s trivial that certain non-epistemic features make a difference to what we 
are in a position to know. To illustrate, the fact that I am seated in the front of the classroom 
means that I am in a position to know that the speaker is to my left, that the chalkboard is 
directly in front of me, and that there are several colleagues seated to my right. But were I to turn 
around, I would also be in a position to know that there is a phone hanging on the back wall, that 
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there is a clock in the back-center of the room, or precisely how many other attendees are seated 
behind me. The place that I am sitting is a non-epistemic fact and it makes a difference to what I 
am in a position to know.  
 But I mean something more than this here. I mean to defend the claim that certain non-
epistemic facts related to one’s social identity make a difference to what we are in a position to 
know. For instance, one’s social identity may make a difference to what evidence one has, 
whether one recognizes evidence as such, what claims one entertains, and so on.15 To the extent 
that social identity changes evidence, it’s different than the way in which changing one’s seat 
changes one’s evidence. It’s not merely a difference in degree, rather, social identity ‘opens one 
up’ to evidence in ways that aren’t modeled by the traditional epistemologist. And it is this sense 
in which one’s social identity, a non-epistemic feature, makes a difference to what one is in a 
position to know. Or so I hope to show.  
 Finally, let me note the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic features, and the 
role this distinction plays in the debate between standpoint epistemologists and traditional 
epistemologists. While I do not have a precise definition of when a feature is epistemic, 
traditional epistemologists take epistemic features to be those features that are truth-conducive - 
that is, features that make a belief more likely to be true. Paradigmatic examples give us a strong 
grasp of this category of features: examples include evidence, justification, truth, reliability, and 
so on. 
 By contrast, standpoint epistemologists stipulate that features beyond these, features that 
are traditionally taken not to be truth-conducive, may make a difference to whether an epistemic 
                                                
15 Unlike in the example above, one cannot simply alter one’s social identity (in the same way one can change one’s 
spatial location) within a social system and thereby change what one is in a position to know. 
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agent knows some proposition or not. In this respect, standpoint epistemology shares a number 
of features with views like pragmatic encroachment (Stanley 2005). 
 Consider, by way of comparison, pragmatic encroachment, the view that practical facts 
make a difference to what an epistemic agent knows. According to traditional epistemologists, 
practical facts neither make a belief more or less likely to be true. However, pragmatic 
encroachers have offered strong intuitive reasons for thinking that such facts make it more or less 
difficult for a person to know some proposition. Thus, the pragmatic encroacher argues that some 
non-epistemic features (the practical facts) make a difference to what a person knows.  
 In a similar spirit, we might interpret the standpoint epistemologist as arguing that certain 
non-epistemic features related to one’s social situatedness make it more or less difficult to know 
some propositions in the social domain. For example, the standpoint epistemologists might argue 
that is easier for women, who are disproportionately more likely to experience workplace 
harassment than their male colleagues, to recognize such harassment when it occurs. Or, at least, 
this is the sort of claim I hope to motivate here.  
(i) Additional Commitments  
What I have described above might be properly referred to as the situated knowledge thesis. This 
thesis is one of a cluster of claims to which the standpoint epistemologist is committed. But 
accounts disagree about which facets of one’s situatedness make such a difference. It is this 
distinction I will explore further in the next sections. For now, there are two other theses worth 
noting that are central to the standpoint epistemologist: the epistemic privilege thesis and the 
achievement thesis.  
 The epistemic privilege thesis is the idea that some ‘epistemic advantage’ can be drawn 
from the position of marginalization. In other words, this thesis suggests that such positions 
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allow for better, more accurate knowledge. Elsewhere, I have argued that the best interpretation 
of this thesis has us understand it as the claim that some epistemic agents who are positioned in a 
certain way have some epistemic advantages such that they are more likely to form true beliefs. 
In order to defend the epistemic privilege thesis, the standpoint theorist must offer an account of 
how such an epistemic advantage is achieved. 
 In defense of epistemic privilege, standpoint epistemologists have examined the role that 
vulnerability within a social system plays in producing a dual perception of that system. 
Following W.E.B. Du Bois (1903), standpoint epistemologists cash this out out in terms of 
double consciousness, which they interpret as the view that those who are socially marginalized 
possess the ability to see things both from the perspective of the dominant and from the 
perspective of the oppressed (Smith 1974; Collins 1990; Haraway 1991). Alison Wylie, 
following Patricia Hill Collins (1986), expresses this as the idea of an ‘outsider-within’, writing 
that the socially marginalized knower is  
…An “insider-outsider” who has no choice, given her social location, but to negotiate the 
world of the privileged, a knower who must understand accurately and in detail the 
knowledge that constitutes a dominant, normative worldview at the same time as she is 
grounded in a community whose marginal status generates a fundamentally different 
understanding of how the world works.” (Wylie 2003: 34-35) 
This ‘outsider-within’ status allows for marginalized knowers to comparatively evaluate both 
perspectives, and so engenders a more robust view of social relations. Dominantly situated 
knowers, by contrast, because they are not vulnerable to those whom they oppress, are under no 
comparable burden to consider the worldview of the oppressed. Consequently, “in systems of 
domination the vision available to the rulers will be both partial and perverse” (Hartsock 1983: 
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285), whereas the vision available to the oppressed will reflect dual perspectives and thus be 
more comprehensive and accurate.  
 Moreover, theorists suggest that epistemic privilege is conferred upon marginalized 
knowers because they have no interest in remaining ignorant of the conditions that allow for their 
oppression (Alcoff 2007; Mills 2007). Consequently, marginalized knowers are motivated to see 
the world clearly. Conversely, dominantly situated knowers do have some interest in remaining 
ignorant of the social conditions that allow for their dominant social positioning (Frye 1983; 
Tuana 2004). Thus, one might argue that because we represent the world, and states of affairs, in 
terms of our interests, that dominantly situated knowers are obstructed from seeing the state of 
affairs as being unjust.  
 However, it is worth noting that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition that 
one be a member of a marginalized group in order to claim epistemic privilege. It is not a 
sufficient condition because one may be marginalized but unaware of the significance of their 
marginalized status. And it is not necessary because one can gain access to the privileged 
perspective provided that one ‘starts thought from marginalized lives’16. In either case, what is 
required in order to gain epistemic privilege is that one becomes aware of one’s social 
positioning and come to the understanding that the predicament they are in is a result of that 
social positioning. This is the function of consciousness-raising. As such, let me turn now to the 
achievement thesis, which explores the relationship between epistemic privilege and 
consciousness-raising in more detail.  
                                                
16 Sandra Harding attributes this formulation to Dorothy Smith, who wrote of the value of thinking about a social 
situation from the perspective of Native Canadians. See Sandra Harding’s “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: 
What is ‘Strong Objectivity’?” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. L. Alcoff and E. Potter [New York/London: 
Routledge, 1993], note 30). 
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 The achievement thesis functions to offer an account both of how a standpoint is 
achieved and how access is gained to its situated knowledge. The project of consciousness-
raising serves both functions. Consciousness-raising involves the process of becoming conscious 
of one’s role in a particular social system and the features of one’s social situation that enable 
them to occupy that role. As Catherine MacKinnon writes, consciousness-raising involves a 
group’s “[seeing] their group identity as a systematic necessity that benefits another group” 
(MacKinnon 1991: 86). By way of illustration, in a patriarchal system, women serve the role of 
bearing children, caring for the elderly, and other such nurturing roles. The feature of their social 
situation that enables them to serve in this capacity is their being designated women, but also 
their being women within a patriarchal system that restricts women to (only) these roles.  
 Consciousness-raising functions so as to help members of an oppressed group (women, in 
the case I outlined above) become aware of their group identity in order to achieve a shared 
understanding of their predicament. Shelia Ruth, examining the role of consciousness-raising in 
the women’s liberation movement, writes, “…consciousness refers to awareness, to a profound 
sensitivity and comprehension of the conditions of women’s lives - social, political, economic, 
psychological and more” (Ruth 1973: 291-292). The project of consciousness-raising, then, 
requires critically examining the relationship between one’s social situatedness and one’s 
oppression (or oppressive role) within a social system. 
 A standpoint emerges through the practice of consciousness-raising. For instance, a 
women’s standpoint develops when women have developed a critical consciousness about the 
nature of their oppression as women. This standpoint is not something one occupies in virtue of 
occupying a particular social location or perspective; rather, it must be struggled for. To 
illustrate, a woman does not occupy a woman’s standpoint merely in virtue of being a woman; 
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rather, she occupies this standpoint because she has engaged in the process of consciousness-
raising.  
 Once a standpoint emerges, knowledge is made available from this standpoint. 
Borrowing language from Peter Railton, I propose that we think of a standpoint as a frame 
through which we engage with, and come to know facts about, the world. As Railton writes 
“Such framing is a matter of the expectations one brings to situations, the features of 
situations one tends to notice or ignore, the spontaneous interpretations of events one is 
primed to make, the possibilities for thought and action that come immediately to mind, and 
so on….They limit the otherwise unbounded and undelimited character of experience and 
restrict one’s scope of attention—not because one sees the frame, but because what one sees 
is seen through it.” (Railton 2006: 18) 
When an epistemic agent moves from seeing the world through the frame of the dominant, and 
shifts to seeing the world through the frame of the oppressed, she comes to have a new body of 
knowledge. Further, this knowledge is made available to anyone who occupies the standpoint. 
Again, this is not restricted to those who share the social perspective or location of the standpoint 
(e.g., women) but is available to those who engage in consciousness-raising regarding that 
standpoint (so men who have engaged in consciousness-raising can see through the frame of a 
women’s standpoint).17  
 While standpoint epistemologists differ with respect to the situated knowledge thesis 
(that is, they differ with respect to which aspect of our social lives makes an epistemic 
difference), they generally agree that a standpoint, and the knowledge generated by that 
                                                
17 Alternatively, one could think of the frame of those who are dominantly-situated as a frame that is distorting. 
Consciousness-raising is the process of this distorting frame being lifted and in so doing, making clear the scope of 
social relations. 
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standpoint, is not given but is achieved. Thus, I will largely focus my efforts in the next sections 
on exploring how accounts of standpoint theory differ with regards to the first thesis.  
 I begin in section two by exploring the historical material and material feminist accounts, 
which focus their attention on the relationship between knowledge and labor. 
2. Material Readings 
Standpoint epistemology can trace its genesis to the works of Karl Marx (1976/1867) and 
Friedrich Engels (2001/1932), George Lukács (1971/1923), and their analyses of the proletarian 
standpoint. The non-epistemic feature of significance in their analysis is that of material labor. 
Thus, I render this reading of (S) as follows: 
(SM) For certain propositions p, whether S is in a position to know that p depends on S’s 
relationship to material labor. 
This reading is general enough to capture both the historical-material reading and the material 
feminist reading it inspired. I’ll begin here first by tracing the development of the historical 
material reading and then move to the material feminist account. 
 It’s worth mentioning that these particular versions of the thesis have largely fallen out of 
fashion. But I will show, in section 4, that the material accounts, particularly the material 
feminist reading, are especially helpful in unearthing some new species of epistemic oppression 
of interest to scholars today. In particular, I’ll suggest the material feminist account helps us 
better understand what Nora Berenstain (2016) calls epistemic exploitation - a form of epistemic 
oppression which demands that women and people of color engage in unpaid (and unrecognized) 
labor in order to educate their oppressors about the nature of their oppression - and other forms 
of cognitive and emotional labor expected of members oppressed groups.  
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2.1 The Historical Material Account 
The historical material account of standpoint epistemology is so named because it is grounded in 
historical materialism - the view according to which the material conditions of a society's mode 
of production fundamentally determine its organization and development. This account explores 
how one’s relationship to a society’s mode of production makes a difference to what one is in a 
position to know.  
 The mode of production of interest under the historical-material account is that of 
capitalism. Capitalism is a mode of production in which “the worker sinks to the level of a 
commodity and becomes indeed the most wretched of commodities” (Marx and Engels 
2001/1932: 764). Under capitalism, the laborer himself becomes a commodity because his labor 
is sold to others, and is done so at a low price. Thus, we might think of capitalism, as Gayle 
Rubin defines it, as “a set of social relations…in which production takes the form of turning 
money, things, and people into capital” (Rubin 1975: 161).  
 Of specific interest to historical material accounts is how the social relations of capitalist 
society are reproduced. As Marx writes in Capital, “The capitalist process of 
production…produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and 
reproduces the capitalist relation itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage-
labourer” (Marx 1976/1867: 724). This particular set of social relations is structured such that the 
capitalist class, or bourgeoisie, profits from the surplus value of what the laborer, or proletariat, 
class produces. Surplus value is the difference between the wage that is paid to the laborer and 
what the products of his labor earn on the market. Thus, the goal of capitalism is achieved when 
the total value of what the laborer has produced exceeds the value of his wage.  
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 Historical material accounts of standpoint epistemology suggest that one’s class position 
within a capitalist system - that is, whether one is a member of the capitalist or the laboring class 
- is relevant to what one is in a position to know. As Hartsock writes, “material life (class 
position in Marxist theory) not only structures but sets limits on the understanding of social 
relations”, such that one’s relationship to labor can be expected to have consequences for 
knowledge (Hartsock 1983: 286). 
 In particular, historical material accounts investigate how one’s knowledge of the mode 
of production is sensitive to one’s class position. The laborer class will represent the world in 
terms of use-value - that is, they represent the value of what they produce in terms of the ends 
towards which it can be applied. The capitalist class, by contrast, will represent the world in 
terms of exchange-value -  what a product is worth in the market. Thus, where the capitalist class 
will value exchange over use, the laborer, because of his involvement in production (and because 
he is alienated from the value of what he produces on the market), will value use over exchange.  
 This will impact how each class views the material conditions of its society. The 
capitalist class will view the material conditions of society as being basically equal, and will 
represent the sale and purchase of labor as a contract between free agents. Further, the capitalist 
class will represent the conditions necessary for capitalism as natural, and therefore necessary. 
Thus, they will view the exploitation of the laboring class as a natural and necessary component 
of capitalism. 
 It is only by taking on the point of view of the laborer that one can “uncover the process 
by which surplus value is produced and appropriated by the capitalist, and the means by which 
the worker is systematically disadvantaged” (Hartsock 1983: 287). This is achieved via 
consciousness-raising among the laborer class, which begins with “the self-knowledge of its own 
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social situation and with the elucidation of its necessity (i.e. its genesis)” (Lukács 1971/1923: 
159). That is, laborers come to have an accurate understanding of their role within the capitalist 
system provided that they understand that 1) surplus value is created as a result of the 
exploitation of their labor and 2) the goal of capitalism is to reproduce and maintain this labor.  
 To the extent that class-consciousness is achieved, the historical-materialist claims 
epistemic privilege over questions of economics and history on behalf of the laborer class. As 
Lukács wrote, “Bourgeois thought judges social phenomena consciously or unconsciously, 
naively or subtly, consistently from the standpoint of the individual” (Lukács 1971/1923: 28). 
But, for the laborer class, “its class situation becomes comprehensible only if the whole of 
society can be understood” (Lukács 1971/1923: 20). Thus, the development of the laborer 
standpoint provides a vantage point from which they are able to survey the whole of society.  
 These are the general characteristics and commitments of the historical-material account. 
Material feminists, taking this as a guide, argue that the gendered division of labor makes way 
for a specifically feminist standpoint.  
2.2 The Material Feminist Account 
Like the historical material reading of the standpoint thesis, the material feminist version 
explores the relationship between labor and knowledge. But unlike the historical material 
account, the material feminist account explores the unique forms of labor in which women find 
themselves primarily engaged. Thus, this account explores the gendered division of labor and the 
manner in which this impacts the different bodies of knowledge men and women have.  
 Where the historical material account explores the role of the proletariat in the 
reproduction of capital, the material feminist account examines the role of women in the 
reproduction of labor - that is, the reproduction of workers. This account investigates those 
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activities that lead to this reproduction - housework, childbearing, and so on. Thus, while the 
mode of production of interest to the historical-materialist is capitalism, the mode of production 
of interest to the material feminist is patriarchy.  
 According to material feminists (Smith 1974; Hartsock 1983; Jaggar 1983; Harding 
1991) the gendered division of labor forms the basis for a specifically feminist standpoint. The 
institutionalized division of labor under patriarchy structures social relations and thereby 
structures our understanding of those social relations.  
 Many material feminists focus on the dual contribution of women to capitalism - their 
contribution to subsistence and their contribution to childbearing. First, women participate in the 
reproduction of labor power by turning commodities into consumable goods - the production of 
food, clothing, and other such tasks (Rubin 1975). Second, women are central in reproduction 
(Hartsock 1983). Thus, women literally produce a commodity in that they have children who will 
go on to become a part of the workforce. Ultimately, because women are not paid wages for 
these tasks (which are necessary for capitalism), this labor contributes to the production of 
surplus value.  
 Of course, in addition to this, many women also engage in paid labor. Thus, we see that 
women are subject to a ‘double shift’ of labor - working for wages outside of the home and then 
performing a second, unpaid shift, at home (Hochschild and Machung 1989). 
 Those who defend the material feminist accounts claim an epistemic vantage point on 
male supremacy (Hartsock 1983). Material feminists argue that because social relations are 
structured in such a way that women are responsible for caring for everyone’s needs, women are 
better able to see the ways in which patriarchy fails to meet these needs. Men, because they are 
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not similarly responsible and do not engage in these forms of labor, are at an epistemic 
disadvantage.  
 This account thus functions as an analogue to the historical material account. While 
historical-materialism suggests that laborers are epistemically privileged with respect to capitalist 
relations, material feminism holds that women’s role as reproductive laborers confers a better 
vantage point on patriarchy than that had by men. In particular, women are able to see, where 
men are not, the exploitation of women as “unpaid reproducers of the labor force and as a sex-
segregated labor force available for low wages” (Hartsock 1983: 303). Furthermore, women can 
see that “women's work is defined as inferior work, and inferior work is defined as work for 
women” (MacKinnon 1991: 92).  
 Of course, this epistemic privilege is only achieved provided that women have engaged in 
the project of consciousness-raising. Consciousness-raising involves women becoming conscious 
of the fact that there is a social reality they share in virtue of being designated ‘women’, that the 
standard for womanhood is one women did not create, and that  men benefit from the very social 
arrangements by which women are deprived (MacKinnon 1991). So, material feminism claims 
an epistemic vantage point not qua women, but qua material feminist (those who have engaged 
in the consciousness-raising project).18  
 The material-feminist account, as I have outlined it here, focuses on the contributions of 
women to capitalist patriarchy. It therefore focuses on the extent to which women’s labor, which 
is often unpaid and unrecognized, contributes to the goal of capitalism. But, women engage in 
specifically gendered labor beyond contributing to the production of surplus value. I turn now to 
labor which is under-discussed in material feminist literature.  
                                                
18 To be clear, this means that women are not epistemically privileged with respect to the patriarchy merely in virtue 
of being women. Rather, epistemic privilege is conferred in virtue of consciousness-raising. This relates to the point 
earlier - one can start thought from marginalized lives even if one does not occupy a marginalized social position. 
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2.3 Beyond Reproductive Labor  
While material feminist accounts focus on the exploitation of women under capitalist patriarchy, 
and thus explore their contribution to sustaining capitalism, we need not restrict our investigation 
to only those forms of labor that involve the reproduction of capital. A robust account of material 
feminist should also look at those forms of labor that are  distinctly coded as feminine. I suggest 
here that emotional and cognitive labor, performed disproportionately by women and people of 
color, are within the purview of material feminism.19  
 Mirjam Müller (2018) defines emotional labor as a form of gender-specific exploitation 
that involves  
…listening to the other’s worries, sensing that something is going on and providing space for 
the other to talk about it, keeping in touch, remembering important things in the other’s life 
etc. The currency of this type of emotional labour includes care, respect, attention, affection 
or empathy. (Müller 2018: 8)20 
This form of labor is one which is unevenly distributed among the genders and which women 
perform to a disproportionate degree. In part, Müller argues, this is because of gendered 
assumptions which view women as suited to these tasks because they are nurturing by nature.   
 Kate Manne (2018) also explores the unequal division of emotional labor along the lines 
of gender. Manne argues that because goods like “attention, affection, admiration, sympathy, 
sex, and children (i.e., social, domestic, reproductive, and emotional labor); also mixed goods, 
such as safe haven, nurture, security, soothing, and comfort” are distinctively coded as feminine, 
women are viewed as obligated to provide these goods to men, and men see themselves as 
entitled to these goods as provided by women (Manne 2018: 130).  
                                                
19 One could, of course, argue that these forms of labor do make the reproduction of labor possible. 
20 See also Arlie Hochschild (1985). 
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 Beyond emotional labor, women also find themselves beholden to performing cognitive 
labor. Cognitive labor includes the invisible mental work that involves organizing, keeping track 
of, and delegating tasks that need to accomplished in order to manage one’s household, office, 
and so on (Walzer 1996). Cognitive labor thus includes tasks like noticing you’re low on toilet 
paper, that the kids have upcoming doctor’s appointments, that laundry needs to be done in 
preparation for a trip, and other such errands. While men increasingly perform these tasks, it is 
still the case that women are expected to keep mental track of what has to be done and thus are 
responsible for delegating.  
 As both Müller and Manne note, women are adversely impacted by the expectation that 
they perform this kind of labor. For instance, in academia, women researchers are 
disproportionately asked to advise students, engage in additional service requirements (like 
serving on committees), and provide support for male colleagues (Guarino and Borden 2017; El-
Alayli, Hansen-Brown, Ceynar 2018). This impedes their career advancement because they have 
less free time than do their male counterparts (Müller 2018: 9). Further, women are punished 
when they fail to provide these services to which others believe they are entitled (Manne 2018: 
111). 
 Material feminist accounts of the standpoint thesis must take into account these forms of 
labor. These forms of labor are demanded of women and people of color under the white-
supremacist patriarchy, which views dominantly-situated agents as entitled to the emotional and 
cognitive labor that marginalized agents provide. These forms of labor are, in many cases, prior 
to the reproduction of labor that material-feminists investigate, such as housework. That is to 
say, women are able to contribute to these systems of reproduction by first participating in the 
emotional and cognitive labor necessary for these systems to operate.  
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 These forms of labor also result in different bodies of knowledge, given that the labor is 
divided around gender. Women, for instance, are better positioned than are men to know what it 
takes to make a household run smoothly, primarily because they are the ones attending to those 
tasks in the home. 
 Much of what I said about consciousness-raising and epistemic privilege on the material 
feminist account applies here. Regarding epistemic privilege, I suggest that material-feminist 
accounts widen their scope to include privilege, not just over male supremacy, but over the 
white-supremacist patriarchy that allows for white male supremacy, in particular. That is, 
material-feminist accounts of standpoint are better positioned to examine the ways in which male 
supremacy and white supremacy are mutually reinforcing systems of oppression.  
 Consciousness-raising must, then, involve examining how and why this labor has not 
been designated as labor. As MacKinnon suggests, this will entail recognizing that this labor has 
been marked as inferior because it is labor designated for women and people of color. Still 
further, it involves the realization that this is labor which is necessary in order to sustain the 
white-supremacist (or white capitalist) patriarchy.  
 Though material accounts of standpoint epistemology are useful as we think about our 
lives as they are structured around labor, this is but one facet of the human experience. The 
narrow focus of these accounts prevent us from considering broader elements of our social 
experiences, outside and beyond work, that might also impact what we know. As such, I will 
now take up the epistemic reading of standpoint epistemology, which explores the relationship 




3. An Epistemic Reading 
Beyond exploring the impact of labor relations on knowledge, some feminist epistemologists 
(Anderson 1995; Fricker 1999; Pohlhaus 2011; Dotson 2012) are also concerned with the more 
general social conditions and relations in which epistemic agents are situated. Other accounts of 
standpoint epistemology should focus more broadly, then, on the social experiences that socially 
marginalized knowers or groups have in virtue of their position of marginalization.  
 Gaile Pohlhaus (2011) has argued that marginalized groups develop a body of conceptual 
resources so as to understand the experiences they have in virtue of their marginalization.21 As 
such, I will cash this reading of the standpoint thesis out in terms of the conceptual resources one 
develops and utilizes as a result of the social position she occupies: 
(SE) For certain propositions p, whether S is in a position to know that p depends on the 
conceptual resources possessed by S. 
This reading is meant to capture the epistemic version of the general standpoint thesis. Before I 
explore how a standpoint emerges on this account, first let me say a bit about conceptual 
resources. 
3.1 Conceptual Resources  
Gaile Pohlhaus writes that these resources are tools epistemic agents use for understanding and 
evaluating their experiences. These resources include language, concepts and their associated 
criteria for sorting. Importantly, these resources “do not stand independently of experience” 
(Pohlhaus 2011: 718, italics Pohlhaus’s). Rather, as epistemic agents, we employ these resources 
to make sense of our experiences, and when our conceptual resources are inadequate to that task, 
                                                
21 Pohlhaus refers to these as epistemic resources, but I will refer to these as conceptual resources so as to avoid the 
implication that these resources are epistemic features. 
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we reform and revise those resources as necessary. Thus, conceptual resources are not stagnant 
but are subject to change as epistemic agents see fit.  
 Conceptual resources play an important epistemic role in directing our attention, in 
organizing our thought, and in structuring our reasoning. As such I will argue that these 
resources have important consequences for knowledge. This is especially so if, as I will show, 
the conceptual resources an epistemic agent has depend, in some cases, on her social 
experiences. To defend this claim, I turn now to work from Miranda Fricker on epistemic 
injustice.  
 Fricker has argued that epistemic agents are marginalized when they are excluded from 
meaning-generating, or interpretative, practices. A meaning-generating practice is one that 
guides, shapes, or governs our way of thinking about things (what some would call a ‘conceptual 
space’). For instance, legal scholarship governs what sort of acts we think of as unlawful. But, 
because women, for example, were formerly excluded from these practices, they neglected to 
consider and regulate the sorts of oppressive behaviors to which women are sometimes subjected 
- among these, sexual harassment, date rape, and marital rape.  
 Like Fricker, Pohlhaus argues that the exclusion of certain epistemic agents from 
participation in these meaning-generating practices has resulted in the marginalization of these 
agents. These agents are marginalized, she claims, because they lack the conceptual resources 
required to understand the experiences they have.22 Fortunately, Pohlhaus and Fricker both argue 
that marginalized epistemic agents, seeing the inadequacy of the available conceptual resources, 
can develop a new body of resources with which to understand their experiences.23  
                                                
22 This is what Miranda Fricker  (1999) refers to as a hermeneutical injustice. 
23 Miranda Fricker used the work of Susan Brown Miller and the case of Carmita Wood to argue that women 
developed the concept of sexual harassment to fill a void in the existing conceptual lexicon. 
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 Consider, as an example, the concept of ‘colorism’. To my knowledge, Alice Walker first 
introduced this term, defining colorism as “prejudicial or preferential treatment of same-race 
people based solely on their color” (1983: 290-291). In particular, colorism involves 
discrimination against, or preferential treatment of, certain people because of their proximity to 
whiteness. This includes, for instance, preferring lighter skinned black people to darker skinned 
ones. But it might also include, for example, discounting the narratives of lighter skinned black 
people or refusing to consider them members of the black community.  
 I first experienced colorism as a senior in high school, though at the time I did not have 
the conceptual resources needed to understand my experience. A college recruiter from a 
historically-black college/university (HBCU) visited to offer me a scholarship. But upon meeting 
me, he didn’t review the offer with me; instead, he handed me a packet with information and 
immediately departed. I later gathered that it is unusual for a college recruiter to behave in this 
way, and I inferred that what ultimately best explained what happened was that he was surprised 
(and perhaps, disappointed) by the fact that I am a fairly light-skinned biracial woman.  
 At the time, I knew that there was something unnerving and hurtful about the experience. 
But, as I did not possess the concept for colorism, I did not fully understand what had occurred, 
or why. It wasn’t until many years later, when I acquired the concept, that I realized this was an 
instance of colorism. Learning this concept threw into sharp relief an experience that had been 
somewhat vague for me until then.  
 Moreover, learning this concept helped me to recognize other instances of colorism that I 
had previously overlooked. For instance, I began to notice that when black actresses are featured 
on the cover of magazines, they are often whitewashed. Still further, it appears that more roles 
are made available for lighter-skinned black actresses than darker-skinned actresses. And lighter-
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skinned actresses, models, and singers appear on magazine covers more often than their darker-
skinned peers.  
 The development of the concept for colorism better helps us attend to a phenomenon that 
was otherwise uninterrogated. This concept goes beyond racism, which merely involves 
discrimination based on race, and is meant to capture a more nuanced form of tone-based 
discrimination whereby people are rewarded for presenting as white, and ostracized when they 
fail to. It therefore captures a wide range of experiences that ‘racism’ will make obscure or 
opaque.  
 There are a number of other conceptual resources that have been developed by 
marginalized communities to attend to the unique aspects of their social experiences. Examples 
include ‘misogynoir’, as coined by Moya Bailey (2013), which describes the particular form of 
racialized sexism that black women face; the term ‘microaggression’, which captures the subtle 
forms of discrimination that people of color and women experience daily (Sue 2010); and as 
Miranda Fricker has noted, ‘sexual harassment’, a concept that allowed women to better 
understand and identify the work place harassment to which they were subjected.  
 I argue that the development of these resources depends on the social experiences that we 
have. Women of color experience misogynoir when they are accused of being overly angry or 
overly sexual as compared to other women; Latinx-individuals experience a microaggression 
when they are routinely asked where they are really from; and women experience sexual 
harassment when their bodies are sexualized in the workplace. 
 Marginalized groups need terms that enable them to make sense of these experiences. 
These resources allow marginalized knowers to understand what they are experiencing and to 
attend to similar experiences in the future.  
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 Dominantly-situated knowers, who do not have these experiences, will not need these 
resources. Thus, the conceptual resources we have will depend on the social experiences that we 
need to describe. Consequently, I suggest that marginalized knowers and dominantly situated 
knowers, because they have different social experiences, will have a different body of conceptual 
resources. This has important consequences for what we can come to know.  
 Although there are conceptual resources shared by all epistemic agents, marginalized 
social groups will have conceptual resources in addition to those that are shared by all agents. As 
such, marginalized knowers may come to have a body of knowledge that is unavailable to 
dominantly situated knowers who lack the concepts needed for knowing. Consequently, I submit 
that dominantly situated knowers who do not possess the concepts developed by marginalized 
knowers will overlook whole parts of the world that those resources attend to. If an epistemic 
agent does not have a particular conceptual resource, it will be difficult for them to notice or 
attend to the fact picked out by that resource.  
 By way of illustration, consider the recently popularized research of the Himba tribe in 
Namibia (Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro 2006).24  As Roberson, et.al’s research has 
established, the Himba tribe, who lack the concept for the color picked out by the English word 
‘blue’, could not correctly identify the odd square out when shown a group of eleven green 
squares and one blue one. The research thus suggests that without the concept for ‘blue’, 
members of the Himba tribe fail to attend to the color (i.e. they fail to see what is distinct about 
it), when they are presented with it.  
 In the same vein, a dominantly situated knower who lacks the concept of colorism may 
fail to realize that this is what I experienced in the example described above. In fact, they may 
                                                
24 Popular dissemination of this research is evidenced by articles in magazines such as Business Insider and Science 
Alert, but the original research appears in the work cited. 
 64 
fail to see that anything off-color happened at all. Or, it may strike them as an ordinary 
occurrence that warrants no further investigation.  
 Of course, even when dominantly situated knowers come to learn of these conceptual 
resources, there may still be an issue of uptake. Dominantly situated knowers may be reluctant to 
adopt the resources developed by marginalized communities. In part, this is because dominantly 
situated knowers may suspect that the newly developed concept picks out, or attends, to nothing. 
As such, there are whole parts of social reality that marginalized knowers are well-poised to 
investigate and analyze, and that dominantly situated knowers may ignore entirely.  
 Conceptual resources are but one part of the epistemic standpoint, however. Work must 
be done, still, to explain how an epistemic standpoint emerges. Let me turn to that task now.  
3.2 An Epistemic Standpoint 
As I said earlier, feminist epistemologists who offer an epistemic account of the standpoint thesis 
shift their analysis from one’s relationship to labor to the social experiences a knower (or group) 
has as a consequence of their marginalization. Consequently, a standpoint emerges, in part, as a 
result of the shared social experiences of a particular marginalized group. Additionally, as I 
suggested above, the emergence of a standpoint depends on that marginalized group developing 
the conceptual resources necessary to understand their social experiences.  
 A standpoint emerges in several stages. The first stage occurs when a group of people 
share that they have had a similar social experience, and recognize that this experience is one 
they have because of some aspect of their social identity. As an example, consider a group of 
black men and women who confide in each other that they have been excluded from certain 
events or groups because they are darker skinned, or have been subject to greater punishment or 
harsher treatment than their lighter-skinned peers, even when they engage in the same sort of 
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behavior. This group will come to realize that this is an experience they all share, and that it is an 
experience they share because they are dark skinned.  
 This is the stage of consciousness-raising. Consciousness-raising, applied to this 
example, involves dark skinned black people coming to the realization that there are experiences 
they share just in virtue of the fact that there are darker skinned. It thus involves moving beyond 
the realization that 1) they are all dark skinned and 2) that this is an experience they all happen to 
share. That is to say, it requires that they realize that it is an experience they share because of 
their skin tone.  
 The second stage involves naming this experience. This requires developing the concept, 
if one does not exist already, to appropriately capture the experience they share. Thus, we see the 
development, for instance, of the term ‘colorism’ to name the experience this group shares as a 
result of being dark skinned. Equipped with this concept that names their social experience, 
members of this group are well positioned to notice other instances of colorism. 
 We might ask what makes this an ‘epistemic’ standpoint. I have so named it because the 
emergence of a standpoint on this account depends on epistemic agents having certain 
conceptual resources. If the group, described above, merely discusses their experience of being 
discriminated against but never attends to the unique flavor of it, they are not in a position to 
know anything about the world above and beyond what they know about their collective 
experiences. Thus, without the conceptual resource, there is nothing that unifies, organizes, or 
directs their thought. 
 Let me now briefly discuss how this account addresses the other commitments taken on 
by standpoint epistemology. This account claims epistemic privilege with respect to social and 
political questions relevant to the oppression of systematically disadvantaged groups. This 
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includes “the character, causes, and consequences of the social inequalities that define the groups 
in question” (Anderson 2017).  
 In part this epistemic privilege is the result of one’s status as an ‘outsider-within’. As 
Sandra Harding writes, those who are marginalized can “see patterns of belief or behavior that 
are hard for those immersed in the culture to detect” (Harding 1991: 124; see also Collins 1986: 
S15). But marginalized standpoints further claim epistemic privilege because their oppression 
gives them fewer interests in remaining ignorant about their social oppression; conversely, 
dominant groups are invested in maintaining or justifying their dominant social positioning such 
that it distorts their vision of social relations.  
 Regarding the accessibility of claims made from the epistemic standpoint, one need not 
be a member of a particular social group in order to make claims from that standpoint. For 
instance, someone who is white can recognize and classify an act as an instance of colorism. But, 
when it comes to developing the concept needed to understand a social experience, and realizing 
that the experience is one that is had because of some feature of one’s social identity, this work 
must be done by those who possess the social feature in question. Thus, the concept of colorism 
needed to be developed by people of color, since they are subject to this sort of discrimination 
and are thus in the best position to recognize and name the experience.  
 I have endeavored in the previous sections to establish two points. First, I argued that 
whether an epistemic agent is in a position to know some proposition in the social domain will 
depend on some non-epistemic facts related to the agent’s social identity. Second, I argued that 
one’s relationship to labor and one’s social experiences (and the concepts developed to 
understand those experiences) are two such non-epistemic facts that influence what knowledge 
one has.  
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 The project of exploring the relationship between social situatedness and knowledge is 
interesting in and of itself. But, as I will suggest in the next section, it is also a necessary project 
if we are to understand how and why the phenomenon of epistemic oppression arises.  
4. Understanding Epistemic Oppression 
I have endeavored, in the previous sections, to disentangle the various readings of the standpoint 
thesis that one might defend. In so doing, I aim to show that these readings can be used to better 
understand various forms of epistemic oppression discussed in the literature.  
 Following Kristie Dotson, I define epistemic oppression as the “persistent epistemic 
exclusion that hinders one’s contribution to knowledge production”, where epistemic exclusion 
is understood as “an unwarranted infringement on the epistemic agency of knowers” (Dotson 
2014: 115). Epistemic oppression occurs when some group (or members of some group) suffers 
some form of epistemic injustice in a systematic way. 
 I want to start here by offering a provisional taxonomy of epistemic oppression so as to 
make the clear the ways in which epistemic agents can be epistemically excluded from the 
practices of knowledge production. In order to do this, I suggest that epistemic oppression can be 
distinguished as either active or passive. Active epistemic oppression occurs when an epistemic 
agent is prevented from sharing her knowledge. Passive epistemic oppression, by contrast, 
occurs when an epistemic agent is prevented from acquiring knowledge.  
 I argue that hermeneutical injustice is a form of passive epistemic oppression. A 
hermeneutical injustice is one in which a marginalized knower’s “social experience remains 
obscure and confusing, even for them” because those experiences are excluded from collective 
understanding (Fricker 1999: 208). To illustrate, my inability to recognize my experience with 
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the college recruiter as an instance of colorism is a hermeneutical injustice that occurred because 
I lacked the term for ‘colorism’.  
 Willful hermeneutical ignorance and testimonial injustice constitute forms of active 
epistemic oppression. Willful hermeneutical ignorance occurs when a dominantly situated 
knower refuses to acknowledge or use the conceptual tools developed by marginalized knowers 
and, as such, fails to understand or misinterprets parts of the world (Pohlhaus 2011). This 
happens, for instance, if when I try to share with someone my experience of colorism, they 
refuse to accept that colorism is a real phenomenon and so dismiss my interpretation of an event 
as an instance of colorism. Testimonial injustice occurs when a dominantly situated knower fails 
to take seriously the testimony of a marginalized knower for reasons related to the marginalized 
knower’s social identity (Fricker 2007). This might happen if, for example, a darker-skinned 
black person fails to take seriously my complaints regarding my experiences of colorism because 
I’m light-skinned.  
 I suggest that other forms of epistemic oppression, like epistemic exploitation, may be 
both active and passive. According to Nora Berenstain, epistemic exploitation occurs “when 
privileged persons compel marginalized persons to produce an education or explanation about 
the nature of the oppression they face” (Berenstain 2016: 570) It is oppressive, she argues, 
because it is “marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic 
labor” (ibid). I suggest that this form of oppression is passive in the sense that existing social 
relations operate to occlude the fact that this sort of activity is labor.  Marginalized knowers are 
thereby prevented from classifying this sort of activity as labor. And it is active in the sense that, 
occasionally, when marginalized knowers try to share knowledge of their oppression with the 
dominantly-situated, they are met with skepticism or outright hostility.  
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 I will argue here that hermeneutical injustice and willful hermeneutical ignorance can be 
understood using the epistemic reading of the standpoint thesis. Next, I will argue that epistemic 
exploitation can be understood using the material reading of the thesis.  
 The existing versions of the standpoint thesis do not, I argue, provide us with the 
resources necessary to understand testimonial injustice. It is for that reason that I have sketched 
the general commitments of the view, in order to pave a way to construct additional readings by 
which we might understand other forms of epistemic oppression not discussed here. At the close 
of this section, I will gesture at an additional reading of standpoint epistemology that I believe 
requires more development, but that I argue can do important work in clarifying testimonial 
injustice. 
4.1 Epistemic Oppression and the Epistemic Reading 
According to Fricker, hermeneutical injustice occurs when a person’s “social experience remains 
obscure and confusing, even for them” because those experiences are excluded from the 
collective understanding (Fricker 1999: 208). Thus, on Fricker’s view, hermeneutical injustice 
occurs when a knower is unable to make sense of some aspect of one’s world because they have 
been excluded from playing a part in the collective understanding. Thus, one’s experiences are 
obscured, even from one’s self, because the interpretative practices necessary to make sense of 
that social experience have not yet been developed.  
 To illustrate, Fricker points to a memoir from Susan Brownmiller that details what we 
today name sexual harassment. Brownmiller recounts the experience of Carmita Wood – an 
employee in the Cornell department of nuclear physics – and a group of students who discover 
that they have all had similar experiences of being groped by men while in their workplace.25 
                                                
25 Although Fricker fails to note this fact, it is important to acknowledge that Carmita Wood is a black woman, as 
her intersectionality is relevant to her experience of sexual harassment and to her understanding of that experience. 
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Brownmiller describes the women’s decision to have a “speak-out in order to break the silence 
about this”, only to realize that the “‘this’ they were going to break the silence about had no 
name” (Brownmiller 1990: 281; quoted in Fricker 2007: 150).  
 According to Fricker, the existing hermeneutical resources left a “lacuna where the name 
of a distinctive social experience should be” (Fricker 2007: 150-151). As a result, these women 
lacked a proper understanding for what we are now easily able to identify as sexual harassment. 
They were thus wronged, in their capacity as knowers, in that they were prevented from 
understanding a significant part of their social experience. 
 Willful hermeneutical ignorance, on the other hand, occurs after marginally situated 
knowers have developed their own conceptual resources. Willful hermeneutical ignorance occurs 
when two conditions are met. First, marginally situated knowers have developed conceptual 
resources such that they are able both to understand and communicate their experience to others. 
And second, these conceptual resources are dismissed by dominantly situated knowers, thus 
rendering unintelligible the claims made by marginally situated knowers.  
 To elaborate, willful hermeneutical ignorance occurs when dominantly situated knowers 
fail “to enter into cooperative interdependence with marginally situated knowers” (Pohlhaus 
2011: 725). Unlike with mere hermeneutical injustice, in cases of willful hermeneutical 
ignorance, a marginally situated knower has developed the resources needed to make sense of 
her social experience. However, dominantly situated knowers either fail, or refuse, to utilize 
those resources in order to enter a collective understanding with the marginally situated knower. 
As a result, dominantly situated knowers remain willfully ignorant, both of what the marginally 
situated knower is attempting to communicate, and of the marginally situated knower’s 
conceptual resources.  
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 Pohlhaus invites us to consider willful hermeneutical ignorance as it applies to concepts 
like ‘white privilege’ or ‘date rape’. As she writes, although “having a [conceptual] resource like 
the concept of ‘date rape’ alleviates an epistemic injustice, anyone who has discussed this issue 
on a college campus knows that there is still a good deal of epistemic injustice thwarting the use 
of this concept for knowing the world well” (ibid: 724).  
 Additionally, one might consider concepts like ‘marital rape’. Until epistemic agents 
began to use the conceptual resources necessary to understand marital rape, many failed to 
recognize that a rape victim’s perpetrator could be their spouse. As such, we failed to afford 
these victims protections against this sort of abuse until well into the 1990s (Ryan 1995). 
 Pohlhaus provides a further case, drawing from an example first used by Fricker from To 
Kill a Mockingbird. Consider the following excerpt from the novel: 
“You felt sorry for her, you felt sorry for her?” Mr. Gilmer seemed ready to rise to the 
ceiling. 
The witness realized his mistake and shifted uncomfortably in his chair. But the damage was 
done. Below us, nobody liked Tom Robinson’s answer. Mr. Gilmer paused a long time to let 
it sink in. (Quoted in Fricker 2007: 24; italics in original)26 
Pohlhaus argues that Robinson is only able to ‘realize his mistake’ because he understands that 
the jury will misinterpret his words. That is, Robinson realizes that the jury will not use the same 
conceptual resources that he is to understand why it is that he felt pity for Mayella. Instead, given 
the conceptual resources of their white supremacist framework, they will fail to see that it is 
possible for there to be a genuine connection between Mayella, a poor unwed white woman, and 
Robinson, a poor, black man. As Pohlhaus writes, “Robinson’s feelings and his reasoning have 
                                                
26 Note that Fricker uses this example to motivate her case for testimonial injustice. Pohlhaus instead argues that this 
case more clearly exemplifies willful hermeneutical ignorance. 
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no proper expression readily available using [conceptual] resources calibrated solely to the 
experienced world of those who live in positions of privilege under patriarchal white supremacy” 
(Pohlhaus 2011: 727). Thus, the members of the jury misunderstand Robinson because they have 
not yet begun to use the conceptual resources that would allow for them to understand what 
Robinson knows.  
 There’s a clear sense in which these two categories of epistemic oppression are tied 
specifically to the epistemic reading of (S). Thinking about standpoint epistemology in terms of 
conceptual resources, and the relationship between a knower’s social location and the conceptual 
resources she employs, helps to make clear why these various forms of epistemic oppression 
occur.  
 According to Pohlhaus, there are conceptual resources that are part of our shared 
conceptual repertoire, but these resources have largely been influenced by dominantly situated 
knowers. In part because, as I discussed earlier, marginalized knowers are largely excluded from 
the meaning-generating practices in which we develop new conceptual resources. The result is 
that the predominant conceptual resources are not suited to make sense of those experiences. 
 Prior to the development of their own, independent conceptual resources, marginalized 
groups will be utilizing the resources of the dominant standpoint. And because those resources 
were not developed with the social experiences of the marginalized in mind, those resources will 
not be useful to marginalized groups as they attempt to interpret their social experiences. This 
results in hermeneutical injustice: “the social experiences of members of hermeneutically 
marginalized groups are left inadequately conceptualized and so ill-understood, perhaps even by 
the subjects themselves” (Fricker 2007: 6-7).   
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 It is because (SE) reveals that our conceptual resources are not independent of our social 
experiences that we are able to see the way in which marginalized groups – whose experiences 
are not reflected in the predominant conceptual resources – suffer a hermeneutical injustice. Of 
course, epistemic injustice does not cease once hermeneutical injustice is eliminated, as the work 
still remains for those resources to be received within the larger social world. Thus, even when 
hermeneutical injustices are largely addressed, marginalized groups may still be subject to 
willful hermeneutical ignorance as they attempt to communicate their experiences to dominantly 
situated knowers. This sort of epistemic injustice is also distinctly tied to the epistemic reading of 
(S).  
 Consider that the situatedness of the dominant knower will not make salient those 
features of the world that the marginalized knower’s conceptual resources attend to. As a result, 
the dominant knower can use this fact to dismiss the knowledge claims of a marginalized 
knower, as well as to dismiss the conceptual resources required to understand those knowledge 
claims. This happens because the resources the marginalized group is using will appear to the 
dominantly situated knower to “attend to nothing at all, or make something out of nothing” 
(Pohlhaus 2011: 722). This occurs particularly because those resources will be drawing attention 
to features that are not within the experienced world of the dominantly situated knower.  
 Consequently, dominantly situated knowers may dismiss the conceptual resources 
developed from the perspective of marginalized standpoints before learning to use them. When a 
marginally situated knower’s conceptual resources and knowledge claims are dismissed in this 
way, the knower is subject to willful hermeneutical ignorance. 
 To return to the example from To Kill a Mockingbird, we see that the jury fails to 
understand what it is that Robinson is communicating because “dominantly situated people can 
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dismiss both the possibility that there is anything to be known here and any conceptual resources 
that might have been developed to make sense of the experienced world of the marginally 
situated” (ibid: 728). As Pohlhaus argues, this occurs because “marginally situated people cannot 
demonstrate to dominantly situated people that there is a part of the experienced world for which 
dominant conceptual resources are inadequate”, and still further, “ the marginally situated cannot 
call the attention of dominantly situated knowers to those parts of the experienced world, 
because the conceptual resources to do so are unavailable or preemptively dismissed” (ibid).  
 In both the case of hermeneutical injustice and willful hermeneutical ignorance, we see 
that marginalized knowers are obstructed in their capacities as knowers. This obstruction, again, 
is due to the inadequacy of the prevailing conceptual resources, either to understand the social 
experiences of marginalized groups, or to allow for marginalized groups to effectively 
communicate those experiences to dominantly situated knowers.  
 Next, let me turn to the material reading and its applications to epistemic exploitation.  
4.2 Epistemic Oppression and the Material Reading 
As I discussed previously, the material reading of the standpoint thesis is somewhat out of 
fashion. However, I will argue here that this reading is useful in shedding light on epistemic 
exploitation. Women and people of color are subject to what Nora Berenstain (2016) calls 
epistemic exploitation, a form of epistemic oppression in which marginalized knowers are 
expected to educate dominantly-situated knowers about their oppression. Epistemic exploitation 
might involve, for instance, a woman of color being asked to explain to white women why it is 
inappropriate for them to touch her hair. This work is exploitative, Berenstain argues, because it 
often goes unrecognized and uncompensated, and places an unfair burden on those who are 
already marginalized. 
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 I argue that emotional and cognitive labor constitute forms of epistemic exploitation. 
While Berenstain defines epistemic exploitation somewhat more narrowly, I suggest that 
including emotional and cognitive labor in this category captures the notion that, in performing 
this sort of labor, the mental energy of women and people of color is diverted away from their 
own projects, goals and interests in the service of someone else’s. Thus, emotional and cognitive 
labor, as Berenstain argues, “[maintain] structures of oppression by centering the needs and 
desires of dominant groups” (Berenstain 2016: 570). Rather than thinking of emotional and 
cognitive labor as being exploited in service of some other form of oppression, I argue that in 
and of themselves, these forms of labor are exploitative.  
 I have suggested that epistemic exploitation is a form of both passive and active 
epistemic oppression because 1) marginalized knowers are prevented, given existing social 
relations, from recognizing this activity as labor and 2) when marginalized knowers try to 
express that this is oppressive, they are met with skepticism, thereby preventing them from 
sharing knowledge they have. Just as the epistemic reading of the standpoint thesis served to 
investigate hermeneutical injustice and willful hermeneutical ignorance, material readings of the 
thesis should function so as to make clear why this particular form of epistemic oppression 
occurs.  
 Material accounts of standpoint epistemology investigate the role of material conditions 
(and the way in which we organize our lives around those conditions) in shaping inquiry. In 
particular, material accounts examine capitalism, and I have suggested, white supremacist 
patriarchy. Primarily, this is because capitalism and the white supremacist patriarchy serve to 
legitimize, or justify, the material conditions they bring about. I suggest that capitalism and the 
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white supremacist patriarchy perform this function through a number of means. In particular, I 
will focus here on the role of schemas and legitimizing myths.  
 Virgina Valian writes that a schema is a  
…mental construct that…contains in schematic or abbreviated form someone’s concept 
about an individual or event, or a group of individuals or events. It includes the person’s or 
group’s main characteristics, from the perceiver’s point of view, and the relationship among 
those features. (Valian 1999: 103)  
Gendered schemas, for instance, depict women as nurturers and care-givers, and men as warriors 
and providers.  
 Legitimizing myths, by contrast, are social narratives which serve to justify and maintain 
the position of dominant groups in a social hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto 1999). These myths 
“[indicate] how individuals and social institutions should allocate things of positive or negative 
social value” and serve as explanations for how the world is (Prato, Sidanius, Stallworth, and 
Malle 1994: 741). For example, they may justify existing systems of inequality by indicating that 
inequality is due to the innate inferiority of some groups compared to others (e.g. White 
nationalism, social Darwinism, and so on). Legitimizing myths include, for instance, racism and 
sexism, which provide a moral justification for discrimination along the lines of race and gender. 
Such myths attempt to naturalize social hierarchies by treating these hierarchies as naturally 
mandated.  
 While schemas function so as to shape our expectations, aid in the formation of 
generalizations, and make sense of the social world, legitimizing myths serve to justify the social 
world as structured. Importantly, legitimizing myths serve to justify our social arrangements by 
suggesting that those arrangements reflect natural inequalities. As Roland Barthes writes, “What 
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the world supplies to myth is an historical reality…and what myth gives in return is a natural 
image of this reality” (Barthes 1972/1957: 142). 
 We might, then, think of legitimizing myths as serving to justify our schemas. These in 
turn justify our organizing society in the particular way that we have. To illustrate: women are 
naturally suited to serving in the role of mother, wife, teacher, nurse, and so on, in virtue of the 
fact that they are by nature caring and giving. Thus, their subservient (and inferior) roles under 
capitalist patriarchy are legitimized by appealing to these myths.  
  I argue that capitalism and white supremacist patriarchy justify the material conditions 
they produce by the construction and maintenance of these schemas and legitimizing myths. 
They thereby justify the material oppression produced as a consequence. Legitimizing myths and 
schemas work together to engender a sort of blindness that inures us to the oppression produced 
by capitalism and white supremacist patriarchy. Schemas and mythes thus render invisible the 
oppressive features of capitalism and white supremacist patriarchy to those who benefit from it.  
 By drawing our attention to how capitalism and white supremacist patriarchy structure 
social relations, material accounts demand that we interrogate the oppressive social systems they 
enact and maintain. I suggest that material accounts make apparent the reliance on these schemas 
and legitimizing myths to justify our participation in an oppressive system.  
 Material accounts successfully accomplish this by making central the role of the practical 
productive interactions in producing knowledge. Social scientists Jack Spapeen and Leonie van 
Drooge define productive interactions as 
…exchanges between researchers and stakeholders in which knowledge is produced and 
valued that is both scientifically robust and socially relevant. These exchanges are mediated 
through various ‘tracks’, for instance, a research publication, an exhibition, a design, people 
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or financial support. The interaction is productive when it leads to efforts by stakeholders to 
somehow use or apply research results or practical information or experiences. Social 
impacts of knowledge are behavioural changes that happen because of this knowledge. These 
changes may regard human well-being (‘quality of life’) and/or the social relations between 
people or organizations. (Spapeen and van Drooge 2011: 212, italics in original) 
Thus, productive interactions yield information or experiences that are socially impactful in 
improving social relations.  
 This analysis of productive interactions is too narrow for my purposes. Practical 
productive interactions, I suggest, are broader so as to include those exchanges analyzing 
practical experiences and social roles. In particular, practical productive interactions are those 
interactions in which one attends to the type of labor in which they are engaged and the relation 
between that labor and one’s social relationships of production. Social relationships of 
production are those relationships we must enter into in order to survive, produce, and reproduce 
our means of life.  
 In Marxist terms, practical productive interactions thus involve investigating how one’s 
social positioning (as a laborer) is the result of a specific set of historical conditions. Namely, it 
involves realizing that one is a laborer in relation to a capitalist under a set of social conditions, 
i.e. capitalism. Practical productive interactions thus require that we critically interrogate the 
conditions of one’s labor and what structures make those conditions possible, i.e. the supporting 
schemas and myths.  
 This point also holds for the material feminist. Practical productive interactions involve 
an examination of how one’s status as, for instance, a caregiver (physically or emotionally) exists 
under a set of social conditions in which men are entitled to that care, i.e. patriarchy. Thus, we 
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see that emotional and cognitive labor is labor demanded of women and people of color, and 
owed to men, given the social relationships of production under white supremacist patriarchy.  
 Like productive interactions, practical productive interactions yield knowledge that is 
socially impactful. In practical productive interactions, however, the knowledge produced is 
knowledge of the schemas and legitimizing myths that are taken to justify one’s oppression. 
Practical productive interactions thus require a reassessment of the schemas that have been taken 
for granted even by those occupying marginalized social positions.  
 A dominantly-situated knower is unlikely to have such a practical productive interaction, 
both because they aren’t expected to engage in these forms of labor, and because they have come 
to represent these inequalities as reflecting nature. Moreover, the social relationship that 
dominantly-situated knowers stand in is that of beneficiary of the labor of others. For instance, 
the capitalist stands in relation to capital goods; men stand in relation to emotional caregiving. 
Thus, there is no need for them to consider the work that goes into the production of that good, 
so long as the good is produced.  
 In the case of epistemic exploitation (and emotional and cognitive labor) marginalized 
knowers are obstructed from recognizing their labor as labor, and from sharing knowledge of this 
fact once they acquire it. This occurs because capitalism and white supremacist patriarchy make 
this labor invisible to the dominantly-situated, and justify it by appeal to legitimizing myths and 
schemas. As these tools are successful to the extent that they seem to ‘naturalize’ inequalities, 
material accounts undermine these tools by questioning the legitimacy of these claims.  
 This is why, I submit, social movements challenging the underlying schemas and myths 
can be successful in dismantling capitalism and white supremacist patriarchy. As Meena 
Krishnamurthy (ms) writes in a discussion of white moderates and the Civil Rights movement, 
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“social movements can be and [are] used to help white moderates overcome their blindness”. In a 
similar fashion, social movements like feminism, #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, and so on, can 
help dominantly situated knowers overcome their blindness to anti-black rhetoric, misogyny, and 
other such oppressive schemas and legitimizing myths.  
4.3 Testimonial Injustice  
I have argued that we can understand hermeneutical injustice and willful hermeneutical 
ignorance under the epistemic reading of (S), and that epistemic exploitation can be understood 
under the material reading of (S). Where does that leave testimonial injustice? Unlike the 
injustices previously discussed, testimonial injustice cannot be understood using the existing 
accounts of the standpoint thesis. Let me briefly explain why I take this to be the case.  
 Testimonial injustice occurs as the result of identity prejudice (Fricker 2007: 27-28). In 
cases of testimonial injustice, identity prejudice influences a hearer’s credibility judgment such 
that a negative identity judgment of the speaker leads to a credibility deficit.27 The credibility 
deficit results in the speaker “receiving less credibility than she otherwise would have” (ibid: 
17). Put simply, testimonial justice occurs “when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated 
level of credibility to a speaker’s words” (ibid: 1).  
 To understand why testimonial injustice occurs, we must first ask what might lead an 
interlocutor to give a speaker a deflated level of credibility. This does not occur because of any 
failure of conceptual resources, as with willful hermeneutical ignorance, nor does it depend on 
one’s relationship to labor, as with epistemic exploitation. Rather, a credibility deficit occurs 
because a hearer assumes certain facts (related to reliability) hold about the speaker because of 
their identity.  
                                                
27 In contrast, a positive identity judgment may lead to credibility excess, in which a speaker “[receives] more 
credibility than she otherwise would have” (Fricker 2007: 17). 
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 As an example, consider that black women are less likely to be believed when they report 
cases of rape and sexual harassment (Crenshaw 1994). This does not occur because we lack the 
concepts for rape or sexual harassment. Rather, I suggest, it occurs because there are 
assumptions about the hyper-sexual nature of black women (Crenshaw 1994). I argue that 
because black women are essentialized as being sexual, and because “non-whites are often 
perceived through schemas that represent them as less rational and more identified with nature 
and the body than whites”, black women are less likely to be believed in these cases (Haslanger 
2008: 213).  
 Thus, I suggest that testimonial injustice occurs when the interlocutor holds certain 
ontological presuppositions about the speaker. As such, we need an account of the standpoint 
thesis that examines the relationship between one’s ontological commitments (about how the 
world is) and what one is in a position to know.  
 An ontological account of the standpoint thesis should investigate how our views about 
the essence of people and groups (among other features) impact what we can know. As an 
example, consider that if black people are viewed as being essentially lazy, then one might think 
poverty in the black community is owed to their laziness, rather than systemic forces that make it 
difficult for blacks to find good employment. 
 To date, no such account of the standpoint thesis exists. But I hope that this can serve as 
the prolegomenon for such a view.  
5. Why Traditional Epistemology Occludes Epistemic Oppression 
Epistemic oppression occurs, in large part, because marginalized knowers know some social 
facts that dominantly-situated knowers can’t, or find difficult, to know. As a result, dominantly-
situated knowers tend to discount the knowledge claims of marginalized knowers. I argue that in 
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order to understand epistemic oppression, we need to utilize the tools made available from the 
standpoint epistemological framework. To see this, I’ll start here by offering a case that is agreed 
upon in the literature to be a standard illustration of epistemic oppression. I will then analyze 
what the traditional epistemologists has to say about this case and why any explanations he has 
to offer will fail to adequately address the issue. 
 The case I offer here comes from legal scholar Patricia Williams (1991). Williams 
describes being denied entry into a Benetton’s located in New York City. The store is one which 
requires that patrons press a buzzer in order to gain entry. Though there were a number of other, 
white patrons in the store, Williams describes a white teenager approaching the door and smugly 
mouthing the words “we’re closed”. While an experience of outright anti-black discrimination, 
this in itself is not epistemic oppression. The epistemic oppression occurred later when Williams 
attempted to share her story in a symposium sponsored by the law review. The editorial board 
rejected her article for including a reference to race, which the board deemed to be in violation of 
their editorial policy.  
 What we see here, in particular, is willful hermeneutical ignorance. In asking Williams to 
omit the reference to her race, they fail to acknowledge that the experience is one she had in 
virtue of her race. In endorsing a race-neutral editorial policy, the board eclipses the experiences 
of people of color. In so doing, they commit a hermeneutical harm.  
 In analyzing this case, we can tease out a few important features that the traditional 
epistemologist will need to explain. But, as I will show, the traditional epistemologist does not 
have the resources to do so.  
 Let’s begin by unpacking the case described by Williams. First, we should acknowledge 
that Williams, as a black woman, occupies a marginalized social position. Second, let’s note that 
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the editorial board constitutes a dominantly-situated body, insofar as they have the power to 
determine collective meaning (by way of publishing, or not, certain works). Additionally, we see 
that Williams knows some proposition that the editorial board does not: p, that including a 
reference to race is relevant to grasping the explanation of the anti-black discrimination she and 
other people of color experience. Finally, we see that because the editorial board does not know 
this, they discount her knowledge by rejecting her article for including a reference to race. In so 
doing, they cause Williams to suffer an epistemic injustice.   
 In order to interpret this case as an instance of epistemic oppression, we need an 
epistemological framework that acknowledges that Williams has some knowledge that the 
editorial board lacks. Thus, to render this incident an illustration of epistemic oppression, we 
need an account that both acknowledges, and can explain: 
i. that Williams knows that p 
ii. that the editorial board doesn’t know p, or why p is more difficult for the board to know, 
and 
iii. why the editorial board might reject Williams’s claim to knowledge that p. 
I will briefly suggest here that traditional epistemology cannot satisfyingly explain these 
features. 
 As Allison Wylie notes, the conventional assumption in epistemology is that objective 
epistemic agents are non-specifically located and that they are neutral with respect to their 
subject of inquiry (Wylie 2003: 32). Following Rebecca Kukla (2006), I will call this assumption 
aperspectivalism. Aperspectivalism holds that it is a condition of knowledge that an objective 
epistemic agent’s claims to knowledge are perspective-independent. That is, according to 
aperspectivalism, for an epistemic agent to truly be said to know some proposition p, that 
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proposition must be one which can be known by any epistemic agent, regardless of the social 
perspective that agent occupies.  
 Traditional epistemology further holds, as a key assumption, that social and historical 
facts are irrelevant to epistemic questions. Perhaps even more strongly, traditional epistemology 
might think that not only are these facts irrelevant, but that they are distorting. To some extent, 
then, traditional epistemology views social identity as a feature that compromises one’s 
epistemic integrity (Haack 1993). Importantly, in endorsing these assumptions, traditional 
epistemologists assume that there is, in fact, some neutral, “view from nowhere”, from which 
one can acquire knowledge.28  
 Given the traditional epistemologist’s commitment to aperspectivalism, how can he 
explain that Williams knows that p? I submit that he can offer no satisfying explanation. The 
very fact that allows Williams to know p is her race. But, this is a feature that the traditional 
account suggests we disqualify from our analysis of knowledge. So there is some tension 
between the traditional epistemologist’s commitment to aperspectivalism, on the one hand, and 
explanations of (i), on the other.  
 The traditional epistemologist can, of course, maintain a commitment to 
aperspectivalism, but in so doing he will have to reject that Williams knows that p. And so, the 
traditional epistemologist will have engaged in epistemic oppression.  
 Still further, without appealing to the social identity of the epistemic agent in question, 
traditional epistemologists cannot explain features (ii) or (iii), either. An explanation of both of 
these features requires that we state why Williams’s knowledge is knowledge that the editorial 
                                                
28 I have argued in Toole (chapter 1) that these assumptions are associated with a particular version of traditional 
epistemology that Jason Stanley calls intellectualism (Stanley 2005).  
 
These assumptions are not without their own problems. I will argue elsewhere that these assumptions ought to be 
dismantled for themselves being politically laden. 
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board doesn’t have, and why they don’t have the hermeneutical resources necessary to come to 
have that knowledge. Again, this would require offering an account of how social identity factors 
into knowledge, which is in tension with other commitments held by the traditional 
epistemologist. So even if the traditional epistemologists granted that Williams has knowledge, 
he has no story to offer to explain (i-iii) above.  
 Though I believe that the traditional epistemologist ought to reject aperspectivalism, I 
will not now argue for that. I merely mean to show here that traditional epistemology, so 
construed, not only obscures epistemic oppression, but perpetuates epistemic oppression. 
Traditional epistemology constitutes, to borrow language from Kristie Dotson, a third-order 
epistemic exclusion. According to Dotson, a third-order epistemic exclusion “proceeds from the 
‘outside’ of a set of [conceptual] resources to throw large portions of one’s epistemological 
system into question as a result of the goals of a given inquiry” (Dotson 2014: 129). Third-order 
epistemic exclusions occur when the existing epistemological systems (in this case, the 
traditional epistemic framework) are themselves the source of epistemic oppression (as opposed 
to the inadequacy or insufficiency of the conceptual resources of a given epistemological 
system). Thus, epistemic oppression occurs not just because our epistemological system, so 
structured, has inadequate resources for understanding marginalized knowledge, but because the 
system itself is committed to assumptions (like aperspectivalism) that are epistemically 
oppressive.  
 Thus, I argue that in order to eradicate epistemic oppression, we have to alter the 
oppressive epistemological systems that allow for this oppression in the first place. Standpoint 
epistemology is one step in the right direction towards achieving this goal. 
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6. Redefining Epistemology 
Epistemic oppression has long been a part of our existing epistemic practices. This oppression 
has been neither subtle nor hidden, merely obscured from our understanding. My aim has been to 
show that standpoint epistemology is useful in that is gives us the tools needed to understand 
what we could not before. In the previous sections, I discussed the distinction between active and 
passive forms of epistemic oppression, and explored how each form can be illuminated by 
versions of the standpoint thesis. I argue that it is only by appealing to the standpoint 
epistemologist’s project that these forms of epistemic oppression are revealed. But I also defend 
a stronger claim: that we cannot make sense of these forms of epistemic oppression without 
making use of standpoint epistemology.  
 The conceptual repertoire of traditional epistemology is ill-suited to make sense of the 
experiences and knowledge of the oppressed. I have argued here that the oppressed have access 
to certain bodies of knowledge that dominantly situated knowers do not have. Standpoint 
epistemology succeeds, where traditional epistemology fails, in offering a story that accounts for 
this fact. 
 Traditional epistemologies, which are atomistic in nature, consider the gender, sex, and 
other features of an epistemic agent’s social identity, irrelevant to knowledge acquisition 
(Grasswick 2004). Still further, traditional epistemologies consider these distorting features that 
make it more difficult to acquire ‘objective’ knowledge. Traditional, atomistic epistemologies, 
long argued that epistemic agents can adopt a ‘view from nowhere’, and know some proposition 
without any reference to their situatedness (Nagel 1989). As a result, traditional epistemology 
fails to consider the role of an epistemic agent’s social identity in making salient certain features 
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(and in obscuring certain others), and how this consequently influences what knowledge she is in 
a position to acquire.  
 Traditional epistemologies presume that some knowers are in a position to make 
knowledge claims that are ‘neutral’ with respect to a standpoint. However, given that knowers 
are socially situated and interdependent, it is unclear that any knowledge claims are or can be 
made independently of a standpoint. In fact, as many feminist critiques have noted, perspective-
independence “itself is not a ‘politically neutral’ option in epistemology; rather, it is a piece of 
ideology, fueled by a history of specific interests and usually accepted without any argument or 
critical interrogation” (Kukla 2006: 82-83).  
 Haslanger also notes this in regards to challenging the prevailing ideology that governs 
much of philosophical thought. Philosophy might take itself to be a hallmark of ‘universal 
reason’, but in fact, philosophy often maps onto false dichotomies regarding gender. As she 
notes, the familiar dichotomies that govern much of philosophical inquiry - the rational versus 
the emotional, the objective versus the subjective, the mind versus the body - situate philosophy 
as “masculine and in opposition to the feminine” (Haslanger 2008: 13). Thus, our epistemic 
practices and ideals, far from neutral, are rather positively viewed as masculine, setting 
themselves over and against the feminine domain of emotion and subjectivity.  
 Consequently, presupposing, as these epistemologies do, that our knowledge claims 
ought to be ‘neutral’ or made without reference to a standpoint, excludes some knowers from the 
practices of knowledge-production and dismisses their claims from consideration as knowledge. 
Primarily, this occurs by holding the claims of marginalized groups to a standard that itself fails 
to be neutral. Traditional epistemologies themselves, which have long been governed by 
dominantly situated knowers, operate from the position of a dominant standpoint. In failing to 
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acknowledge this, traditional epistemologies are too quick to dismiss claims that conflict with the 
assumptions of their own standpoint. This occurs because traditional epistemologists fail to 
understand how their own dominant social positioning influences what features of the world they 
notice and what facts they are then in a position to know.  
 Simone de Beauvoir offers an example of this in her examination of how men respond to 
women who express disagreement with their claims. She writes 
In the midst of an abstract discussion it is vexing to hear a man say: “You think thus and 
so because you are a woman”; but I know that my only defense is to reply: “I think thus 
and so because it is true,” thereby removing my subjective self from the argument. It 
would be out of the question to reply: “And you think the contrary because you are a 
man,” for it is understood that the fact of being a man is no peculiarity (de Beauvoir 
1989/1949, xxi).  
As de Beauvoir captures here, women’s claims can be dismissed on the basis that those claims 
were made from the female standpoint. Men, on the other hand, who may take themselves to be 
in a neutral position, do not similarly see their claims as being subject to dispute because they are 
made from a male standpoint. Men thus reject women’s claims, in cases such as this, because 
they take women to be making knowledge claims from the female perspective, which lacks the 
objectivity of the neutral male perspective.  
 I argue that this point applies more broadly. Traditional epistemology perpetuates 
epistemic injustice precisely because it takes itself to be neutral and absent of the ‘peculiarities’ 
of gender, sex, race, and so on. But knowers are situated, and so too is our knowledge.   
 I want to close with an example from Rachel McKinnon, one which I think standpoint 
epistemology can explain easily but with which traditional epistemology will have some 
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difficulty. In this example, McKinnon considers how a male-to-female transition alters what a 
person is in a position to know:  
Now consider a trans woman who transitions in her 20s. I’ve spoken to many trans women 
who transitioned in their 20s or 30s who’ve had the experience where pre-transition they had 
no real concern about walking home on a particular route at night. But post-transition, they 
were acutely afraid of that same route, and they changed their behaviors according. What was 
taken to be known—that women experience fear and concern about walking home alone in 
the dark—took on a new depth of understanding when the same agent occupied the social 
identity and position of a woman being confronted with walking home alone in the dark. 
(McKinnon 2015: 437) 
These women came to know what they were not in a position to know before - that this route 
cannot be taken because it is dangerous. This knowledge is made available because they now 
occupy a woman’s standpoint.  
 There are myriad examples, both real and theoretical, like this one. And this knowledge 
cannot be dismissed simply because it is available from one standpoint but not another. But that 
is the route that the traditional epistemologist’s narrow conception of knowledge will have us to 
take. If traditional epistemology is to accurately represent the various forms of knowledge one 







Chapter Three: On Social Identity and Epistemic Peerhood: In Defense of Epistemic 
Privilege 
Standpoint epistemologists are committed to the view that an epistemic agent’s social identity 
makes a difference in what propositions she is in a position to know. Relatedly, many standpoint 
epistemologists have identified the further claim that some epistemic privilege can be drawn 
from the position of powerlessness. Rebecca Kukla, for instance, writes  
Most standpoint theorists have insisted upon two further claims: (1) that some contingent 
features of knowers can give them not only different but better, more objective knowledge 
than others have, and (2) that social positions of marginalization and structural disadvantage, 
such as those inhabited by women, African-Americans, or the working class, yield 
epistemological advantages, giving those who occupy them the potential to see truths that are 
inaccessible from the point of view of the dominant center. (Kukla 2006: 81-82, italics mine) 
Rachel McKinnon similarly suggests that 
…those with a particular situatedness— particularly those with oppressed intersectional 
identities—have, as a consequence of having their identity within a social structure, an 
epistemic advantage in accessing certain kinds of knowledge, especially of the structures of 
oppression themselves. (McKinnon 2015: 428 italics mine)29 
And Nancy Hartsock, arguably the progenitor of the view in feminist thought, analyzes this 
claim as it relates to the historical-material account of standpoint epistemology, writing 
In particular, I will suggest that like the lives of proletarians according to Marxian theory, 
women’s lives make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy, 
                                                
29 McKinnon’s wording suggests that one has epistemic privilege in virtue of occupying an oppressed social identity. 
This is the strong thesis. I will defend the moderate claim here, that one can engage in the process of consciousness-
raising and thereby achieve an epistemically privileged position. 
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a vantage point which can ground a powerful critique of the phallocratic institutions and 
ideology which constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy. (Hartsock 1983: 284, italics mine) 
Let’s call the idea that an oppressed social position affords for ‘better, more objective 
knowledge’, an ‘epistemic advantage’, or a ‘privileged vantage point’, the epistemic privilege 
thesis. This thesis, in some form or other, is present in the works of a number of other feminist 
thinkers, including Marilyn Frye (1983), Gayle Rubin (1984), Patricia Hill Collins (1986), 
Maureen Linker (2014), and Ashwini Vasanthakumar (2016), just to name a few.  
 The epistemic privilege thesis is controversial. After all, what does it mean for some 
knowledge to be ‘better’, or ‘more objective’? While some epistemologists merely resist the 
characterization of epistemic privilege as it is offered here, still others, including some feminist 
epistemologists, argue that we should give up altogether the idea that any kind of epistemic 
privilege can be attributed to those in the social margins (Bar-On 1993; Janack 1997). And even 
those who are open to the idea of epistemic privilege argue that the notion needs a radical rethink 
(Fricker 1997). 
 I believe that the controversy surrounding this thesis is owed primarily to unclarity and 
vagueness in the literature. We need not abandon the idea of epistemic privilege. Rather, the 
notion stands in need of explication and support. I will start here by offering one way of 
developing the epistemic privilege thesis that appeals to the notion of epistemic peers that is 
available in a separate literature. In explicating the epistemic privilege thesis in terms of more 
"mainstream" concepts or tools I hope the thesis can gain wider acceptance.  
 Next, using the epistemic privilege thesis, I aim to show that marginally situated knowers 
and dominantly situated knowers are not epistemic peers. In order to defend this claim, I first 
establish that marginalized knowers are epistemically privileged in the social domain. I then 
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draw on the peer disagreement literature in order to show that, in the social domain, dominantly 
situated knowers fail to satisfy the conditions for peerhood as developed in that literature.  
 Establishing that marginalized knowers and dominant knowers are not in the position of 
epistemic peerhood is an important task, and is of more than just idle theoretical concern. As 
several philosophers working on the topic of epistemic oppression have noted, certain epistemic 
harms are produced when dominant knowers position themselves as the epistemic peers of 
marginalized knowers. In particular, I’ll argue that such positioning results in the testimony of 
marginally situated knowers being devalued, dismissed, or discredited, or it functions to 
undermine the confidence of marginally situated knowers in their own judgments. My hope is 
that, in establishing that marginally situated knowers are epistemically privileged, we can better 
understand, address, and eventually avoid, such harms.  
 Before delving into the argument, I would like to provide a more nuanced 
characterization of the view I will be defending. The discussion above somewhat obscures the 
fact that there are two ways to read the epistemic privilege thesis: 
1. There is an epistemically privileged standpoint from which better, more objective 
knowledge is available, or 
2. Epistemic agents who are positioned in a certain way have some epistemic advantages.30  
The first reading suggests that, in virtue of being socially oppressed, marginalized knowers are 
epistemically privileged. This reading thus implies that some social perspectives are 
epistemically more valuable because they lead to objectivity in a way other perspectives do not. 
                                                
30 Other epistemologists, Bat-Ami Bar On (1993), for instance, have characterized epistemic privilege in terms of 
social distance from the social center. Thus, on these conceptions, the more marginalized a person is (and so, the 
further that person is from the social center) the greater epistemic privilege that person has. This is compatible with 
the first reading of the thesis. 
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This is a stronger reading of the thesis than I will defend. Instead, I defend the more modest 
second reading. 
 The second reading suggests that some epistemic advantage is available from, but not 
guaranteed by, one’s position of social marginalization. In order to draw this epistemic 
advantage, there is first a process of consciousness-raising, in which one develops a critical 
consciousness about the nature of one’s oppression (Wylie 2003). Consciousness-raising 
involves unmasking the ideological misrepresentations of the dominant, and recognizing the 
connection between these ideological misrepresentations and one’s own oppression. For 
instance, consciousness-raising among black women might involve recognizing how European 
standards of beauty are used to discriminate against black women who cannot or will not 
conform to these standards (by having curly natural hair versus smooth, silky hair).  
 There’s a sense in which the modest reading of the epistemic privilege thesis seems trivial. 
It’s obvious, for instance, that where you are seated in the room makes a difference to what facts 
about the room you know, and that someone with a better seat may have an epistemic advantage 
because of their positioning. But the epistemic privilege thesis is controversial because it suggest 
that features traditionally thought to be non-epistemic, like facts about one’s social identity, can 
offer some epistemic advantage. This is the claim I aim to make more plausible.  
 But before I do so, allow me to offer a few clarifications regarding my terminology. I will 
use the terms ‘socially marginalized knowers’ and ‘marginally situated knowers’ 
interchangeably. These terms all refer to socially marginalized agents who occupy an oppressed 
social location. Second, I will use the terms ‘dominantly situated knowers’ or ‘dominant 
knowers’ to refer to agents who do not occupy positions of social oppression. Finally, when I say 
that marginalized knowers and dominant knowers are not epistemic peers, this claim is restricted 
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to the social domain. Characterizing this domain is tricky. Largely, what I have in mind when I 
speak of the ‘social domain’, is those questions relating to the oppression, both political and 
epistemic, of members of marginalized groups, or those questions that have evidential relevance 
to where there is oppression.  
 To illustrate those questions which I believe are, properly considered, members of the 
social domain, consider the following propositions: “that some comment x is homophobic”; “that 
some act x is an instance of sexism (or racism)”, and other statements of this form. I believe 
these are paradigmatic of the sorts of questions I have in mind. I will here defend the general 
claim that marginalized knowers are epistemically privileged with respect to questions such as 
these. Consequently, I will show that with respect to such questions, marginalized knowers and 
dominant knowers are not peers. 
 This formulation does obscure questions of intersectionality, which, for the purpose of this 
paper, I largely set aside here. I do, however, wish to note that it is possible to be marginalized 
with respect to some social propositions but not others, and thus epistemically privileged with 
respect to some questions but not others. Cisgender, heterosexual Black men, for instance, are 
marginalized along the dimension of race, but not along the dimension of gender. Thus, black 
men, compared to white women, for instance, are epistemically privileged with respect to 
questions about race, but not with respect to questions about gender.  
 Here is the general plan for the paper: first, in section 1 I will provide two cases that I 
claim are representative of the phenomenon that I want to target and convey the importance of. 
These cases are designed to illustrate the epistemic harms I believe arise when dominantly 
situated knowers position themselves as the epistemic peers of socially marginalized knowers. 
Next, in section 2, I use the notion of epistemic peerhood to get a better grasp on the concept of 
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epistemic privilege. Then, in section 3 I offer four arguments that serve to explain how and why 
socially marginalized knowers are epistemically privileged. Finally, in section 4 I apply these 
arguments to the cases surveyed in section 1 to more concretely illustrate how, in the social 
domain, marginalized knowers and dominantly situated knowers are not in the position of 
peerhood because the former, but not the latter, are epistemically privileged in this domain.  
1. Two Cases of Epistemic Harm  
I aim to show that socially marginalized knowers and dominantly situated knowers are not 
epistemic peers in the social domain, and that refusing to acknowledge this perpetuates certain 
social and epistemic harms. We first need some examples that will help us focus on the issue in 
question. Here are two: 
Unwilling Barista: Elena is really looking forward to the in-house philosophy conference her 
department hosts every year, so she arrives bright and early, and in serious need of coffee. 
She greets her colleagues and bounds toward the coffee pot only to discover, after her first 
sip, no less, that this is yesterday’s coffee. So she brews a new pot. But when she returns for 
the much-anticipated cup, the pot is empty. It turns out that her fellow conference goers, all 
white men, really wanted coffee, too. Slightly annoyed, she mentions to her friend Preston 
how sexist it is that all the men waited for her to arrive and brew a fresh pot. But Preston 
replies “You’re overreacting - you see sexism everywhere! Isn’t it more likely that they just 
don’t know how to use the coffee pot?”  
 
Homophobic Frat: Damien is a gay man and a newly initiated member of one of his 
university’s many fraternities. He is thrilled at his fraternity’s open-minded outlook and 
embrace of openly gay men. But a few incidents lead Damien to believe that his fraternity 
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isn’t as open-minded as he thought. Worryingly, at a recent chapter meeting one of his 
brothers complained about the upcoming theme party requiring that all brothers wear the new 
male romper, remarking, “This dress code is gay!”. Damien mentions the comment to the 
chapter president, Mark. Damien suggests that the statement is homophobic. But Mark 
responds: “Are you sure? Sometimes gay people are too sensitive - I think it’s a harmless 
figure of speech.” 
Let’s begin by briefly analyzing what is happening in each of these cases. In each, a socially 
marginalized knower – Elena in the former case, Damien in the latter – is reporting that a 
statement, event, or behavior is problematic in some way. And in both cases a dominantly 
situated knower – Preston in the former case, Mark in the latter – is disagreeing with the 
marginalized knower’s interpretation or analysis of the event in question. 
 How should Elena and Damien respond, under the assumption that Preston and Mark are 
their epistemic peers, respectively? According to the popular Equal Weight View, which I’m 
adopting here, if you learn that a peer disagrees with you about some proposition, you should 
become less confident in your opinion about that proposition.31 Thus, if Elena and Preston are 
epistemic peers, then Elena should lower her confidence that her colleagues’ behavior was sexist, 
and increase her confidence that they just didn’t know how to use the coffee pot. In the same 
vein, if Damien and his fraternity president are epistemic peers, then Damien should lower his 
confidence that the statement was homophobic, and raise his confidence that it’s just a harmless 
expression.  
 However, to treat Preston as the epistemic peer of Elena, and Mark as the epistemic peer of 
Damien, facilitates at least two harms - gaslighting and testimonial injustice. According to Nora 
Bernstein, “gaslighting functions to undermine a person’s confidence in their grasp on reality 
                                                
31 The Equal Weight View is not without opposition. See, for instance, Kelly (2010) or Licon (2013). 
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leading to an overall sense of self-doubt and a lack of trust in one’s perceptions” (Berenstain 
2016: 580). Gaslighting is particularly pernicious because it has the aim of “getting another not 
to take herself seriously as an interlocutor” (Abramson 2014: 2), thus causing her to lose 
knowledge she once possessed.  
 Testimonial injustice, on the other hand, occurs when an hearer fails to take her 
interlocutor’s testimony seriously for reasons related to that agent’s identity (Fricker 2007). 
Gaslighting is a form of testimonial injustice (or so McKinnon 2017 argues) but it is distinct in 
this respect: when an epistemic agent is gaslit, the agent comes to doubt herself as a reliable 
source of knowledge (the agent is both the subject and object of doubt). In testimonial injustice, 
however, the epistemic agent is doubted to be a reliable source of knowledge by someone other 
than herself (thus, the agent is only the object of doubt), for reasons related to identity prejudice.  
 Arguably, in each of the cases described above the socially marginalized knower 
experiences both forms of epistemic injustice. However, I intend gaslighting to be the salient 
feature in Unwilling Barista. Consider Preston’s response to Elena’s plight. In suggesting that 
she is overreacting, he causes her to doubt that her analysis of the event is accurate. He instead 
implies that she is an unreliable judge by suggesting that she sees sexism even where there is 
none. He thus undermines her confidence in her own assessment, causing her to lose knowledge 
that she had - that her colleagues behaved in a sexist manner.  
 Regarding Homophobic Frat, read this case as a straightforward illustration of testimonial 
injustice. In order to dismiss Damien’s testimony, Mark invokes a collective conception of gay 
identity - that gay people are too sensitive. He then uses this collective conception to justify his 
rejection of Damien’s testimony. He thereby refuses to take Damien’s testimony seriously under 
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the assumption that Damien is an unreliable source of knowledge given his identity as a gay 
man.  
 I argue that these harms occur because Preston and Mark position themselves as the 
epistemic peers of Elena and Damien, respectively. In responding as they do, Preston and Mark 
assume that they are as equally qualified as Elena and Damien to evaluate what counts as sexism 
or homophobia. But, I will argue, this is a mistake. Using the notion of epistemic peerhood, I will 
develop a more tractable formulation of epistemic privilege that allows us to see that, in the cases 
described above, Elena and Damien are epistemically privileged, and as a result, Preston and 
Mark are not their epistemic peers.  
2. From Epistemic Peerhood to Epistemic Privilege 
As I have discussed above, the concept of epistemic privilege is somewhat murky. But we need 
the epistemic privilege thesis in order to show that socially marginalized knowers, like Elena and 
Damien, need not lower their confidence in those cases where dominantly situated knowers 
disagree with their assessments. So work must be done to bring some clarity to this notion.  
 My aim here is to explain the nature of epistemic privilege by appealing to the notion of 
epistemic peers as it has been developed in the peer disagreement literature. The concept of 
epistemic peerhood is central to the discussion of peer disagreement, in part because whether we 
ought to respond to disagreement by rationally adjusting our confidence, or remaining steadfast 
in our beliefs, depends on whether the person with whom we disagree is a peer or not. To 
illustrate, consider this example, popularized by David Christensen (2007):  
Mental Math. My friend and I have been going out to dinner for many years. We always tip 
20% and divide the bill equally, and we always do the math in our heads. We’re quite 
accurate, but on those occasions where we’ve disagreed in the past, we’ve been right equally 
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often. This evening seems typical, in that I don’t feel unusually tired or alert, and neither my 
friend nor I had more wine or coffee than usual. I get $43 in my mental calculation, and 
become quite confident of this answer. But then my friend says she got $45.  
How I ought to respond to the disagreement in this case turns on whether I take my friend to be 
an epistemic peer. If I take us to be peers, then I ought to modify my confidence. But if I do not 
regard her as my peer, then I may be under no such requirement.32 But the question remains: how 
do I determine if she is my peer? 
 According to some working on this topic, an epistemic peer is “someone who is, 
somewhat roughly, antecedently as likely as you are to get things right (on matters of the 
relevant kind)” (Enoch 2010: 956; see also Elga 2007 and arguably Christensen 2007). This 
leaves us with an even more difficult question: how am I to determine whether my friend is 
antecedently as likely to get things right as am I? This is the question that needs answering.  
 A more tractable way of answering this question can be had if we appeal to two other 
characterizations of peerhood available in the literature. The first comes from Thomas Kelly, 
who describes an epistemic peer as someone who is “[equal] with respect to their familiarity with 
the evidence and arguments which bear on the question” (Kelly 2010: 174). A person who 
satisfies this condition is an evidential equal. The second condition, suggested by Jennifer 
Lackey, is that an epistemic peer is someone who is “equally competent, intelligent, and fair-
minded in their assessment of the evidence and arguments that bear on the question” (Lackey 
2010: 302). Lackey calls this a cognitive equal. 
                                                
32 Of course, it’s true that even if my friend is not quite my epistemic peer, the fact that she disagrees may be some 
reason to modify my confidence a little, though not as much as I would if she were my epistemic peer. That is, I 
should not, in such a case, allow my friend’s disagreement to undermine my confidence that what we owe really is 
$43 (I should not, for instance, suspend judgment). For a mathematical approach to this question, see Elga (2007). 
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 I confess consternation as to what Lackey may mean by ‘equally intelligent and fair-
minded’. As such, I center my attention on her stipulation that an epistemic peer is someone who 
is ‘equally competent’, as I take it there is a shared intuitive grasp for what it means to be 
competent with respect to one’s evidence. For the sake of clarity, however, let me state that by 
‘equally competent’, I mean one is equally competent at adopting the confidence their evidence 
makes rational, and inferring, on the basis of one’s evidence, what one has a rational permission 
to infer.  
 Applying these conditions to Mental Math, I can establish that my friend is my epistemic 
peer if she is equally as likely as I am to get things right, and this is true when she 
1. Has equally strong evidence relevant to the question at hand, and  
2. Is equally competent with respect to the evidence relevant to the question at hand.  
If my friend either fails to be my evidential equal or my cognitive equal, then it follows that she 
is not my epistemic peer. I suggest that epistemic privilege can be defined in such a way that it 
parallels this characterization of epistemic peerhood.  
2.1 Epistemic Privilege Examined 
Where Christensen, Elga, Enoch, and others have suggested that peerhood is met when someone 
is equally likely as you are to be correct, I suggest that epistemic privilege is met when someone 
is more likely to be correct. I argue that a person is more likely to be correct when she either 
1. Has a greater body of evidence, or 
2. Is more competent with respect to the evidence relevant to the question at hand.   
Thus, a person is epistemically privileged with respect to some question when she is either an 
evidential superior or a cognitive superior.  
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 Let’s consider how this applies to a revised case of Mental Math. Let’s imagine that in 
this revised scenario my friend has indeed had more wine than usual, enough that it is impairing 
her ability to mentally calculate the bill. Let’s call this version Mental Math*. In Mental Math*, I 
am epistemically privileged with respect to the question of our total owed. In this scenario, my 
judgment is superior since she is impaired but I am not. At the very least, it’s clear in this version 
that we are not cognitive equals. We can just as easily modify the case so that my friend satisfies 
the second condition of peerhood but fails the first (if, for instance, we imagine that she just 
ventured a guess at the total independently of looking at the bill, then she would fail to be my 
evidential equal).  
 What I mean to demonstrate by Mental Math* is the following. If I am epistemically 
privileged with respect to the question at hand, then it follows that my friend fails to be my 
epistemic peer. Epistemic peerhood and epistemic privilege are, then, very closely related.  
 That some people are epistemically privileged with respect to a domain is not, by itself, a 
controversial claim. In fact, I believe examples of epistemic privilege abound in the literature. As 
Adam Elga (2007) notes, we defer to our weather forecasters both because we believe they have 
more information than we have, but also because we believe they have superior judgment with 
respect to that information. Still further, the concept of epistemic privilege helps us to make 
sense of a number of other practical cases. It is not controversial, for instance, to suggest that 
ultrasound technicians and auto mechanics are epistemically privileged over patients and auto 
consumers, respectively, because the former are either evidentially or cognitively superior to the 
latter.  
 Additionally, consider Sarah Stroud’s analysis of doxastic partiality in the case of 
friendship. Stroud argues that it is a constitutive element of friendship that we believe the best of 
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our friends. I hope I may be forgiven for merely reporting without much argumentation that I 
find this analysis to be somewhat implausible. But the intuition at the heart of this analysis is not 
irredeemable. To the contrary, I believe this is a prime example in which epistemic privilege can 
be put to good use.  
 Rather than thinking doxastic partiality is something owed to our friends, I argue that it’s 
rational to be partial towards one’s friend, even in light of contravening evidence, simply 
because one is epistemically privileged with respect to one’s friends. That is, when it comes to 
our friends, we have a greater body of evidence against which to consider new evidence.33 In 
defense of this point, consider the following example from Stroud: 
Suppose, for instance, that a third party reports that your friend Sam recently slept with 
someone and then cruelly never returned any of that person’s calls, knowingly breaking that 
person’s heart…[L]et’s stipulate that the story is not something which you know to be false. 
Rather, what is being presented to you is new information about your friend. (Stroud 2006: 
504) 
Assuming that this third party is merely an acquaintance, and not a friend, of Sam’s, it seems to 
me that you are epistemically privileged with respect to Sam’s character. That is, given your 
friendship with Sam, you have more evidence of his or her character than does the third party 
making the report. As such, your friendship places you in a better position to evaluate how likely 
it is that Sam knowingly broke this person’s heart. 
 The preceding examples, which I take to strongly motivate the analysis of epistemic 
privilege I offer above, demonstrate that epistemic privilege should not, at least as articulated 
here, be taken as controversial. And yet, the standpoint epistemologist’s defense of this thesis has 
                                                
33 Sarah Stroud argues that epistemic or doxastic partiality towards our friends is constitutive of friendship. Here I’m 
merely suggesting that friendship makes one epistemically privileged with respect to one’s friend. 
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been widely resisted. I take this to show that the real controversy regarding epistemic privilege is 
not about whether some people are epistemically privileged or not; rather, the controversy is 
about whether in virtue of being marginalized, marginalized knowers are epistemically 
privileged with respect to some question. 
2.1 Worries about Epistemic Privilege 
I believe this controversy is owed in part to the worry that claims of epistemic privilege conflict 
with the commitments of traditional epistemology. ⁠34 Epistemic privilege is anathema to 
objectivism, the view that knowledge is produced “only through dispassionate, disinterested, 
value-free, point-of-viewless, objective inquiry” (Harding 1990: 87). ⁠35 I  suspect this 
commitment to ‘objective inquiry’ is motivated, in part, because there is a lingering worry that 
knowledge that fails to meet this condition is somehow partial or distorted. There is a clear 
tension here, as the epistemic privilege thesis suggests that not only can knowledge which does 
not satisfy the condition of objective inquiry be produced, but that in some cases, that knowledge 
is more accurate.  
 Cassandra Pinnick (1994, 2005) raises an additional concern, asserting that there is no 
evidence to support the epistemic privilege thesis. Pinnick is quite strong in her rebuke of the 
project, writing, “any self-respecting epistemologist who places a premium on evidence-driven 
belief and justification ought not to accept the hypothesis” (Pinnick 2005:108). Worryingly, as 
Kristina Rolin (2006) notes, more than ten years after Pinnick’s 1994 publication, “the thesis of 
epistemic privilege still remains without evidence to support it” (Rolin 2006: 126). 
                                                
34 I am aware that what I call ‘traditional epistemology’ is thinly described here, but this merely serves an entry 
point to my argument and is not central to it. 
35 See also Daston (1992), Code (1995), and Kukla (2006). 
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 In the next section, I will attempt to vindicate the epistemic privilege thesis. I will argue 
that marginalized knowers and dominantly situated knowers gather different evidence and reason 
in ways such that dominantly situated knowers are epistemically worse off than marginalized 
knowers. In so arguing, I believe I can address both concerns canvassed above.  
 Recall, of course, that my principal aim here is to show that, in the social domain, 
socially marginalized knowers and dominantly situated knowers are not epistemic peers. I intend 
to establish this by demonstrating that socially marginalized knowers are epistemically 
privileged in the social domain. It is obvious, of course, that if dominantly situated knowers have 
less evidence or are less competent with respect to that evidence, then they are not the epistemic 
peers of marginalized knowers. But it is less obvious that marginalized knowers do, in fact, have 
greater evidence or are more competent than their dominantly situated counterparts. However, 
below I will provide a number of arguments that I believe adequately motivate this claim. 
3. Four Arguments for Epistemic Privilege  
Standpoint epistemologists argue that features of one’s social identity make a difference to what 
she is in a position to know. Here I will argue that not only do features of one’s social identity 
make a difference in what one in a position to know, but that it may, in some cases, make one 
more likely to form true beliefs. In order to defend this claim, I must show that in the social 
domain, marginalized knowers either have a greater body of evidence or that they are more 
competent with respect to that evidence. I will offer four arguments to defend this claim. The 
first three arguments I will appeal to will establish that marginalized knowers are evidentially 
superior to dominantly situated knowers. The fourth, and final, argument will show that 
dominantly situated knowers are cognitively inferior to marginalized knowers. 
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3.1 The Argument from Double Consciousness  
A well-known view that we can appeal to in order to defend the claim that marginalized knowers 
are more likely to form true beliefs comes from W.E.B. Du Bois (1903). The view I have in mind 
is that of double consciousness, or dual perception.36 I call this the argument from double 
consciousness.   
 Double consciousness refers to the experiences of African Americans who, due to their 
oppression, were forced to see the world both from their own perspective and from the 
perspective of their oppressors. Regarding this experience, Du Bois writes  
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self 
through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,— an American, a Negro; two souls, 
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose 
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (Du Bois 1903: 5) 
The concept of double consciousness suggests that when you are not dominantly-situated (in 
terms of race), you see yourself through two conceptions - first, as the dominantly-situated see 
you, and second, as you wish to see yourself. It further explores the inner conflict that arises 
when these perspectives clash.  
 Standpoint epistemologists have argued that this concept can be extended to marginalized 
knowers more broadly to account for the view that their position of marginalization allows for a 
more robust perspective of the world. This is due to the fact that members of marginalized 
groups are forced to both engage with the world from their position of powerlessness, and to 
anticipate the way in which the dominantly-situated engage with the world. 
                                                
36 This is often referred to as dual vision. To avoid ableist connotations I have instead shifted to dual perception. 
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 Defending this application of double consciousness, Allison Jaggar writes that the 
marginalized perspective “allows them to see not only the lives of the ruling class but also the 
lives and experiences of the oppressed, and their worldview will be shaped by the interests of the 
totality in a given historical period” (Jaggar 1983: 371). Gaile Polhaus similarly argues that “if a 
person’s social position makes her vulnerable to particular others, she must know what will be 
expected, noticed by, and of concern to those in relation to whom she is vulnerable” (Pohlhaus 
2012: 717). 
 As an example, consider this quote from McKinnon:  
…one’s social location as, say, a cisgender black heterosexual woman, as a member of an 
oppressed class, may allow her to “recognize that many of the concepts and procedures 
adopted by [a] discipline are problematic when her colleagues do not, precisely because she 
is able to see the objects of study both with the eyes of a researcher trained in the discipline 
and through her own experience from a marginalized social location”. (McKinnon 2015: 428; 
citing Crasnow 2013: 417) 
As McKinnon’s example illustrates, a cisgender black heterosexual woman will have more 
evidence than her dominantly-situated colleagues because she will evaluate the procedures 
adopted by her discipline from two perspectives - that of a trained researcher and that of a 
marginalized person. Her colleagues, however, are likely to only see things from the perspective 
of trained researchers.  
 Consider, by way of illustration, several recent advertising debacles, most notably, 
clothing store H&Ms decision to feature a black model wearing a sweater that said “Coolest 
Monkey in the Jungle”, and Dove’s soap commercial that showed a black women removing her 
shirt to reveal a white woman. These ads were taken to task for being racist - the former because 
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the term ‘monkey’ was at once a common pejorative used to describe black people, and the latter 
because it implied that black people are dirty and that after using Dove soap they will be clean, 
and therefore white. Because black people are still vulnerable to white people, they are better 
placed to consider how these campaigns would be viewed as attacks on black identity. However, 
because white Americans are not vulnerable to Black Americans in the same way, they are less 
capable of considering how the campaigns might be viewed. 
 This vulnerability is key to the argument from double consciousness. Marginalized 
knowers are vulnerable to dominantly situated knowers, and as such, they have to consider how 
the world (and their actions and beliefs) will be seen from the dominant perspective. The 
converse relationship does not hold. As a result, dominantly situated knowers are not forced to 
‘see’ the world or consider things from the marginalized perspective. This is but one way in 
which marginalized knowers have greater evidence in the social domain than do dominantly 
situated knowers. 
3.2 The Argument from Second Natures 
I also argue that marginalized knowers draw epistemic privilege from their position of 
oppression because this social positioning allows them to develop a capacity to notice and attend 
to what dominantly-situated knowers do not. Call this the argument from second natures. This 
argument is distinct from the preceding one in the following respect. Where double 
consciousness is a capacity one has to interpret or evaluate some piece of information from 
multiple perspectives, a second nature is a persistent mode of engagement one has with the world 
in virtue of some aspect of one’s social identity.  
 The argument from second natures proceeds as follows. As a result of their oppression, 
marginalized knowers are more likely to notice or attend to features of the world that dominantly 
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situated knowers are likely to overlook. This argument is largely inspired by Rebecca Kukla 
(2006), who argues that our experiences of oppression permit us to develop a finely tuned 
perceptual capacity that allows us to ‘see’ reasons that are unavailable to others.  
 Kukla defends this claim by drawing on Aristotle’s work on moral perception. Aristotle 
argued that moral perception is a function of moral education. That is, the better-educated one is 
morally, the better one will be at perceiving moral facts. This capacity to see moral facts is what 
Kukla calls a “contingently inculcated second nature” (Kukla 2006: 83).  
 So what is a ‘second nature’? We might think of a ‘second nature’ as a tendency, or habit, 
one has developed through training or as a result of cumulative experiences to notice certain 
features. These second natures will make a difference to how we see the world, such that two 
people (one with a morally developed second nature and one without) might notice very different 
facts even given the same causal inputs. Consider an example: A morally well-educated person 
might notice that an elderly woman on the subway is searching for a place to sit and offer his 
seat; a person who has not been well-educated morally might notice the elderly woman, but not 
notice that she is in need of a seat and so fail to offer his to her.  
 The idea of a second nature can be extended beyond the moral domain to the social one. In 
the social domain, second natures function as patterns of habituation. I argue that we become 
attuned to patterns that turn up in our experience, such that we come to develop a second nature 
whereby we notice these patterns over time. These patterns of experience modulate our attention, 
shifting our attention away from certain areas and towards others.  
 The pattern of experience of particular interest here is that of oppression and other social 
marginalization. As a result of a history of oppression and marginalization, marginalized 
knowers become habituated to notice facts and distinctions as they relate to oppression. Thus, 
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because marginalized knowers are more likely to experience oppression, they are better 
positioned to have developed a capacity, through habituation, to recognize instances of 
oppression. 
 Consider an example. Ruby is a physically disabled graduate student in philosophy. In her 
department, it is common for graduate students to go out for drinks with the professors after a 
seminar. But, they tend to go to establishments without accessible entrances. Ruby notices that it 
is very often the case that after-work functions and events take place at locales without 
accessible entrances.  
 Worth noting is the fact that these establishments aren’t accessible is information that is 
available (and easily) for anyone who attends the after-seminar events. But those who are not 
disabled are not, as Ruby is, attending to the fact that there aren’t accessible entrances. Further, 
Ruby’s experience, in which she is excluded, from participating in certain events, is an 
experience she has in virtue of some facet of her social identity, namely, her disability. Thus, 
there is an important connection between one’s social identity and the experiences one has (or is 
likely to have) as a result of that social identity.  
 This argument finds support from the literature on embodied perception, which suggests 
that the experiences we have - and the cognitive significance of those experiences - are shaped 
by social identity. Linda Alcoff (1999), for instance, argues that social identity is relevant to 
beliefs not because identity determines judgment, but because “identity can in some instances 
yield access to perceptual facts that themselves may be relevant to the formation of various 
knowledge claims” (Alcoff 1999: 83).  
 Drawing on the account of embodied perception advocated by Merleau-Ponty, Alcoff 
argues that social identity (and the experiences we have in virtue of our social identity) helps to 
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structure our perception. Social identity structures perception in the sense that it directs our 
attention, such that what element of an experience we attend to will depend on facts about our 
social identity. Following Alcoff, I defend this argument by suggesting that social identities are 
correlated with particular experiences of oppression or privilege. Experience is how we construct 
meaning, and consequently, our experiences contribute to our interpretation of an event. As such, 
social identity constitutes the necessary background from which agents know the world. In 
essence, Alcoff argues that perception is an interpretive exercise, and how we interpret a 
particular event will, to some extent, be shaped by our social identity. Furthermore, if different 
social identities confer different experiences, then it follows that people from different social 
identities may interpret the same event differently. Thus, two people may form different beliefs 
about the same event. 
 To illustrate, let’s return to the case of Ruby. Imagine that Ruby complains to her 
department chair that the department’s events are discriminatory because they often fail to 
provide accessibility accommodations. The chair might disagree, simply because, as a non-
disabled person, he does not have the experience of wanting, but being unable, to attend an event 
because of accessibility issues. As such, he may be oblivious to the pattern of events being 
scheduled at locales without accessible entrances.  
 The argument from second natures can easily account for this. I argue that we have 
experiences of oppression or privilege as a result of our social identities. These patterns of 
experience lead to the development of a second nature, whereby we are habituated to notice 
features that conform to those patterns. Thus, for those who experience a pattern of oppression, 
they will notice instances of oppression. Conversely, those who do not experience a pattern of 
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oppression are unlikely to notice oppression. Thus, I claim that social identity will make a 
difference to what features of the world we notice.  
 Importantly, this means that as a result of their experiences of oppression, marginalized 
knowers have a greater body of evidence with respect to the social domain. As Alcoff and Kukla 
argue, our social identity - and the experiences that we have in virtue of our social identity - 
shape our dispositions and habits to notice (or overlook) some parts of the world. Thus, it is 
reasonable to think that social identity places us in a position to form some epistemic judgments 
(and not others). In the social domain, marginalized knowers are well placed to notice and attend 
to those features of the world that contribute to their oppression. Dominantly positioned 
knowers, however, are not similarly well placed. 
3.3 The Argument from Conceptual Resources 
The third argument I offer to suggest that marginalized knowers have a greater body of evidence 
is the argument from conceptual resources. Conceptual resources are the body of resources one 
uses to understand one’s experiences. Note that while Gaile Pohlhaus calls this body of resources 
‘epistemic resources’, I will use the term ‘conceptual resources’ so as to avoid these resources 
being mistakenly identified as epistemic features.37  
 According to this argument, positions of marginalization force those occupying them to 
develop a body of resources with which to understand their experiences. This argument is similar 
to, but distinct from, the argument from second natures. That argument drew our attention to how 
our patterns of experience habituate us to notice certain facts about the world (or obscures certain 
                                                
37 I have argued elsewhere that conceptual resources do not directly count as evidence. As such, conceptual features 
(themselves) do not count as traditionally epistemic features, i.e. features relevant to the acquisition of knowledge. 
However, I will show here that, in some cases, conceptual resources play an epistemically significant role in that 
they can make some bodies of evidence more or less salient, depending on features of the epistemic agent in 
question. 
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facts). The argument from conceptual resources focuses instead on how the concepts we are in 
possession of influence our understanding and interpretation of events.  
 Conceptual resources include the language, concepts and criteria that epistemic agents 
use to interpret events and make sense of the world. Conceptual resources are flexible and admit 
of change. For instance, the concept “transgender” is a fairly new tool developed in order to 
make sense of the experiences of people whose gender does not correspond with their sex 
assigned at birth. Furthermore, we can revise our criteria for the concept of ‘womanhood’ so that 
it includes trans women.  
 Conceptual resources, Pohlhaus suggests, are developed in response to, and in order to 
understand, our social experiences. However, Pohlhaus argues that many conceptual resources 
are created and distributed by dominantly situated knowers. These resources will thus reflect the 
experiences of the dominantly positioned. As such, marginalized knowers will find the existing 
epistemic repertoire ill-suited to understanding or communicating the unique experiences they 
share in virtue of their oppressed social locations.  
 Marginalized knowers can, however, develop new conceptual resources to make sense of 
their experiences of oppression. But, Pohlhaus argues, they will find it difficult to share these 
resources with dominantly situated knowers. This is, in part, because the conceptual resources 
we have will determine what aspects of the world we notice. Because dominantly situated 
knowers do not possess the conceptual resources needed to understand the parts of the world 
experienced by marginalized knowers, they are likely to think that the conceptual resources used 
by marginalized knowers pick out or attend to nothing. As José Medina writes, “Because the 
[socially] privileged (or non-disadvantaged) do not have the experience of being unable to 
properly conceptualize certain things, they have little opportunity to realize (and little motivation 
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to accept) that there is more to see and talk about than what the culturally available 
hermeneutical tools enable people to recognize” (Medina 2013: 73). Precisely for this reason, 
Medina argues, we can think of those who are socially marginalized as having some epistemic 
advantage, because they have  “a more acute attentiveness to hermeneutical gaps (at least in 
some respects, if not in others)” (ibid, italics in original). 
 Consider the concept of ‘misogynoir’, a term coined by queer Black feminist Moya 
Bailey to name the “specific violence of representational imagery depicting Black women” 
(Bailey 2013: 341). Misogynoir examines the particular racialized sexism that Black women 
experience. The ‘angry black woman’ trope, which characterizes black women as “aggressive, ill 
tempered, illogical, overbearing, hostile, and ignorant without provocation” (Ashley 2014: 27), is 
one example of misogynoir. Now consider the following example, modified from Nora 
Berenstain (2016). Imagine that Amina, a Black woman, is expressing frustration to a white male 
acquaintance, Ben, about what happened to her at lunch. She recounts that a white woman 
touched her hair without her permission and commented on its softness. Ben asks Amina why 
she’s so angry about something so insignificant - after all, he suggest, the white woman was 
probably just curious or she wanted to offer a compliment.  
 I argue that Amina has experienced misogynoir, and that she will recognize that Ben’s 
response is an instance of this. The white woman trying to touch her hair is also an instance of 
misogynoir. As Berenstain writes regarding this example, there is a “history of white 
objectification of Black women’s bodies and the racist entitlement that is inherent in a white 
person touching a Black woman without her permission” (Berenstain 2016: 576). But Ben, who 
we can stipulate lacks this concept, will fail to see that his response is both racist and sexist - 
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first, in suggesting that her emotional response is unjustified in this circumstance, and second, in 
dismissing the cultural history that prompts her emotional response. 
 The evidence regarding the misogynoir that Amina experiences is available both to 
Amina and Ben. However, only Amina has the conceptual resource (she can have the concept 
even though she may not have the word) that allows her to recognize this evidence as evidence 
of misogynoir. As such, conceptual resources can make a difference to what evidence a person 
has, and social identity makes a difference to what conceptual resources a person is in possession 
of.   
 This means that marginalized knowers have a greater body of evidence in two respects. 
First, marginalized knowers have a more robust set of conceptual resources, because they have 
both the resources disseminated by dominantly situated knowers, and those resources they have 
developed to understand their experiences of oppression. Dominantly situated knowers, however, 
tend to have only the resources developed by their own social location. Second, because 
marginalized knowers have a more robust set of resources, they are likely to notice features of 
the world that dominantly situated knowers overlook, because they (but not dominant knowers) 
have the resources needed to understand those features.  
3.4 The Argument from Ignorance  
Thus far I have given three arguments to support the claim that marginalized knowers have a 
greater body of evidence with respect to propositions about the social domain. The last argument 
I’d like to offer supports the claim that marginalized knowers are cognitively superior with 
respect to the evidence. This argument largely depends on showing that dominantly situated 
knowers are ‘blocked’, or prevented, from reasoning from the available evidence to the belief 
they are rationally permitted to infer. 
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 The argument I offer here to support this claim draws from work on the epistemology of 
ignorance. As such, let us call this the argument from ignorance. The aim of epistemologies of 
ignorance is to explore ignorance as it is cultivated and maintained by socio-political structures. 
In particular, epistemologists of ignorance argue that ignorance is a structural phenomenon in 
which what we know and, more importantly, fail to know, is rooted in an ignorance of the social 
relations that enable oppression. Philosophers in this tradition argue that ignorance is not merely 
a passive lack of knowledge, but can also be actively maintained by both individual and systemic 
structures.  
 Interestingly, many epistemologists of ignorance argue that active ignorance is the result 
of resistance to evidence. That is, even when epistemic agents have access to correct information 
relevant to the question at hand, they still fail to form true beliefs. Charles Mills, Linda Martin 
Alcoff, and others working in this tradition locate the source of this ignorance in the motivations 
we have (to know or not to know) in virtue of our social identity.  
 Alcoff and Mills each argue that dominantly situated knowers are less capable of 
accessing the truth as it pertains to social matters because they have a vested interest in 
remaining ignorant of those conditions that allow for their dominant social positioning. Alcoff, 
for instance, writes that oppressive societies will often represent forms of inequality as basically 
just and fair. Those in the dominant group will believe the world is basically just and fair because 
their membership in the dominant group secures these benefits for them. That the world seems 
just and fair will thus shape the interpretive practices of those who are dominantly positioned.  
 Alcoff (2007) suggests that in addition to enabling access to certain kinds of knowledge, 
social identities also confer certain motivations. Mills (1997; 2007), for instance, has argued that 
whites have a positive interest in misrepresenting the world in ways that support their dominant 
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position. Similarly, Alcoff suggests that men have this same interest. To paraphrase Mills (1997), 
men (like whites) will have a motivation to ‘see the world wrongly’, and thus will be motivated 
to ignore sexism (and racism) if it is fundamentally at odds with their worldview.  
 Following Amia Srinivasan (ms), I call this phenomenon, in which one’s access to the 
truth is obscured because of the motivations conferred by one’s social identity, “bad ideology”. 
According to Srinivasan, bad ideology, which she defines as “structures of thought and practice 
whose function it is to obscure the truth in order to sustain systems of oppression”, shapes and 
constrains our access to truth. I propose that we think of the relationship between epistemology 
of ignorance and bad ideology in this way – epistemologies of ignorance investigate bad 
ideology and the manner in which bad ideology shapes and constrains our access to truth. 
 Bad ideology can account for dominantly situated knowers reasoning poorly from their 
evidence. To illustrate, Lauren Woomer (2017) explores how white Americans reason badly 
from the evidence available to them regarding the severity of police brutality. She begins by 
noting the overwhelming availability of evidence that indicates that Blacks are treated unequally 
by the cops in comparison to whites (e.g. the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement; 
heightened media attention to the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and 
countless others; reports released by the DOJ on Baltimore and Ferguson, and so on). And yet, 
she notes, many white Americans take police brutality to be an isolated incident. She writes  
The “isolated incident” theory, which often takes the form of asserting that the police officer 
in question is an exception to the norm, is only one of the many alternate explanations given 
by skeptical whites. Other examples include, for instance, the theories that black people 
commit more crimes and so are rightfully targeted by police, that the officers’ fears were 
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justified in such incidents, that these incidents wouldn’t happen if black people had complied 
with police orders, and so forth. (Woomer 2017: 4) 
Woomer’s research supports the analysis that white Americans fail to change their beliefs to 
reflect readily available evidence regarding police brutality.38 Epistemologies of ignorance 
suggest this unwillingness to revise one’s beliefs occurs because it conflicts with the prevailing 
narrative that white Americans would choose to believe - that police are generally trustworthy, 
and that Blacks are predisposed to criminal behavior.  
 There are a number of similar explanations available in the philosophical and 
psychological literature to support this argument. One need only look to the research on 
motivated reasoning and cognition to see that cases abound in which an epistemic agent’s 
motivations shape her interpretation of the evidence and, subsequently, what belief she arrives at 
(Kunda 1990: 5; Molden and Higgins 2005: 297). Consider, for instance, confirmation and 
disconfirmation bias. Confirmation bias involves selectively attending to evidence that confirms 
one’s prior belief (or cutting off the search for further evidence once one’s belief has been 
confirmed), where disconfirmation bias involves holding to higher standards of evaluation any 
evidence that challenges one’s belief.  
 By way of illustration, consider reactions to widely disparate cases of police brutality, 
like Alton Sterling and Philando Castile. White Americans who believe that black people could 
behave differently during police encounters in order to avoid police brutality might appeal to 
Alton Sterling’s case as confirmation for their belief. Given that Alton Serling was in possession 
of a firearm and was arguably resisting arrest, white Americans might think this is a case where 
they can justifiably believe that the incident wouldn’t have happened had Sterling complied with 
police orders. But Philando Castile’s case poses a clear challenge - he complied with the officer’s 
                                                
38 Woomer refers to this phenomenon as agential insensitivity. 
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demands, disclosed that he had a concealed carry permit and a concealed weapon, and was still 
shot by the officer. Philando Castile’s case would seem, then, to be a strong counterexample to 
the claim that blacks need only comply with police orders to avoid violent outcomes. However, 
many white Americans remain unpersuaded by Castile’s case. By raising the standards of 
evaluation for this case - suggesting that we can’t be sure because the camera footage is 
unreliable or inconclusive - white Americans can discredit this case as evidence against their 
belief.  
 Why does this happen? Primarily, because, as Srinivasan argues, we are socially 
determined to see through bad ideology. By this, I take Srinivasan to mean that some epistemic 
agents are more likely to be subject to ‘seeing’ or interpreting the world through bad ideology 
than are others. Dominantly situated knowers are, I suggest, driven by an interest in maintaining 
the status quo (by whites, men, etc.), and this leads to cognitive distortions that obscure one’s 
access to the truth. 
 Marginalized knowers have an inverse interest. As Alcoff writes, “members of oppressed 
groups have fewer reasons to fool themselves about this being the best of all possible worlds, and 
have strong motivations to gain a clear-eyed assessment of their society” (Alcoff 2007: 44). I 
argue that this interest, coupled with their greater access to evidence (as established by the three 
arguments provided above) allows marginalized knowers to gain such an assessment. In the next 
section, I explore how we can apply these arguments to the cases discussed previously to show 





4. Analyzing Our Cases  
Let’s return now to the cases described at the outset of the paper. Recall that I described two 
cases, Unwilling Barista and Homophobic Frat, in which a socially marginalized knower 
reported that an event or statement was offensive in some way. In the former, Elena expressed 
the view that her colleagues waiting for her to brew the coffee was sexist. But her friend, 
Preston, suggested that she was overreacting. In the latter, Damien worried that a statement made 
by one of his fraternity brothers was homophobic. But his fraternity president, Mark, disagreed, 
suggesting that it was merely a harmless expression. 
 I worried that, in positioning themselves as epistemic peers, Preston and Mark cause 
Elena and Damien some epistemic harm - gaslighting in the first case, testimonial injustice in the 
second. But, I suggested, such harms can be avoided if we acknowledge that socially 
marginalized knowers are epistemically privileged in the social domain. To that end, I will first 
show that we can apply the first three arguments discussed above to Unwilling Barista in order to 
establish that Elena has a greater body of evidence than Preston. I will then apply the fourth 
argument to show that, in Homophobic Frat, Damien is better able to reason from the evidence 
than is Mark.  
4.1 Unwilling Barista 
If Elena takes Preston to be an epistemic peer, then she ought to reduce her confidence that her 
colleagues’ behavior is sexist, and increase her confidence that they just don’t know how to use 
the coffee pot. However, I aim to show that with respect to the question of whether her 
colleagues behaved in a sexist manner, Elena is epistemically privileged, and as such, she and 
Preston are not epistemic peers. It follows then that Elena is not required to lower her confidence 
that her colleagues behaved in a sexist fashion.  
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 In Unwilling Barista, I argue that Preston does not have equally strong evidence as does 
Elena, and that this is the case for a number of reasons. First, we can use the argument from 
double consciousness to argue that Elena has more evidence than Preston because she has 
considered the issue from both the male and female perspective. I argue that because Elena is in 
a male-dominated field and so she is vulnerable to the men she works with in certain ways, she 
will have considered how she and other women are viewed from the perspective of her male 
colleagues. Elena has this dual perspective, whereas her male colleagues do not. As a result, she 
realizes that because the coffee is usually brewed by the female office staff, her male colleagues 
didn’t think to brew any. And once it was made, they didn’t think about who made it, or the fact 
that their colleague, who happens to be a woman, might have wanted coffee, too. Elena’s 
colleagues fail to see that she is a woman who is also a philosopher participating in the 
departmental conference. They instead see Elena, as a woman, in relation to their desires and 
choices, rather than as a being with free consciousness (de Beauvoir 1949). Because of her dual 
perspective, Elena knows all of this. She thus knows that that her colleagues behavior is sexist 
because they, as well as Preston, fail to see her in the right light.  
 Alternatively, we might use the argument from second natures to argue that Elena has 
developed a capacity to notice features about departmental interactions that her colleagues may 
fail to notice, and as such she recognizes her colleague’s behavior as one instance of a broader 
phenomenon. Elena is more likely to notice, for instance, that her department generally relies on 
the female staff to brew the daily coffee. I argue that she’ll notice this because she may suspect 
that the way her male colleagues treat the female staff, in particular, is indicative of how they 
think of and treat women, generally. She may have noticed, for instance, that women graduate 
students in her department are more likely to be asked and expected to take care of basic 
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housekeeping tasks. Preston, and other men in the department, may fail to notice this simply 
because as men, the same is not expected of them. As such, he likely fails to see a pattern of 
behavior that Elena has picked up on. 
 Furthermore, Preston’s response to Elena is illuminating in that it reveals his inability to 
think about what his alternative explanation implies. Elena is likely in a position to realize that 
her colleagues’ inability to use the coffee pot is itself a manifestation of sexism. Generally, 
women are expected to accomplish such basic and menial tasks, and so many men typically don’t 
take the time to learn them. 
 One might also appeal to the argument from conceptual resources to argue that Elena has 
a concept that Preston does not. For instance, Elena may by employing the concept of a 
microaggression to interpret the actions of her colleagues. D.W. Sue characterizes 
microaggressions as  
…brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether 
intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, 
and sexual orientation, and religious slights and insults to the target person or group. (Sue 
2010: 5)  
Some examples of microaggressions include but are not limited to: asking an Asian or Latinx 
where they are really from (thereby suggesting that they are not really American); saying to a 
Black person that they are very articulate (suggesting that Black people are not typically well-
spoken); or using a racial or ethnic group in a derogatory manner (for instance, saying “I jewed 
him down!” or “She gyped me!”).  
 Elena may use this concept, and interpret her colleague’s behavior as a microaggression. 
That is, she may view their behavior as an attempt to communicate that she, as a woman, is not 
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really a philosopher or that she does not really belong. Or, she may take their behavior to suggest 
that her proper role in the department is to take of care of tasks typically attended to by women, 
like brewing the daily coffee.  
 Preston is unlikely to have (or is likely to reject) this concept. The concept of a 
microaggression is still fairly new and still fairly controversial. Many associate the development 
of the concept with the rise of “a culture of victimhood”. Articles on this topic have been 
presented in The Atlantic (Friedersdorf 2015; Lukianoff and Haidt 2015), The New York Times 
(Brooks 2014), and it is making its way into academic conversations, as well (Campbell and 
Manning 2018).39  
 Still further, when marginalized knowers try to share their experiences, and their 
interpretation of those experiences as microaggressions, they are often dismissed by their 
dominantly-situated companions. Saba Fatima (2017), for instance, writes that she is often told 
the following when she describes some incident as a microaggression  
The first set of advice…[appears] quite sensible, mostly because it [is] an appeal to 
rationality…I have been told many times that to assume prejudice in cases of 
microaggression is irrational. Many suggest that I need to be more open and objective in 
assessing my experiences. (Fatima 2017: 148). 
As this is meant to illustrate, dominantly situated knowers often intimate that marginalized 
knowers are failing to be rational when they view some incident as a microaggression. What I 
believe is more likely is that dominantly situated knowers are failing to take up this concept. As a 
                                                
39 Interestingly, these are primarily liberal sources. One can only imagine how the subject is portrayed at more 
conservative media outlets. 
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result, dominantly situated knowers fail to recognize and take seriously the occurrence of 
microaggressions.40   
 I conclude that Elena is in a position to know and to notice features of sexism, and that 
she has the conceptual resources to understand these slights when they occur. Preston, however, 
is not similarly well placed to notice these events, and given his dominant social positioning, he 
likely does not recognize the concept of a microaggression. As such, Elena has a greater body of 
evidence to bring to bear on the claim that her colleagues’ behavior is yet another instance of the 
sexism in her department. Given this, Elena is epistemically privileged with respect to this 
question. It follows that she and Preston are not epistemic peers.  
4.2 Homophobic Frat 
Just as in Unwilling Barista, if Damien and his fraternity president, Mark, are epistemic peers, 
then Damien should reduce his confidence that his brother’s remark was homophobic, and 
increase his confidence that it is a harmless turn of phrase. However, I will argue that in this 
case, Mark is reasoning badly, and is failing to adapt his belief to the evidence. As such, I will 
argue that Damien and Mark are not epistemic peers.  
 First, I stipulate that Damien and Mark have an equal body of evidence in this case: they 
know what is meant to communicated, they share conceptual resources. Though this case is 
artificial, I believe the core epistemic features are shared with many real-life examples where 
people share evidence and yet reach different beliefs. As such, we can draw important lessons 
from the case as it is spelled out here.  
 I argue that, because of his position as a dominantly situated knower – that is, because he 
is a heterosexual man – Mark is blocked from reasoning from the available evidence to the 
                                                
40 I believe this is an instance of what Gaile Pohlhaus (2011) calls willful hermeneutical ignorance, a form of 
epistemic oppression in which a dominantly situated knower refuses to use the conceptual resources developed by 
marginalized knowers, thus rendering unintelligible the claims made by marginalized knowers. 
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conclusion that the statement is indeed homophobic. In order to defend this claim, we first need 
to investigate what inference Mark is entitled to, but failing to make. This requires that we do a 
little work to analyze the statement in question. 
 Damien’s fraternity brother claimed that “The dress code is gay”. What is meant by this, 
and how does the statement derive its intended meaning? First, what is meant is that the dress 
code is somehow undesirable or uncool or bad. Further, the statement derives this meaning under 
the assumption that being gay is all of these things – undesirable, uncool, bad. I submit that we 
cannot derive the intended meaning – that rompers are bad – without assuming that being gay is 
also bad. Furthermore, the fraternity brother who made the statement, and Mark, the fraternity 
president, must know this and be drawing on it, because otherwise the statement would have no 
meaning (or it would not communicate the intended meaning). 
 In denying that the statement is homophobic, Damien’s fraternity brother is failing to 
rationally analyze the connection between what is meant (that rompers are undesirable) and how 
what is said derives its meaning (that being gay, like wearing rompers, is undesirable). That is, 
Damien’s fraternity brother and his fraternity president fail to understand the implication of their 
own words. Why does this cognitive failure occur? 
 Ultimately, this is the result of Damien’s fraternity brothers failing to put together the 
premises that lead to the conclusion they aim to arrive at. In other words, they are failing to put 
two and two together. This is partially the result of Damien’s fraternity brothers seeing through 
bad ideology. I argue that as a result of bad ideology, Damien’s fraternity brother’s fail to 
consider under what conditions their statement is made true (that is, that rompers are ‘gay’ if 
being gay is bad). As Srinivasan writes, “differences in social position shape one’s ability to 
access the truth under conditions of systematically deceptive ideology (Srinivasan ms: 18). Thus 
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I suggest that, even though the fraternity brother and Mark must be aware of the way the 
statement derives its meaning in order to use it successfully, they’re blocked from connecting the 
dots between how that statement derives it meaning to the conclusion that the way in which it 
derives its meaning is in fact homophobic.41 
 Just as Mills argued that “white group interest in the racial status quo…needs to be 
recognized as a major factor in encouraging white cognitive distortions of various kinds”, 
heteronormative interest encourages similar cognitive distortions (Mills 2007: 34-35). 
Furthermore, heteronormativity can lead to such cognitive distortions even if it is not consciously 
recognized or endorsed.  
 Even if Damien’s fraternity brothers are not openly (or subconsciously) heteronormative, 
his brothers do not have a positive interest in questioning or dismantling the heteronormative 
patriarchal structure under which that statement derives its meaning. Damien, on the other hand, 
as a gay man who is harmed by heteronormative statements, does have such an interest and so he 
isn’t invested in remaining ignorant of the statement in the way his brothers are. As Sandra 
Harding (1991) writes, “members of oppressed groups have fewer interests in ignorance about 
the social order and fewer reasons to invest in maintaining or justifying the status quo than do 
dominant groups” (Harding 1991: 126). 
 Though Damien and his fraternity brothers share evidence, Damien is able, where his 
brothers fail, to reason from that evidence to the claim that the statement is homophobic. This is 
because he does not have an interest in leaving such statements unexamined. Thus, his judgment 
on these matters is superior because he is not suffering from any cognitive distortions which 
                                                
41 Suppose Damien’s fraternity brothers defend themselves by saying that the statement is an instance of a dead 
metaphor, and as such, it is not in any way meaningful. 
My response is simplistic but true upon reflection. The statement is not a completely dead metaphor for us today in 
the context of use. 
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obscure his access to the truth about the claim being made. As such, Damien is epistemically 
privileged with respect to the question at hand, because he satisfies the second condition set out 
for epistemic privilege. It follows, then, that Damien and his fraternity brothers are not epistemic 
peers.  
Concluding Remarks 
There is a growing body of literature, of which this paper aims to be a part, that explores how our 
epistemic practices contribute to the epistemic oppression of socially marginalized knowers. I 
have argued that treating dominantly situated knowers and marginally situated knowers as 
epistemic peers is one such practice.  
 I expressed the worry that, if marginally situated knowers and dominantly situated 
knowers are treated as epistemic peers with respect to the social domain, then marginalized 
knowers should adjust their beliefs in light of disagreement, and reduce their confidence that 
their belief is the correct one. This leads to a number of epistemic harms, chief among them, 
gaslighting and testimonial injustice.  
 These harms occur because dominantly situated knowers fail to recognize that in the 
social domain, socially marginalized knowers are epistemically privileged - they have a greater 
body of evidence, and are better at reasoning from that evidence, than dominantly situated 
knowers. As such, we should defer to the testimony of marginalized knowers. To paraphrase 
Adam Elga regarding deference to experts, conditional on a marginalized knower having 
probability x in any social-proposition, our probability in that proposition should also be x (Elga 
2007: 479). However, when dominantly situated knowers position themselves as the peers of 
marginalized knowers, they downgrade the credibility that ought to be given to marginalized 
knowers.  
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 In order to avoid such harms, I have used machinery from the peer disagreement 
literature to establish that dominantly situated knowers and marginalized knowers are not in the 
position of peerhood. I suggested that marginalized knowers are epistemically privileged in the 
social domain. I offered four arguments to support this claim: 1) the argument from double 
consciousness, 2) the argument from second natures, 3) the argument from conceptual resources, 
and 4) the argument from ignorance. I showed that these four arguments can be used to establish 
that, in the social domain, marginalized knowers have a greater body of evidence or are better at 
forming the belief to which they are entitled. Consequently, it follows that marginalized knowers 
and dominantly situated knowers are not in the position of peerhood.  
 Acknowledging the relevance of social identity to evaluations of epistemic peerhood, at 
least in the social domain, has a number of important upshots. It allows us to consider in which 
cases we ought defer to the testimony of marginalized knowers, and it further places us in a good 
position to begin to think about who has the authority to speak on certain delicate issues. But 
perhaps most importantly, this conversation allows us to address the harms caused when we fail 
to acknowledge the epistemic privilege of socially marginalized knowers, and to ultimately 









Chapter Five: Conclusion 
In 2016, shortly after the election of Donald Trump, Saturday Night Live revisited its famously 
popular “Black Jeopardy” sketch, this time featuring Tom Hanks as Doug, the sole white 
contestant. Typically, sketches feature the host asking questions about black tropes, culture, and 
stereotypes, much to the confusion and consternation of the lone white player. The sketch 
featuring Tom Hanks was notable because in this particular episode his character, Doug, who 
donned a “Make America Great Again” cap and a folksy accent, hilariously beat the black 
contestants to answer questions like “What can a skinny woman do for you?” Answer: “Not a 
damn thing”, according to Doug. Throughout the sketch, Doug, the black contestants, and the 
black host bond over their shared distrust of the government and their love of curvy women. But 
the spell is broken with the Final Jeopardy question: “Lives That Matter”. While his fellow 
contestants look on skeptically, Doug responds by saying: “I have a lot to say about this”, and 
thus ends the sketch.  
 The answer to this question is meant to be obvious: “Black” - as in “Black Lives Matter”. 
But Doug’s response indicates that he doesn’t find the answer so simple. Why, we might ask, did 
Doug struggle to reach this answer, especially given that he answered the other questions so 
easily?  
 I have argued in this project that cases like this can be understood using the framework of 
standpoint epistemology. Knowledge, I argue, is in many cases sensitive to non-epistemic 
features related to social identity. These features, I suggest, make a difference in what a person is 
in a position to know.  
 Consider Doug, a white man, may have had very little negative interaction with the 
police. Let’s assume that his friend group is also largely white, and they too don’t have many 
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interactions with the police (and that when they do, those experiences aren’t negative). If this is 
the case, all of Doug’s evidence may suggest that the police are caring and helpful, dedicated to 
protecting people from harm, not perpetuating it. And so, when Doug hears reports from black 
Americans about police brutality, he weighs those reports against his evidence and concludes 
that the reports from black Americans must not be credible. I argue that because of his race, and 
the experiences he has as a result of his race, that Doug is not in a position to know about police 
brutality - at least, not in the same way black Americans are in a position to know.  
 The Black Jeopardy sketch in general, and Doug in particular, is interesting because 
Doug is presented as an amalgam of what SNL and the popular media consider Trump supporters 
to be like. In presenting Doug in this way, SNL shed light on the clear harmonies between poor 
whites and blacks that transcend race - they have similar interests, they share economic fears. 
But the threat of police violence is largely invisible to many white Americans. As a result, many 
fail to understand why Colin Kaepernick kneels during the national anthem or why the slogan 
“Black Lives Matter” is significant to the black community. In dismissing these acts, or in re- 
appropriating them (for instance, by saying “Blue Lives Matter” or “All Lives Matter”), white 
Americans oppress black Americans, in a specifically epistemic way, by failing to take seriously 
the social oppression they are reporting and protesting. 
 In failing to acknowledge the relevance of social identity to knowledge, we too contribute 
to this oppression. As I have indicated in chapter two, traditional epistemology, characterized as 
a commitment to intellectualism, comes at a cost. It renders unintelligible epistemic oppression, 
and still more worryingly, may itself be an epistemically oppressive epistemological system.  
 I have argued that standpoint epistemology better empowers us to understand, address, 
and mitigate occurrences of epistemic oppression. In recognizing that knowledge may be 
 130 
sensitive to social identity, we come to appreciate that there are facts about the social world that 
we may not know, but that others know all too well. And in acknowledging that some epistemic 
agents know things that we cannot, or do not, yet know, we recognize that our personal position 

























Abramson, Kate. (2014). “Turning Up the Lights on Gaslighting”. Philosophical Perspectives, 
28(1), 1-30. 
Alcoff, Linda Martín. (1999). “On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?”. 
Philosophic Exchange, 29(1), 72-93.  
Alcoff, Linda Martín. (2007). “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types”. In Shannon Sullivan 
 and Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. 39–58. State University 
 of New York Press.  
Anderson, Elizabeth. (1995). “Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense”. 
Hypatia, 10(3), 50–84.	
Anderson, Elizabeth. (2017). “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science”. In Edward N 
Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Retrieved from 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/. 
Ashley, Wendy. (2014). “The Angry Black Woman: The Impact of Pejorative Stereotypes on 
Psychotherapy with Black Women”. Social Work in Public Health, 29(1), 27–34. 
Baber, Harriet. (1994). “The Market for Feminist Epistemology”. Monist, 77(4), 403–423.  
Bailey, Moya. (2013). “New Terms of Resistance: A Response to Zenzele Isoke”. Souls, 15(4), 
341–343.	
Barthes, Roland. (1972/1957). Mythologies. Annette Lavers (trans.), Noonday Press. (All page 
refernces are to the 1972 edition).  
Bar-On, Bat Ami. (1993). “Marginality and Epistemic Privilege”. In Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth 
Potter (eds.), Feminist Epistemologies, 83–100. Routledge. 
Beauvoir, Simone de. (1989/1939). The Second Sex. H. M. Parshley (trans.), New York: Vintage 
 132 
 Books. (All page references are to the 1989 edition.). 
Berenstain, Nora. (2016). “Epistemic Exploitation”. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of 
Philosophy, 3(22), 569-590. 
Bloom, Paul. (2016). Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion. Harper Collins 
Publishers. 
Boghossian, Paul. (2014). Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford 
University Press. 
Brooks, Arthur C. (2014, Dec. 26). “The Real Victims of Victimhood”. Retrieved from 
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/opinion/sunday/the-real-victims-of-victimhood.html. 
Brownmiller, Susan. (1990). In Our Time: A Memoir of Revolution. Dial Press.  
Campbell, Bradley, and Jason Manning. (2018). The Rise of Victimhood Culture. Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
Cappelen, Herman, and Josh Dever. (2015). Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical 
Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford University Press. 
Christensen, David. (2007). “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”. Philosophical 
Review, 116(2), 187–217. 
Code, Lorraine. (1995). Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations. Routledge. 
Collins, Patricia Hill. (1986). “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance 
of Black Feminist Thought”. Social Problems, 33(6), 14–32. 
Crasnow, Sharon. (2013). “Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity”. Philosophy 
Compass, 8(4), 413-423.  
Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. (1994). “The Marginalization of Sexual Violence against Black 
Women”. NCASA Journal, 2(1), 1–15.  
 133 
Daston, Lorraine. (1992). “Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective”. Social Studies of 
Science, 22(4), 597–618.  
DeRose, Keith. (1992).  “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions”. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 52(4), 913–929.  
DeRose, Keith. (2002). “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context”. The Philosophical Review, 11(2), 
167-203. 
DeRose, Keith. (2009). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, 
Volume 1. Oxford University Press.  
Dotson, Kristie. (2012). “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression”. Frontiers: A 
Journal of Women Studies, 33(1), 24–47. 	
Dotson, Kristie. (2014). “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Social Epistemology, 28(2), 
115–138. 
Du Bois, W.E.B. (1903). The Souls of Black Folk, A.C. McClurg and Company. 	
El-Alayli, Amani, Ashley A. Hansen-Brown, and Michelle Ceynar. (2018). “Dancing Backwards 
 in High Heels: Female Professors Experience More Work Demands and Special Favor 
 Requests, Particularly from Academically Entitled Students”. Sex Roles, 1–15. 
Elga, Adam. (2007). “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs, 41(3), 478–502. 
Enoch, David. (2010). “Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (But Not Too 
Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement”. Mind, 119(476), 953–97. 
Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford 
University Press. 
Fatima, Saba. (2017). “On the Edge of Knowing: Microaggression and Epistemic Uncertainty as 
a Woman of Color”. In Kirsti Cole and Holly Hassel (eds.), Surviving Sexism in 
 134 
Academia: Strategies for Feminist Leadership, 147–157. Routledge. 
Feigl, Herbert. (1953). “The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and Humanism”. In H. Feigl and M. 
 Brodbeck (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science: Naturalism and Humanism, 8–
 18. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.  
Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee. (1985). “Evidentialism”. Philosophical Studies, 48(1), 15–
34. 
Fricker, Miranda. (1999). “Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege”. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 29(sup1), 191–210. 
Fricker, Miranda. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford 
University Press.	
Friedersdorf, Conor. (2015, Sept. 11). “The Rise of Victimhood Culture”. The Atlantic, 
Retrieved from www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-rise-of-victimhood-
culture/404794/. 
Frye, Marilyn. (1983). The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Crossing Press.	
Gettier, Edmund L. (1963). “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”. Analysis, 23(6), 121–123. 
Goldman, Alvin I. (1979). “What Is Justified Belief?”. In George Pappas (ed), Justification and 
Knowledge, 1-23. Reidel Publishing Company. 
Goldman, Alvin I. (2010). “Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement”. In R. Feldman 
and T. Warfield (eds), Disagreement, 187–215. Oxford University Press. 
Grasswick, Heidi E. (2004). “Individuals-in-Communities: The Search for a Feminist Model of 
Epistemic Subjects.” 19(3), 85–120.	
Guarino, Cassandra M., and Victor M. H. Borden. (2017). “Faculty Service Loads and Gender: 
Are Women Taking Care of the Academic Family?” Research in Higher Education, 
 135 
58(6), 672–694.	
Haack, Susan. (1993). “Epistemological Reflections of an Old Feminist.” Reason Papers, 18, 
31–43.	
Haraway, Donna. (1991). “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Knowledge”. Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, 183–202. Routledge.	
Harding, Sandra. (1990). “Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critique”. In Linda 
Nicholson (ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism, 83-106.  Routledge.	
Harding, Sandra. (1991). Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives. 
Open University Press.	
Hartsock, Nancy (1983). “‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically 
Feminist Historical Materialism”. In Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, (eds.), 
Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, 
and Philosophy of Science, 283–310. Reidel Publishing Company. 
Haslanger, Sally. (2008). “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason 
(Alone)”. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 23(2), 210–223.	
Hawthorne, John. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.  
Hempel, Carl G. (1952). Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. University 
of Chicago Press. 
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. (1985). The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. 
University of California Press.	
Hochschild, Arlie Russell, and Anne Machung. (1989). The Second Shift: Working Families and 
the Revolution at Home. Penguin. 
 136 
Jaggar, Alison M. (1983). Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Janack, Marianne. (1997). “Standpoint Epistemology Without the “Standpoint”?: An 
Examination of Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Authority”. Hypatia, 12(2), 125-139.  
Jones, Karen. (2002). “The Politics of Credibility.” In Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt 
(eds.), A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, 154–176. 
Westview Press.  
Kelly, Thomas. (2005). “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”. In John Hawthorne and 
Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1, 167-196. Oxford 
University Press. 
Kelly, Thomas. (2010). “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”. In Alvin I. Goldman 
and Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, 183–220. Oxford 
University Press.  
Kelly, Thomas. (2014). “Evidence Can Be Permissive”. In Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa 
(eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 298–311. Wiley Blackwell. 
Kelly, Thomas. (2016). “Evidence.” In Edward N Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Retrieved from plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/.  
Krishnamurthy, Meena. (ms). “White Blindness”.	
Kukla, Rebecca. (2006). “Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge”. Episteme: A 
Journal of Social Epistemology, 3(1), 80–95.	
Kunda, Ziva. (1990). “The Case for Motivated Reasoning”. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480–
498.  
Lackey, Jennifer. (2010). “A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance.” In 
Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, 298–325. Oxford 
 137 
University Press. 
Leer, Harper. (1960). To Kill a Mockingbird. J. B. Lippincott & Co. 
Licon, Jimmy Alfonso. (2013). “On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-
Weight View”. Philosophia, 41(3), 809–823. 
Linker, Maureen. (2014). “Epistemic Privilege and Expertise in the Context of Meta-Debate.” 
Argumentation, 28(1), 67–84. 
Lukács, Georg. (1971/1923). History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. 
Rodney Livingstone (trans.), Merlin Press. (All page references are to the 1971 edition.).	
Lukianoff, Greg, and Jonathan Haidt. (2015, Sept.) “The Coddling of the American Mind”. The 
Atlantic, Retrieved from www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-
of-the-american-mind/399356/. 
MacFarlane, John. (2011). “Relativism and Knowledge Attributions”. In Sven Bernecker and 
Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 536–
544. Routledge. 
MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1991). Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University 
Press.	
Manne, Kate. (2018). Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Oxford University Press. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. (2001/1932). “From Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844.” In Vincent B. Leitch (eds.), The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 
764–767. (All page references are to the 2001 edition).  
Marx, Karl. (1976/1867). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Ben Fowkes (trans.), 
Penguin. (All page references are to the 1976 edition.). 
McKinnon, Rachel. (2015). “Trans*Formative Experiences”. Res Philosophica, 92(2), 419–440. 
 138 
McKinnon, Rachel. (2017). “Allies Behaving Badly: Gaslighting as Epistemic Injustice”. Gaile 
Pohlhaus Jr., Ian James Kidd, and José Medina (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Epistemic 
Injustice, 167-174. Routledge. 
Medina, José. (2013). The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations, Oxford University Press. 
Mills, Charles W. (1997). The Racial Contract. Cornell University Press.  
Mills, Charles. (2007). “White Ignorance.” In Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race 
and Epistemologies of Ignorance, 11–38. State University of New York Press. 
Molden, D. C. and E.T. Higgins. (2005).  “Motivated Thinking”. In K.J. Holyoak and R.G. 
Morrison (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, 295–317. Cambridge 
University Press.  
Müller, Mirjam. (2018). “Emotional Labour: A Case of Gender-Specific Exploitation”. Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 1–22.	
Nagel, Thomas. (1989). The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press.	
Neta, Ram. (2007). “In Defense of Epistemic Relativism”. Episteme, 4(1), 30–48.  
Ninan, Dilip. (2010). “De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication”. Philosophy Compass, 
5(7), 551–567.  
Paul, L. A. (2016). “First Personal Modes of Presentation and the Structure of 
Empathy”. Inquiry, 60(3), 189–207.  
Pinnick, Cassandra. (1994). “Feminist Epistemology: Implications for Philosophy of Science”. 
Philosophy of Science, 61, 646–57.  
Pinnick, Cassandra.  (2005). “The Failed Feminist Challenge to ‘Fundamental epistemology’”. 
Science & Education, 14, 103–116. 
 139 
Pitts-Taylor, Victoria. (2013). “I Feel Your Pain: Embodied Knowledges and Situated 
Neurons”. Hypatia, 28(4), 852–869. 
Plato.(1980). Meno. G.M.A. Grube (trans.), Hackett. 
Plato. (1992). Theaetetus. Bernard Williams (trans.), Hackett. 
Pohlhaus, Gaile. (2011). “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory Of 
Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance”. Hypatia, 27(4), 715–735. 
Pratto, Felicia, James Sidanius, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Bertram F. Malle. (1994). 
  “Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political 
Attitudes”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 741–763. 
Prinz, Jesse. (2011). “Against Empathy”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49, 214–233.  
Railton, Peter. (1991). “Marx and the Objectivity of Science.” In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, 
and J.D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science, 763–773. MIT Press. 
Railton, Peter. (1994). “Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief.” Philosophical Issues, 5, 
71–93.	
Railton, Peter. (2006). “Normative Guidance”. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, 3–34.	
Ramakrishnan, Aditi, Dana Sambuco and Reshma Jagsi. (2014). “Women's Participation in the 
Medical Profession: Insights from Experiences in Japan, Scandinavia, Russia, and 
Eastern Europe”. Journal of Women's Health, 23(11), 927–934. 
Roberson, Debi, Jules Davidoff, Ian R.L. Davies, and Laura R. Shapiro. (2006). “Colour 
Categories and Category Acquisition in Himba and English”. In Nicola Pitchford and C. 
P. Biggam (eds.), Progress in Colour Studies, 159–172. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Rolin, Kristina. (2006). “The Bias Paradox in Feminist Epistemology”. Episteme: A Journal of 
 140 
Social Epistemology, 3(1-2). 125-135 
Rubin, Gayle. (1975). “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex”. In 
Rayna Reiter (ed.), Toward an Anthropology of Women, 157–210. Monthly Review 
Press. 
Rubin, Gayle. (1984). “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality”. In 
Carole S. Vance (ed.), Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, 267–319. 
Routledge.  
Ruth, Sheila. (1973). “A Serious Look at Consciousness-Raising”. Social Theory and Practice, 
2(3), 289–300.	
Ryan, Rebecca M. (1995). “The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption”. 
Law & Social Inquiry, 20(4), 941–1001.	
Scheman, Naomi. (1995). “Symposium: Feminist Epistemology”. Metaphilosophy, 26(3), 177–
190.  
Schoenfield, Miriam. (2013). “Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It 
Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief ”. Noûs, 48(2),. 193–218.  
Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. (1999). Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social 
Hierarchy and Oppression. Cambridge University Press.	
Smith, Dorothy E. (1974). “Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology”. 
Sociological Inquiry, 44(1), 7–13.	
Spaapen, J., and L. Van Drooge. (2011). “Introducing 'Productive Interactions' in Social Impact 
Assessment”. Research Evaluation, 20(3), 211–218.	
Srinivasan, Amia. (ms). “Radical Externalism.”  
Stanley, Jason. (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.  
 141 
Stroud, Sarah. (2006). “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.” Ethics, 116(3), 498–524. 
Sue, Derald Wing. (2010). Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender, and Sexual 
Orientation. Wiley.	
Tuana, Nancy. (2004). “Coming to Understand: Orgasm and the Epistemology of Ignorance”. 
Hypatia, 19(1), 194–232. 
Tuana, Nancy. (2006). “The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women's Health Movement and 
Epistemologies of Ignorance”. Hypatia, 21(3), 1–19. 
Valian, Virginia. (1999). “Schemas That Explain Behavior.” Why So Slow?: The Advancement of 
Women, 103–124. MIT Press. 
Vasanthakumar, Ashwini. (2016). “Epistemic Privilege and Victims’ Duties to Resist their 
Oppression”. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 1-16.  
Velleman, J. David. (2015). “On the Aim of Belief”. The Possibility of Practical Reason, 
Michigan Publishing.	
Walker, Alice. (1983). In Search of Our Mothers' Gardens: Womanist Prose. Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich.	
Walzer, Susan. (1996). “Thinking About the Baby: Gender and Divisions of Infant Care”. Social 
Problems, 43(2). 219–234.	
Williams, Patricia J. (1991). The Alchemy of Race and Rights. Harvard University Press. 
Woomer, Lauren. (2017). “Agential Insensitivity and Socially Supported Ignorance.” Episteme, 
1–19. 
Wylie, Alison. (2003). “Why Standpoint Matters”. In Robert Figueroa and Sandra G. Harding 
(eds.). Science and Other Cultures: Diversity in the Philosophy of Science and 
Technology, 26–48. Routledge.	
